# An Analysis of Lakers Replacements for Marcus Smart and Rui Hachimura

### Stats taken from 2025-26 BBall-Index Advanced Stats

| Out | In | Nominal position |

|---|---|---|

| Marcus Smart | Quentin Grimes | Guard / off-ball wing |

| Rui Hachimura | Sandro Mamukelashvili | Power forward |

## The Central Questions

This post is organized around six questions:

1. **Point-of-attack defense —** In each pair, who is the better perimeter defender? Who is the better *on-ball, point-of-attack* stopper? Do the Lakers keep the ability to put their best perimeter defender on the opponent's primary threat?

2. **Hiding Luka and AR —** Luka Dončić and Austin Reaves are not great defenders and have to be schemed around. Does either outgoing player take an assignment burden the incoming player cannot replace?

3. **Spacing, and whose shooting is *real* —** Do these swaps improve the floor-spacing around Luka and Reaves? And critically: which players' shooting numbers are manufactured by elite teammates?

4. **Off-ball engine & rim pressure —** In an offense run by two high-usage creators, who moves, cuts, and attacks closeouts — and who just stands still?

5. **Net verdict per pair —** Dimension by dimension, is each move an upgrade, an neutral move, or a downgrade, and where?

# PAIR 1 — Marcus Smart → Quentin Grimes

## 1A. Perimeter Defense

| Metric (value, pctile) | Smart | Grimes | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Perimeter Isolation Defense | **1.19 (92)** | 0.77 (86) | Smart |

| Ball Screen Navigation | 1.63 (95) | **1.88 (97)** | Grimes |

| Off-Ball Chaser Defense | 0.55 (78) | **1.21 (92)** | Grimes |

| Passing Lane Defense | **1.22 (92)** | 0.47 (20) | **Smart, large** |

| Steals / 75 | **1.80 (87)** | 1.04 (39) | **Smart, large** |

| Matchup-Adj. Def. Feet / Min | **4.70 (52)** | −7.38 (32) | Smart |

When evaluating the replacement of Smart with Grimes, the core question is how effectively the new addition can be at defending the PoA. Both grade as good perimeter defenders, but they earn it a little differently. Grimes is the superior off-ball defender — he navigates screens (97th) and chases shooters (92nd) more effectively. Smart is the superior on-ball, point-of-attack defender: higher isolation defense (92nd vs 86th), and a chasm in disruption — 1.22 passing-lane rate (92nd) and 1.80 steals/75 (87th) against Grimes' 0.47 (20th) and 1.04 (39th). Smart forces live-ball events; Grimes contains his man but generates almost nothing.

| Guarded Data (value, pctile) | Smart | Grimes | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Matchup Difficulty | **1.65 (95)** | 0.38 (80) | **Smart, large** |

| Guarded USG% | **21.97% (94)** | 20.69% (80) | Smart |

| Guarded Guards% | 46.68% (87) | 45.97% (86) | ~even |

| Guarded On-Ball % | **24.38% (94)** | 22.38% (83) | Smart |

Smart didn't just defend well — he defended the hardest assignments (95th-percentile difficulty against 94th-percentile-usage guards). That was a team-need role: with Luka a defensive sieve, the Lakers pointed Smart at the opponent's primary perimeter threat every night. Grimes checked lower-usage assignments in Philly (80th difficulty). Even granting that Grimes is a fine perimeter defender, no one left on the roster absorbs the top-end assignment the way Smart did. It has to be seen if Grimes can fill that role.

## 1B. Interior & Help Defense

| Metric (value, pctile) | Smart | Grimes | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Rim Protection | **0.52 (86)** | −0.46 (22) | Smart |

| Rim Deterrence / 100 | **1.07 (98)** | −0.43 (16) | **Smart, huge** |

| Post Defense | **1.52 (95)** | 0.20 (69) | Smart |

| Blocks / 75 | 0.48 (48) | 0.45 (45) | ~even |

The true value for Smart over Grimes is that Smart was actually great for Interior Defense. Smart provides rim and post value no guard should — 98th-percentile rim deterrence and 95th-percentile post defense, a product of elite strength and BBIQ. Grimes offers none of this (16th deterrence), so this is the significant downside of replacing Marcus Smart with Quentin Grimes.

