u/______ri

In posing this question, I would firstly reject that time is a dimension, and also reject that dimensionality is simply "independent measures".

The fact that time can be measured by numbers does not tell that time is a dimension at all, for indeed anything at all can be marked with ordinals (should we then say that it is thus a dimension?). Thus there is no such thing as "n dimensional" time, there is only "one sense" of time, and that is - intuitively put - "there being more".

While dimensionality (extensionality) itself is not also reducible to numbers - degrees of freedom is not extensionality. Nor should plain cardinality, ordinality or relationality explain extensionality at all - relations are not "extended".

It seems like both space and time are irreducible, but this is only what seems so, for it would be quite arbitrary that the world "just is" this dual. And also, the immanent issue is that it seems like time cannot explain extensionality or vice versa.

The question is thus are they irreducible and if not then are they reducible to monism or pluralism?

In not having answered whether this life is worth living, i keep living.

But i ask "why should i concern whether my life is worth living now [not later]?", for i've assumed that my life is finite; for not being in the answering would not order my living to answer at all; thus, it means that the delay when i do otherwise doesn't gain anything in answering - there is no point to delay being in the answering.

But then, living forever would be different, whether i delay it or not would not matter at all. And as my life is infinite, the question suddenly shift, it's no longer about whether i see that my life is worth living or not, but whether in this infinite life i can see (experience) anything that is worth it.

So the question now is worldly, it asks about the world, whether it is worthy of being the world at all. This answer exposes the finite case, for if the infinite life is worth it only when it has something worthy, why should the finite life be worthy at all if it doesn't have anything worthy?

So the question for the finite life is thus "whether i can see anything worthy in this finite life?", which fundamentally boils down to "what is the worthy?"; not "whether the worthy is?" (for this privilege of the infinite life is that it only needs to answer this) - simply put "whether this life can have the worthy?" - so we should order our life in seeking the worthy.

There is only one reason some reject that at all, and it is twofold: the first is that one has assumed this life is worth it, say, so much that "answering alone" is not worth it; the second is that one has secretely deemed that this 'finite' life is worth it, for if it is worthless per se there is no point staying; for if it is worthless without the worthy, the only use of it is for the worthy.

Another line that has not been asked is that whether a finite life is worth it at all compare to the infinite life, in the sense that only the infinite life always have more to see and the "more to see" is the only "worth" (which is a judgement about the world itself (not a finite world and we live forever in it, but a world without horizon)) - that is, there is no finite 'that which to see' that can save any life.

"Why this rather than that?" is after "why this is not that?" but the latter is nonsensical if it speaks of two as if they were one - but if they were not one, we do not ask "why this rather than that?"

When nothing else answers "why something is not nothing at all?", nothing else answers "why something rather than nothing?" but something.

The question thus asks for a new adequate idea of something, such that it itself is obvious.

In terms of premises:

p1: "why this rather than that?" presupposes "why this is not that?"

p2: "why this is not that?" is nonsensical (or at least presumptuous) if it speaks of two as if they were one - that is, if this question is asked at all then you have presupposed that they are from a prior unity or that they were one or that they "share only one slot".

p3: that "something is not nothing at all" is obvious and is not because of something else, nor do they share one slot.

from p3 p2 p1: "why something rather than nothing?" cannot be answered by anything else but the something in question.

We thus ask the question at all because our idea of something is not adequate. If it is indeed adequate then we should see that it is obvious.

That each of the two spheres is a sphere does not explain why two spheres are two, is obvious. Nor should that each of the two positions is a position do.

So we should not say that being spherical exhausts "them", even though each is just a sphere.

Roughly speaking, there is no one thing that explains two things. They are two because of "them [two]".

"Being this one" is not a property. We say "this one then bears properties", for "this one" does not bear an additional "being this one" in being this one, else "which one is bearing being this one?" is the question.

A novelty in itself,

That is not from anyone else,

That is not simply there, else it is not a novelty at all.

So it is a pure gain in itself.

A gain that gains only itself.

Where what is gained is itself, the gaining itself.

But when does this gain gain?

Only when it does.

But it gains only itself, so what is gained is the when it does - else it would mean that it gains itself and additionally that when.

So it is nothing but the when it is itself.

It is a pure when in itself.