## 1C. Perimeter Shooting, Gravity, and Floor Spacing

| Metric (value, pctile) | Smart | Grimes | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| 3PT% | 33.11% (43) | 33.42% (49) | ~even |

| Catch-&-Shoot 3PT% | 33.17% (43) | **40.00% (77)** | Grimes |

| Stable C&S 3PT% | 35.34% (10) | **38.27% (88)** | **Grimes, huge** |

| 3PT Shooting Talent | −0.93 (19) | −0.44 (44) | Grimes |

| 3PT Versatility | 28.88 (38) | **49.53 (81)** | Grimes |

| Off-Ball Gravity | 0.11 (26) | **1.26 (77)** | **Grimes, large** |

| 3PT Attempt Rate | 61.55% (83) | 50.33% (64) | Smart (volume) |

Nearly identical raw 3PT%, wildly different value. **Grimes is a decisively better floor-spacer:** 40% catch-and-shoot on 88th-percentile *stability*, real off-ball gravity (77th vs Smart's 26th), and 81st-percentile shot versatility. Smart launches more threes (83rd attempt rate) on 19th-percentile talent — high volume, low quality, and defenses don't respect him off the ball.

That means when Doncic or Reaves drove the basketball, defenses felt comfortable sagging off Smart to crowd the paint, because they weren't afraid of him nailing a 3 when open. And he was open A LOT.

| Metric (value, pctile) | Smart | Grimes | Read |

|---|---|---|---|

| | | | |

| 3PT Openness (defender distance) | 0.28 (70) | −0.33 (7) | Smart's looks far more open |

| 3PT Shot Quality (full composite) | **1.14 (87)** | −0.13 (29) | Smart's looks *even better* than openness alone |

| C&S 3PT Shot Quality | 0.83 (80) | −0.16 (33) | same story |

| C&S 3PT Shot Making | **−0.86 (2)** | **0.10 (77)** | canyon |

| C&S 3PT Shot Making Efficiency | −1.37 (10) | 0.14 (70) | canyon |

Anything else need to be said? Grimes statistically had a higher 3pt%, but was far less open. His shot quality was garbage, while Smart's was very high. Next to Luka and AR, his 3 point shooting should be much better than Marcus Smart's, which makes up for his inferior interior and help defense.

## 1D. Off-Ball Movement

| Metric (value, pctile) | Smart | Grimes | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Off-Ball Screen Poss / 75 | 0.39 (66) | **1.12 (86)** | Grimes |

| Movement Attack Rate | 5.47% (43) | **12.79% (72)** | Grimes |

| Movement Points / 75 | 1.00 (37) | 1.71 (54) | Grimes |

| Movement Scoring Impact / 75 | **0.26 (89)** | −0.07 (27) | Smart |

| Movement Speed Rating | −0.62 (2) | −0.18 (21) | Grimes |

Grimes runs far more off-ball motion — nearly 3× the off-screen possessions and much higher movement volume and attack rate. The one asterisk: his movement scoring impact graded negative (27th), while Smart's was strongly positive (89th) on tiny volume. Read alongside the openness data, Grimes' weak movement scoring is almost certainly a looks problem (contested shots off screens in Philly) rather than a skill problem — his play-type PPP below confirms it.

## 1E. Finishing & Rim Pressure

| Metric (value, pctile) | Smart | Grimes | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Rim Shot Creation | −0.09 (59) | **0.44 (80)** | Grimes |

| Drives / 75 | 4.11 (55) | **5.46 (68)** | Grimes |

| Drive Assist Rate | 8.59% (56) | **13.51% (85)** | Grimes |

| Rim FG% | 61.90% (35) | **69.83% (70)** | Grimes |

| Finishing Talent | −0.71 (29) | **0.23 (78)** | Grimes |

| Contact Finish Rate | **26.00% (72)** | 19.78% (45) | Smart |

**Grimes adds a rim dimension Smart lacks:** he creates rim looks (80th), drives more (68th) and *passes out of them well* (85th drive-assist rate — a connective skill), and finishes far better (70th vs 35th rim FG%). This is exactly what you want punishing the closeouts Luka and Reaves force.