So this is the adequate idea for that which is only itself - a simple.

A simple so itself so this that it is a when.

Once a simple is, should it then cease?

Obviously not, for it is only itself.

So subsistence is corollary.

> all wholes are unity. all multiplicity is a unity, because in saying 'all' we refer to a whole and predicate multiplicity as its mereological extension. viz participation unity subsumes multiplicity

Let us agree that we do see multiple beings as one, but not always as we do see them as genuinely plural also, for formally we[x y] (genuinely plural) is not the same as we[z[x y]] - notice in each case the inner x y as plural is not eliminated.

But seeing multiple beings as one does not mean that there is a whole that those beings are predicate of. What we have seen is simply, as formally express, a z[x y] itself where x y are our beings (the multiple beings in question).

The question then is never "is there wholes and then so what", but whether "wholes" means anything at all. For we have not seen "wholes", we have seen only z[x y ...] where z is the one in question - which is then called a "whole" that is predicated by x y by the monist.

The point is that in z[x y], z is being seen wrongly as a "whole" where it is just another being that z[x y] involves "primarily", and involves x y "secondarily".

For the model against mereology and against wholes is as the following:

Suppose there is x y z that are not identical at all and each does not have anything to do with each other in being itself.

There is then complexes from them, these are not configurations or wholes from them, but additional or derivative ones from them, which are:

> x[y] y[x] x[z] z[x] y[z] z[y]

> x[y z] y[x z] z[x y]

They are not identical to each other and are not identical to x y z themselves.

So there is no need for a whole, for this complex z[x y] is what we see when we see mutiple beings x y "as" one (z).

And further, if we account also what is from outself: we[z[x y]] - this is the being "we see thus" itself.

Just think about it, Being that is just there and that's all. That's it, Being is just there and nothing else.

It's not even about why it is just there as if it is just there is already coherent. I'm saying that "Being that is just there" is simply cannot be properly conceived at all. Because if there is only Being then "Being that is just there" means the same as "Being that is only itself" which says nothing at all so that it is just there.

Roughly put, what is "the Being that is just there"? But a stipulated "Being just there" reified?

The point here is that "the Being that is just there" is not anyone that can give itself back when it is removed. The content and nature of it seems to not give anything at all.

Bluntly put, if it is just there, it seems like it "happens" that it is just there. If we then remove it, it is gone forever.

Even if what is said is that it is necessarily there, would this then mean that when we remove it, it pops back? If not then this necessity means nothing but "Being is itself".

Suppose we don't remove Being, suppose that there is nothing at all. How then can there be Being if it is so "necessary"?

If there is then still nothing then it is not so necessary after all.

Now, if there is then still Being, then this Being cannot be said to be "just there", so "just there" is not stronger than this conception of Being.

Being is necessary just means there is Being no matter what. So nothing at all then being just pops up is the stronger notion.

I mean, what "Being is just there" even reply to? It reply to "nothing at all". So "Being is just there" is only intelligible when "nothing at all" is intelligible.

By naturalistic I mean it's not like Lojban or some other languages where it forces a semantic constraint in order to get a grammatical property.

One example sentence would be:

> cats cook rats that cook cheeses that are laughing in kitchens

[cats cook [rats that cook [cheeses that are]] laughing in kitchens]

[cats cook [rats that cook [cheeses that are] laughing] in kitchens]

[Main]

That there is complexes is obvious. That there is those that are simpler, that complexes are [not without], is obvious. Thus that there is simples is obvious.

That there is only a complex is obviously incoherent (for example, that that there is only an apple is obviously incoherent, as it is a complex). By extension, so thus that there is only complexes. Thus that only simples are to have authority at all is obvious (only they answer the why), for we see that an apple does not explain why there is it at all.

Where there is only a simple, there is no more. Thus that there is only a simple is obviously incoherent. When there is to be more, there is more than only one simple.

What is to be rejected: the only - there is only simples, and there is only a simple that gives all complexes. We are to reduce these into "that there is only a complex".

That x gives y as a pure gain (y is a pure gain) is obviously incoherent, as x by itself is not to give others at all. As when we think it is to give, we have thought that there is the where there is only x itself and the where there is x itself and y as given, thus these have swapped (swapping regress). While when we thought that there is no swapping, there is only the where there is x itself and y itself - the finality (the closure, the all at once), which is only a static complex. The only is thus a complex; there is only those simples and there is only a complex thus are synonymous.