## 1F. Efficiency & Play-Type

| Metric (value, pctile) | Smart | Grimes | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| True Shooting% | 54.42% (33) | **58.15% (57)** | Grimes |

| Effective FG% | 49.68% (26) | **53.44% (48)** | Grimes |

| Points Per Shot | 1.22 (40) | **1.33 (66)** | Grimes |

| Play-type PPP (value, pctile) | Smart | Grimes | Note |

|---|---|---|---|

| Spot-Up | 1.03 (63) | **1.12 (86)** | Grimes better spot-up value |

| Off-Ball Screen | **1.15 (99)** | 0.89 (15) | Smart's = Lakers system + open looks |

| Handoff | 0.80 (4) | **0.92 (67)** | Grimes far better |

| Cut | 1.24 (30) | **1.32 (79)** | Grimes |

| Isolation | **0.93 (87)** | 0.83 (20) | Smart can self-create a bit more |

| P&R Ball Handler | **0.85 (68)** | 0.78 (10) | Smart |

Grimes is the more efficient overall scorer (57th TS vs 33rd). The **off-ball-screen split tells a lot*: Smart's 99th-percentile mark is the Lakers *system* creating value around his cuts and screens — not his shot-making (his stable C&S is 10th) — while Grimes' 15th-percentile mark is contested looks that should invert on the Lakers. Smart retains an edge in the on-ball buckets (isolation 87th, P&R handler 68th), a residue of his secondary-creation reps.

## 1G. Rebounding

| Metric (value, pctile) | Smart | Grimes | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Off. Reb / 75 | 0.75 (24) | 0.75 (24) | even |

| Def. Reb / 75 | 2.82 (18) | **3.69 (39)** | Grimes |

| Def. Reb Talent | −1.17 (21) | **0.08 (68)** | Grimes |

Offensive glass is a wash (both hang back — good floor balance next to two creators). **Grimes is a meaningfully better defensive rebounder for a guard** (68th talent vs 21st), a quiet plus for a smaller team.

## Pair 1 — Dimension Scorecard

| Dimension | Winner | Margin |

|---|---|---|

| Point-of-attack defense | **Smart** | Moderate |

| Off-ball / chase defense | **Grimes** | Moderate |

| Assignment difficulty | **Smart** | Large |

| Interior / help defense | **Smart** | Large |

| Shooting & spacing | **Grimes** | Large |

| Off-ball movement (volume) | **Grimes** | Large |

| Finishing / rim pressure | **Grimes** | Large |

| Scoring efficiency | **Grimes** | Moderate |

| Defensive rebounding | **Grimes** | Moderate |

## Overall Profiles — Pair 1

- **Marcus Smart** — an elite, versatile perimeter *and* interior defender who shoulders the toughest assignment, but a low-gravity, streaky, low-movement, low-efficiency offense. His entire value is defense and assignment toughness; his shooting was poor even on wide-open looks.

- **Quentin Grimes** — a 3-and-D movement wing/guard: high-volume off-screen shooter with real gravity and 88th-percentile catch-and-shoot reliability, rim pressure and connective passing on drives, efficient finishing, and solid guard rebounding. His off-ball defense is elite; his PoA defense and interior value are *not* Smart's, but still a great PoA defender who can fight over screens. Six years younger, and his shooting will likely improve next to Luka and AR.

**Pair verdict:** A clear slight offense-for-defense trade with an age kicker, but with a much younger player. Spacing, movement, rim pressure, efficiency, and youth go up; PoA defense slightly go down; and interior deterrence go down. The overall-impact gap will probably be neutral-to-positive, because most of Smart's edge is a defensive role the team may replace collectively, while most of Grimes' offense should climb.