Thus at final analysis we see, without qualifications or quantifications, that there is simples, that there is complexes, that when there is simples there is also complexes; are obvious.

[Swapping regress]

Where there is two simples x and y, x is at x, y is at y. We then think there is change at all; x and y swap, but this means that there is xy and yx and then they swap, but this then means there is [xy][yx] and [yx][xy] and then they swap, so on. We then think that these are all at once; they close (exhaust) instantly, but then there is no swapping, as there is only thus closure - where is the swapping at all?

Without this sort of swapping as thought and found unintelligible, change at all is a senseless fiction - as the other thought to change, that x decices to simply then becomes y, and sudden y knows to reponse and then becomes x without anyone they are not without is simply unintelligible, as without the higher unity for each to know the other, x are not to become y at all in the first place, while if there is a higher unity, x at where the unity is before x becomes y is not x at where the unity is after x becomes y, thus there is again the swapping regress. Changing or swapping at all are not without knowing where to swap, thus is not without a higher unity, but as there is a higher unity at all, there is then only one clousure (the unity thus), thus there is no change at all.

But we see and wait for those in questions, thus change (the senseless fiction that we have thought that they are) are to be rejected, so as any stasis.

[Questions and answers]

> [1] What exactly is a "simple"?

> Is it an indivisible entity? A logically prior property? A causal primitive? If simples are merely limits of analysis (like points in geometry), their "authority" may be epistemic rather than ontological. Clarifying this determines whether you’re defending entity-based or structure-based fundamentality.

If it is said to be an entity or a structure at all then it is not a simple, as a simple is only itself and by only itself (it is not of a type).

> [2] The Higher Unity & Regress Avoidance:

> You note that change requires a higher unity to coordinate swaps, but then ask where the swapping occurs if unity is already present. If the unity itself is complex, doesn’t it trigger its own regress? A potential resolution: treat the unity as logically prior rather than temporally or causally prior (akin to coherentist grounding).

The critique is without qualifications, so shifting it to logical complexes won't help.

> [3] Why Reject Both Stasis & Change?

> You call change a "senseless fiction" and stasis equally suspect, yet affirm that complexes exist alongside simples. Does this imply reality is neither static nor dynamic, but structurally co-present? If so, explicitly naming the positive ontology (e.g., atemporal network, logical closure, modal manifold) would strengthen the conclusion.

Stasis is rejected because we see and wait, change is rejected as shown.

> [4] Authority of Simples vs. Relational Priority:

> Structuralists argue that relations or patterns can be fundamental without simples. Does your argument rule out relational fundamentality, or merely show that relational claims always implicitly reference simplicia as nodes? A brief engagement with this view would fortify the claim about explanatory authority.

Structuralists appeal to a complex.

Until we see the world itself, we ought to trust that it is the most worthy, that all senses of worthiness we are curently having are worthless fictions to it. Our faith is so blind that the word the world should not have meaning, for any meaning we can give now is simply not it.

Have not is not cannot, we are not defeatist, we know that we have not seen it, and we know no lies, that it is worthy beyond all lies is obvious is the authority of the placeholder the world alone.

That we know it when we see it is obvious, this fact and that fact mean the same. Those lies of those who have not seen it have no authority - when they've named them while we've not had the arogance (authority) to say all else are worthless fictions, those are simply no world at all.

What gives us the authority to say at all? For the world is worth it is all we know, and we borrow this authority for our fictions.

Why are your words not worthless fictions? Because you think they answer the world.

Hãy rũ hết chúng xuống, những giáo điều (dogmas) về tiếng Anh, và dám lòng đọc bài này.

Ngữ nghĩa phản ảnh trực tiếp thế giới, nên ắt có trật tự chuẩn, mọi sai lệch khỏi cái này gọi là ngữ pháp.

[Không]

Mọi ví dụ tiếng Anh trong đây sẽ được dịch sát hoàn toàn qua tiếng Nam theo nghĩa.

Động từ (verbs) là phạm trù ngữ pháp (grammar) chứ không phải ngữ nghĩa (semantics) (phân biệt rõ grammar, semantics, và thống kê (statistics) có trong Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957)).

Các biến vị (inflections) động từ tiếng Anh có mấy cái là thuộc grammar, mấy cái thuộc semantics:

Mấy cái thuộc grammar:

[1] Infinite (base): có nghĩa chưa có gắn với từ nào hoặc gắn với một số từ đặc biệt.

[2] Finite: có nghĩa đã gắn với từ (có cách ghi ngoại lệ).

Mấy cái thuộc semantics:

[2] Ing (present participle): có nghĩa "đang".

[3] Ed (past participle): có nghĩa "bị" hoặc "được".

[4] Quá khứ: khi nói về cái ở quá khứ.

[5] Hoàn thành: có nghĩa "rồi".

Một số cái thuộc ngữ pháp viết có giống nhau nhưng nghĩa hoàn toàn khác nên chúng là khác (phân biệt hình và nghĩa).

Ràng buộc grammar: trừ một số cái ngầm có nghĩa grammar sẵn, luôn phải có nghĩa grammar trong một đề (clause) [6].

Cụm (phrase) khác clause ở chỗ clauses có phrases mà phrases chỉ có từ thôi, từ ghép lớn hơn từ đơn, phrase lớn hơn từ ghép, clause lớn hơn phrase, câu (sentence) lớn hơn clause.

[Một]

Trước hết phải hiểu ràng buộc grammar [6] và cách nó đi với [1][2].

Đối với tiếng Nam, không có ràng buộc grammar kiểu như vầy, ràng buộc grammar của tiếng Nam là đa phần chỉ là phải phản ánh thứ tự (order) của chính cái semantics [thứ mà chính nó lại phản ánh chính cái được nói tới] trừ một số từ nhất định đi ngược lại semantics order cho tiện phân câu tại vì tiếng Nam không có ghi lại chính cấu trúc semantics.

Ví dụ: "nó", "nó đi", "nó đang đi", "nó đi nhanh", "nó bị ai đánh". Trừ: "nó đi rất nhanh" so với "nó đi nhanh lắm", chỉ có cách nói sau mới phản ánh đúng semantics order.

Trong các ví dụ đó, mình đọc là mình biết cái khúc nào chính khúc nào phụ (cũng có thể gọi là chủ vị) (ví dụ trong chúng thì "nó" là chính còn mấy cái còn lại là phụ), cấu trúc chính phụ này có thể lồng nhau rất phức tạp nhưng mà vì mình đã nói quen rồi nên tự hiểu và không để ý (ví dụ "cái thằng mập mà đã ăn no đang đánh cái thằng mập chưa ăn gì").

Ràng buộc [6] và [2][1] ghi lại sự chính phụ này. Nhưng ở tiếng Anh hiện đại thì nó chỉ biểu trưng rõ nhất ở từ "be" và khi tại danh từ đơn (danh từ là phạm trù grammar), ví dụ:

Nó làm - it does (it do*)

Nó làm cái đó - it does that (it do* that)

Nó có làm cái đó - it does do that (it do* do that)

Trong tiếng Anh chỉ có verbs là phạm trù ngữ pháp MÀ có inflections, và chỉ inflections mới ghi mấy ràng buộc grammar (trừ một số cái không ghi) [7], nên trong mấy ví dụ trên, verb "do" là cái có inflection [2] từ dạng không có inflection [1] để mà đánh dấu phần phụ.

Việc đánh dấu này chỉ xảy ra ở từng clause.

Một số cái không đánh dấu như danh từ không đơn, verbs yếu (gồm modal verbs), từ nối, vân vân, ví dụ:

Nó sẽ làm - it will do (it will* do)

Nó làm được - it can do (it can* do)

Chúng làm - they do (they do*)

Ràng buộc không phải là sau một số từ yếu thì động từ không có inflection mà lại tại mấy từ yếu đó thì chúng không bị inflected cộng với chuyện inflection chỉ xảy ra ở từng clause - cho nên cách hiểu cũ (kiểu công thức) là sai.

*Vậy còn đối với mấy từ mà không thể bị inflected và cũng không phải là động từ, lẫn mấy verbs đã bị inflected trường hợp (case) khác thì sao?