Furthermore, I think Grimes (and Mamu) shouldering more of an offensive burden will release some of the pressure off of Luka and AR on the offense, which means they might be able to do more defensively. When AR had a smaller offensive burden, his overall perimeter defense was actually pretty good. In fact, AR got his start in the NBA by being a defender. The scoring came after.

# PAIR 2 — Rui Hachimura → Sandro Mamukelashvili

Sandro is **6'9", 240** — larger than Rui (6'8", 230) and only slightly smaller than LeBron (6'9, 250). He has played as a stretch 5 for most of his career, but he is basically the perfect size to replace LeBron and Rui. Playing as the center also impacts his metrics. As a starting power forward next to Kessler, only some of that role carries over.

## 2A. Perimeter Defense

| Metric (value, pctile) | Rui | Sandro | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Perimeter Isolation Defense | **0.29 (77)** | −1.12 (13) | Rui |

| Off-Ball Chaser Defense | **1.03 (90)** | −1.04 (24) | Rui |

| Ball Screen Navigation | −0.78 (27) | −0.63 (36) | ~even (both poor) |

| Passing Lane Defense | 0.41 (15) | **0.81 (61)** | Sandro |

| Steals / 75 | 0.73 (16) | **1.32 (62)** | Sandro |

**Rui is clearly the better perimeter defender** — 77th-percentile isolation and 90th off-ball chaser versus Sandro's 13th and 24th. **The heavy caveat:** those Sandro marks were logged as a center who was rarely isolated in space or asked to chase shooters; when he *was* switched out, he lost. He gambles more successfully in the passing lanes (61st) than Rui (15th). Whether he holds up slotted as power forwards is the biggest genuine unknown. Rui is the safer, proven wing-and-forward defender at the 4, but also isn't that good. Hell, Sandro still graded better at navigating Ball Screens than Rui, so maybe when playing as the 4 Mamu will see significant improvement at defending wings instead of just 4s and 5s.

## 2B. Interior & Help

| Metric (value, pctile) | Rui | Sandro | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Rim Protection | −0.34 (32) | −0.26 (39) | Sandro (both poor) |

| Rim Deterrence / 100 | −0.42 (16) | −0.10 (39) | Sandro |

| Blocks / 75 | 0.39 (40) | **0.85 (72)** | Sandro |

| Help Defense Talent | −0.37 (45) | **0.36 (77)** | Sandro |

| Help Defensive Activity | −0.41 (49) | **0.82 (80)** | Sandro |

| Screener Mobile Defense | 0.23 (77) | 0.27 (78) | ~even |

Sandro's 39th-percentile rim protection was shit for a center — but at the 4 next to Kessler, he doesn't have to anchor a defense. However, he is way better at help defense: 72nd-percentile blocks, 77th help talent, 80th help activity. Behind a real rim anchor, that makes him a useful secondary* deterrent and rotator — a far better use of his tools than the primary-anchor role he played on Toronto. Rui offered essentially nothing here (16th deterrence, 45th help). At power forward, Sandro is the better help/weak-side defender; neither anchors, and neither needs to next to Walker.

## 2C. Shooting & Spacing

| Metric (value, pctile) | Rui | Sandro | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| 3PT% | **44.27% (95)** | 38.85% (80) | Rui |

| Stable C&S 3PT% | **40.00% (98)** | 37.19% (67) | Rui |

| ATB 3PT% | **45.70% (96)** | 39.82% (88) | Rui |

| 3PT Shot Quality (the look) | **1.81 (98)** | 0.39 (57) | Rui — far better looks |

| C&S 3PT Shot Quality (the look) | **1.60 (96)** | −0.19 (32) | Rui |

| 3PT Shot Making (result, adj.) | **0.71 (91)** | 0.38 (85) | Rui, narrowly |

| C&S 3PT Shot Making (result, adj.) | **0.64 (92)** | 0.26 (84) | Rui, narrowly |