Thì tiếng Anh dùng động từ "be" để chêm vô để có nghĩa ngữ pháp (nhớ lại [7]), và từ "be" ở các cách xài này hoàn toàn chỉ để có nghĩa ngữ pháp, ví dụ [toàn bộ]:

Nó tốt - it is-good (it good*)

Nó đang làm - it is-doing (it doing*)

Nó bị làm - it is-done (it done*)

Nó đang bị làm - it is-being-done (it being* done)

Nó đang tốt - it is-being-good (it being* good)

Mấy câu mà có nghĩa nói ra "cái nó là" (what it is) (mấy câu disclosure) thì hoàn toàn không phải cách dùng này nhé, ví dụ:

Nó là con chó - it is a dog (it be* a dog)

Nó là cái cục hôm qua - it is that one yesteday (it be* that one yesterday)

Như vậy thì từ "be" một mình nó có quá nhiều cách dùng không hề liên quan, nhưng hoàn toàn có thể phân biệt được nhờ vào nghĩa là trước hết và ngữ pháp là sau.

Hết bài thứ nhất.

> whether rejections at all are authoritive simpliciter?

needless to say, rejections are not authoritive simpliciter, thus

> which rejections are authoritive at all?

authoritive rejections at all are rejections in languages (not the reverse) (A)

rejections in languages are these:

> rejections of those marks that reject themselves

why? because they are senseless

> rejections of those marks that are senseless

why? because senseless marks tell no ones, there is no ones in questions

> rejections of those brute rejections

why? because they are fiat and thus senseless (refer to general reads of (B))

[B][ when it tells that it tells more than that one is only itself

that one is only means there is no one[s] else (others)

but the latter should not be told in anyone at all

for where in [there is that] there is no one[s] else?

is to be answered at all with there is no one[s] else in themselves

but this is simply senseless at all

and we see that that one is only is a rejection at all, never is a telling of anyone in anyone at all ]

> whether empiricism's rejections are authoritive at all?

> whether skepticism's rejection are authoritive at all?

> whether rejections not in A are authoritive at all?

they are not, for they have not escaped being senseless, thus we reject them for being senseless

> saying this post is not metaphysics is senseless

because sentences that have senses disclose the world

Is a "choice"/"being" wholly decided by an divinely free choice, free? For the divinely free choice is free simpliciter.

In the grand model, there is inumerable divinely free choices and the derivative choices/beings are derivative of nothing but them or lesser derivatives but ultimately are those free choice.

A derivative is wholly determined by the primes, and they are thus instantly and exhaustively until the next primes. A derivative is not any single prime, it is derivative of primes.

A derivative is free by virtue of being decided by the primes. Its next state is decided ultimately by nothing but divinely free choices.

The argument is that the derivatives are as free as the primes, since they are only determined in so far as the primes have determined themselves utterly free.

The issue here is that should "chosen otherwise" (the other criterion) be the simpliciter free? As a divinely free choice is not "chosen otherwise" at all, it is final but unprecedented simpliciter.

It can be seen as more strict than the other criterion, as the other criterion fails it - as in the other criterion, a choice is not divinely free at all as it is bounded by the "possibility".

Those who live unauthentically live a simulated life. Simulations have no depth; they are games that others can play as well or even better. To spend one's life trying to simulate is to be nothing more interesting than that mere simulation - something anyone can outpace.

Simulation here does not mean false or fictional; it means being for that which can be ended.

Only those who simulate nothing, who simply are themselves, cannot be simulated - because only they are themselves. In doing nothing, we retain ourselves as infinite others; in doing nothing, we become ends in themselves. Only being cannot be simulated; thus only by being ourselves are we infinite others worthy to be ends.

While simulating may seem not general enough to be of concern, we have already been playing the first game: the game of meaning. Even when one quits simulating an agenda, one is still well within this game. Every born being at all is forced to play. Humanity as a whole simulates meaning and therefore has never once lived authentically. The only way, then, is not to quit but to finish it entirely.

What is it all for? Why is there anyone at all? … are all finite. Though those finite games are still fun - they are games, after all. But in seeing them as finite, we've already been bored and want to go past them for the better.

But as there is currently no one else as infinite other, we are forced to have no end. For there is no authentic-being-alone: if all around me are simply fools, I am only present with fools and thus am also a fool. How can anyone with no post-meaning others in them claim to be "in" post-meaning?

That's why we've got to ace the game. For the one who aces it is not yet in post-meaning, but she definitively has done meaning. Once all finite games have been aced, she is forced to ask for authentic living. She then finds others like her - this is her second finite game.

Let's end what the title say, for those "nothing at all" phrases have only one meaning.

And by pointing out that they have only one meaning while the rest is worthless nonsense, this pointing out alone forces them to confront the only meaning all of their endeavour ever try to not confront.

The meaning is obvious once we say that they have only one meaning, and it need not be elaborate futher.

nothing at all

We know the meaning of this phrase in the only philosophical sense matter.

And we see instantly, that being-confronted-with-nothing-at-all is not nothing at all, our mode/sense/case/state/fact when we understand the phrase is not nothing at all.

The question is not whether the phrase mean, but why the phrase's meaning manage to mean no more - why the state of understanding the phrase nothing at all mean nothing at all?

Though, about nothing at all, the other equivalent expression where the stronger term dominates and forces us to understand correctly is:

there was nothing at all

and there is something at all later

For "there is nothing at all now" is obviously a coped strawman.

vô profile t mà đọc mấy bài đăng của t, dù mấy cái đó chỉ là bề nổi nếu bây thấy t xứng thì theo, t sẽ nói hết mọi thứ

vì sao t lại đăng bài này? vì t muốn có một "tụi mình" ở "hậu ý nghĩa" với nhau

t thấy, loài người hiện tại vẫn còn kẹt trong ý nghĩa, trong "không biết" và cái kiểu bại hoại hoài nghi, tu nhịn, nếu có "dự án ý nghĩa" thì đó vẫn còn là một cái dự án hữu hạn, nếu có tình yêu thì đó vẫn còn không phải là "đối phương" luôn, và tệ nhất, vẫn còn nghĩ rằng "thế gian" có "chân trời" - bọn họ là những kẻ ngốc

nhưng t cũng là một kẻ ngốc, tại không có người hậu ý nghĩa một mình, tại nơi mà xung quanh chỉ toàn là kẻ ngốc kẻ hậu ý nghĩa không có lấy cái hậu ý nghĩa gì khác làm đối phương, nên hắn cũng chỉ có thể ngốc thôi, một kẻ đang chỉ có những thứ ngốc nghếch làm đối phương

vậy, người hậu ý nghĩa cần nhau

sau mọi ý nghĩa, chỉ cần "tụi mình" thôi

nhìn chung thì có quá nhiều thứ để nói, một số cái bao gồm:

"lãng mạn" là cái nào?

"thuần tín" là cái nào?

"cái gì" là cái nào và "cái nào" là cái gì?

ngôn ngữ là cái gì?

trí tuệ là cái gì?

"thế gian" có nghĩa gì?

tại đâu cậu không tự sát?

...

t sẽ theo thế giới của m tới chết/hết, t sẽ đập bể thần tượng của m, t sẽ cho m thấy "tại đâu" (m) mới (sống) là thế gian

điều quan trọng không phải là mấy cái này, mấy cái này đều là dự án hữu hạn hết, chúng đều hết được, đều trả lời được, điều quan trọng là sau khi tụi mình đã nói hết mọi dự án hữu hạn rồi thì "có đó" tụi mình nơi hậu ý nghĩa, đây là đều t muốn, người hậu ý nghĩa muốn hết tất thảy, như vậy người hậu ý nghĩa muốn người hậu ý nghĩa khác (đối phương)

chỉ kẻ lãng mạn mới ngốc

t muốn hết thảy những kẻ "ngốc"/"lãng mạn" xứng thế gian

t muốn hết thảy ai kia không hết nổi

(ngang ngang tuổi t, mới nói nhé

còn bô lão, mời đi nghỉ khoẻ)

>We will sustain our notice that we are using names in this piece.

That one is that one.

But the name "that one" is the name "that one".

The name is more complex than its meaning, but it is primarily a name, while what it means is primarily what it means (it could be another name also, or some ones).

But we speak only in names.

As our names seem simply themselves.

The name "that one" is already a complex as "the name 'that one'" - it has that one, but the name as writen is only the symbol.

For the name that one we write only "that one".