| 3PT Pull-Up FG% | 36.36% (80) | **50.00% (93)** | Sandro |

| 3PT Versatility | 22.27 (21) | 19.63 (15) | ~even (both narrow) |

| Off-Ball Gravity | **1.26 (77)** | 0.79 (60) | Rui |

Both are legitimate floor-spacing 4s. Rui is the more efficient, higher-gravity spot-up marksman** (44.3% on 98th-percentile stable catch-and-shoot). Sandro is the more versatile shooter though. He can pull up off the bounce (50% pull-up 3, 93rd), which enables the pick-and-pop more with Luka and AR.

Applying the same look-vs-making lens as Pair 1 tells a more nuanced story than the raw gap. Rui's 3PT *shot quality* is 98th percentile (that's fucking nuts) and his openness (75th) confirms Luka/LeBron/Reaves manufactured a lot of nice shots for him; but his *shot making* is also 91st–92nd percentile, so he wasn't merely a benefactor of being surrounded by elite playmakers. Sandro is the reverse of the flattering case: he made his shots (85th shot making) on **worse-graded looks** (57th, and a 32nd-percentile C&S shot quality). So the raw 3PT% gap (95th vs 80th) overstates the skill gap — most of it is look quality Rui will partly leave behind, not shot-making that travels with him wherever he goes. So, Rui remains the better pure shooter, but by less than the percentages imply.

## 2D. Off-Ball Movement & Cutting

| Metric (value, pctile) | Rui | Sandro | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Movement Points / 75 | 2.37 (70) | **3.25 (84)** | Sandro |

| Movement Scoring Impact / 75 | **0.27 (90)** | 0.23 (88) | ~even |

| Movement Attack Rate | 16.18% (80) | **18.60% (86)** | Sandro |

| Cuts / 75 | 0.79 (55) | **2.10 (82)** | **Sandro, large** |

| Movement Speed Rating | −0.05 (34) | **0.21 (67)** | Sandro |

**Sandro is the more active, faster mover** — and a *much* more frequent cutter (82nd vs 55th), which matters enormously next to a passer like Luka who rewards rim-runs and dives into open space. Both convert movement efficiently (88th–90th scoring impact). This is a real, and slightly surprising, edge for the "big" in the pair.

## 2E. Finishing & Rim

| Metric (value, pctile) | Rui | Sandro | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Rim Shot Attempts / 75 | 2.17 (28) | **4.93 (77)** | Sandro |

| Rim FG% | 66.09% (53) | **71.31% (75)** | Sandro |

| Rim Shot Quality | 0.66 (78) | 0.69 (79) | ~even |

| Contact Finish Rate | 13.51% (28) | **26.19% (73)** | **Sandro, large** |

| Finishing Talent | **−1.24 (4)** (WTF❗) | 0.31 (80) | **Sandro, huge** |

**Rui is a genuine non-finisher** — 4th-percentile finishing talent, 28th-percentile contact finishing. His entire scoring value is the jump shot. Sandro attacks the rim more than twice as often, finishes better (75th vs 53rd), and finishes *through contact* (73rd), a valuable trait for a 4 who will roll and cut into traffic. On everything at the rim, Sandro is dramatically better.

## 2F. Efficiency & Play-Type

| Metric (value, pctile) | Rui | Sandro | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| True Shooting% | 61.90% (81) | **63.88% (88)** | Sandro |