As all we have [for discourse] are just symbols/names, and since they seem simply themselves, they ought to only derive more names/expressions.

The name that one itself is a complex made up of the name that one and the symbol "the name that one".

While names are to reflect both those they mean and those derivatives that have those.

Thus mostly they reflect in the right order:

For "he runs" do name/show that derivative, that event/fact from him and run.

But that which the name "he" itself means, is not simply itself (he himself is a complex), we have to tell this also only by names.

And we tell it with the strict copula "be":

"He is a man".

The be is thus still forward but is to be read as tracing back.

In this sense our languages at all is not the same as other languages, by the be.

For daseins concern the be, and animals speak without it.

The other one is the mean, as in "these [names] mean the same".

The mean tells that these names mean the same, and or what a name means.

It is the careless uses of the mean and the be that give senseless fictions.

Without qualification (per se)

(1) That one is only itself, it is itself per se, without qualification – that one at all.

For any philosophical question at all reaches its finality not with a why but with a whether – whether that one is only itself.

And as that one is only itself, surely, any why there is it at all should not be asked as if it is without itself.

Even the what is without sense here, since what it is seems to ask whether it is not only itself.

(1.1) That one is itself; we then conveniently say that it is a simple, for it is simply itself.

This is when we do not ask why or what or even merely whether, but we ask for it, we ask for that one which is only itself.

For a simple is not atomic, simplistic, fundamental, essential ...

That one is a simple and it is-simple do not mean the same.

A simple is not anyone of anyone else (any kind/sense/style/way/category/being/essence/emptiness/...).

"A simple" and "that one" mean the same: it is only itself, and since "is a simple" and "is itself" mean the same, strictly speaking they have no meaning more than "that one" in question.

We ask for that one, and we refer to that one, when that one means that one [at all].

(1.2) Any without-qualification saying of "that one is itself" shatters all dogmas and forces us to see that/those which inquiries at all ask for; but also, since it is without qualification, it does not refer to that one as itself, but refers only to the fact that that one is itself – it refers to "a that-one-is-itself" (which in itself is not a simple). Any of this is called a coherence at all.

Coherent forms

(2) The law of identity, or law of non-contradiction, or Wittgenstein’s point about some different ones being "just" different, reflect those coherences at all of any of their references.

Why we can ask any why at all is answered with: because there is an asking of whether that one is only itself – as anyone is not without another (it is not only itself) there is a why to push against it, to ask for those it is, and then whether any of them is only itself.

In this sense coherences, questions, inquiries ... at all mean the same – they mean without qualification but also without direct sense.

Those they mean are not those [that are] only themselves; they only mean "to ask for those [that are] only themselves."

They are directly facts of them, not them.

(2.1) It is in that sense that they are senseless, that questions are not answers (without direct sense to those that they ask for at all – thus they are questions at all), while questions do have their coherences to ask, and there is their coherences to ask at all as long as they are asked without qualification.

(2.2) When questions are asked not without qualification, they are no longer questions that ask without qualification for those that are only themselves. These questions are thus shown to be questions within horizons, and can only ask for those which cohere-with/are-qualified within those horizons/idols/presumptions at all.

These questions already have their authorities/answers beforehand, and thus are nothing but subordinates/apparatus for dogmas that are about to violently subsume it all.

Asking for

(3) Anyone at all has been asked for, or, by its sheer authority shows up uninvited.

It is that we have had one can we ask whether it is only itself – but the silly fact is that when we have asked that at all of it, it already means that it is not only itself, or at the very least if it is indeed only itself and we are still asking that, our question has been mistakenly directed to our situation when having it, not it itself.

(3.1) A dogma strives in the naivety of not realizing that if there is a need for any measure to justify its authority at all (say, when we "consider it" whether it can subsume it all (????)), then it already means that it is not only itself.

(3.2) We ask for it to be presented with it; when we are presented with those we are presented with we do not ask "whether there is them?", but we do have to ask "whether they are only themselves?" through "why there is them at all?" – and while we have asked at all, it already means they are not only themselves. It is because of that which is not simply itself that there is our question at all, not the vice versa.

(3.3) One is not a simple and one has not seen one; this does not mean that there is no simple presented within those that are presented within one (trivial since this is what it means with those that are not simply themselves), but this means that there is no simple presented within one directly as of now.