| Effective FG% | 61.14% (86) | **61.41% (88)** | ~even |

| Points Per Shot | 1.31 (61) | **1.42 (82)** | Sandro |

| Points Over Expectation / 75 | **1.98 (95)** | 0.43 (76) | Rui |

| Play-type PPP (value, pctile) | Rui | Sandro | Note |

|---|---|---|---|

| Spot-Up | **1.29 (99)** | 1.12 (86) | Rui elite (on elite looks) |

| Off-Ball Screen | **1.11 (98)** | 1.03 (92) | both strong |

| Handoff | 0.96 (82) | **1.00 (90)** | Sandro |

| Cut | 1.25 (56) | **1.34 (83)** | Sandro |

| P&R Roll Man | 0.99 (15) | **1.03 (30)** | both poor — *neither is a roller* |

| Isolation | **0.96 (93)** | 0.91 (84) | Rui |

| P&R Ball Handler | **0.93 (90)** | 0.82 (21) | Rui (real on-ball juice) |

Sandro is the more efficient overall scorer (88th TS, 82nd points-per-shot). Rui counters with elite spot-up (99th) and **95th-percentile points-over-expectation** — he massively out-shot his (already great) look quality, a real shot-making signal even after discounting for the looks. Both are pop/movement players. That isn't a problem next to Kessler, who does the rolling. Rui keeps the on-ball edge (isolation 93rd, P&R handler 90th), but we all know he lapses, like when he forgets that he can just shoot over Reed Sheppard.

## 2G. Rebounding

| Metric (value, pctile) | Rui | Sandro | Edge |

|---|---|---|---|

| Off. Reb / 75 | 0.77 (24) | **2.25 (73)** | **Sandro, huge** |

| Off. Reb Talent | −0.43 (46) | **0.49 (78)** | Sandro |

| Def. Reb / 75 | 3.48 (33) | **5.94 (77)** | **Sandro, huge** |

| Def. Reb Talent | −0.90 (32) | **0.91 (87)** | **Sandro, huge** |

**Sandro is a comprehensively better rebounder on both ends** — 87th-percentile defensive-rebounding talent versus Rui's 32nd. Even discounting for the fact that some of this was compiled at center, he will be a meaningful upgrade. Rui rebounded like a weak wing playing out of position at the 4 — a real hole this swap closes.

## Pair 2 — Dimension Scorecard

| Dimension | Winner | Margin | Note |

|---|---|---|---|

| Perimeter defense | **Rui** | Large | *Sandro's marks earned at C* |

| Help / weak-side defense | **Sandro** | Moderate | Fits behind Kessler |

| Rim anchoring | neither | — | Kessler's job now |

| Catch-&-shoot efficiency | **Rui** | Moderate | *On elite, borrowed looks* |

| Shooting versatility / pull-up | **Sandro** | Moderate | Pick-and-pop |

| Off-ball movement / cutting | **Sandro** | Large | Feeds off Luka |

| Finishing at the rim | **Sandro** | Large | Rui is a non-finisher |

| Scoring efficiency | **Sandro** | Moderate | |

| On-ball creation | **Rui** | Moderate | |

| Rebounding (both ends) | **Sandro** | Huge | Closes a real hole |

## Overall Profiles — Pair 2

- **Rui Hachimura** — a forward whose value is an elite, high-gravity catch-and-shoot jumper and some on-ball isolation juice, wrapped around a body that can guard slow wings and small bigs. But he is a **poor rebounder and a genuine non-finisher (4th-percentile finishing talent)**, and his gaudy shooting may have been substantially manufactured by his star teammates.

- **Sandro Mamukelashvili** — a power forward that can stretch to the 5: pick-and-pop range with pull-up ability, strong rebounding on both sides of the ball, active high-frequency cutting, efficient rim finishing through contact, and help-side shot-blocking that fits far better as a secondary deterrent than the primary anchor role he was forced into. The swing variable is whether he can switch onto wings — his existing marks are poor but were earned guarding centers.

**Pair verdict:** Read correctly — this trades Rui's proven (and partly borrowed) elite 3pt and mid-range shooting for better rebounding, better finishing, better cutting/movement, better efficiency, better overall spacing, and help defense protection. The only thing they lose is proven elite shooting in the regular season and playoffs. On the metrics, Sandro is better in many different areas and by larger margins.

# Conclusion

In both pairs, the Lakers trade a veteran for a younger player who is a better offensive fit around Luka, Reaves, and Kessler while only moderately weakening their defense, if the defense is weakened at all. Both moves are defensible and roster-fit-positive.

If you watched the game you'll know he chucks up too many difficult mid range shots, ISOs too much, and turns the ball over a lot (ranks 1st in lost-ball turnovers).

If you look at the stats, his basic stats production are hindered by his TOs and low efficiency. By Fantasy basketball value his output is about the same as Andrew Wiggins and Giannis (injured and not playing seriously) last season, while having the third highest usage rate among all players.

By advanced stats, his Win Share (the best MVP indicator) is about the same as Deni Avdija at 6.9 (ranked 22nd), behind his teammates Queta (9.0), Pritchard (8.5), Derrick White (7.0), indicating he's arguably the 4th best contributor on his team in regular season play. So the rumor that he's the 7th best player on the Celtics last year may not be total hyperbole. He does have a 22.05 Player Efficiency Rating, ranking slightly above Anthony Edwards at a tied-17th with Jonas Valanciunas (Yeah advanced stats are tricky).

All this is to say he's a really polarizing player. He does have a good looking step back shot and a deep mid-range bag, to the point you're happy with him taking a game deciding shot, but he's a tier below the top players in offensive output. He had shown to be a valuable piece on a championship team on both ends, but when he was put in a position to be the 1st option on a deep team, he can't really elevate his production to the next level. I'm not surprised at the Celtics front office not liking him, especially with his off court antics on social media and streaming sites. I am surprised at how little the Celtics got from trading him. Hopefully being on the 76ers where he can be a happy 2nd option behind Maxey will help him be his best self and prove the analytics wrong.

I’ll start by saying that I have traditionally considered myself a big fan of analytics. There have been multiple instances throughout the season that are exposing the limitations of an analytical understanding of the game. NBA players have been critical of analytics since their introduction. This Jaylen Brown trade is another nail in the coffin.

Kenny Atkinson had perhaps the worst quote in recent memory from the coach of a playoff team saying “Analytically, we’ve won 2 out of 3 games” when they trailed 3-0 to the New York Knicks in the eastern conference finals.

Now, with the Jaylen Brown trade an anonymous scout evaluated him as the “7th best player” on the Celtics. This evaluation helped fuel a climate that allowed Walker Kessler to have a higher trade return than a finals mvp coming off his best individual season. Anyone with eyes knows that Jaylen Brown is a better player than that.

In general, teams seem to be taking the idea that basketball is a “probabilistic game” a bit too seriously. To have a head coach defending his team on the brink of being swept is unfathomable in a pre-analytics era and it seems this obsession with analytics has pushed certain executives into a lala land where predictive models are more important than real-world results. Basketball is only theoretically probabilistic, in reality each game one team wins.

There is evidence of this also with the over-reliance on three point shooting that seems to have swept through the league. Teams that are having a bad shooting night will frequently continue to chuck up three pointers relying on a theoretical “regression to the mean.” When the Celtics lose, they tend to lose in this way.

Josh Hart said it best “Analytics are a lamppost to a drunk person. You can lean on them, but it won’t get you home.” Evidently, the psychological aspect of basketball is not taken seriously enough. Jalen Brunson is better than Ben Simmons and it’s not because of some objective physical metrics. Jalen Brunson, and the Knicks more generally, seemed to have a will to win that defied an analytical understanding. They didn’t win analytically but they won in the only way that actually matters.

I wonder if this season could be a turning point in how basketball nerds privilege mathematical understandings of basketball. Of course, I very much understand the importance of analytics and how it has made teams better. It does seem like the 2026 season will push teams and fans towards a greater skepticism of Analytics.

Celtics have the following on their books ahead of 2028 Free Agency base on current roster:

$85M guaranteed/team option to Tatum, Hugo, and Pritchard

$35M player option to Derrick White (will be 34 ahead of 2028-2029 season)

$16M cap hold to Hauser

$12M cap hold to Scheierman

For a total of $85-$148M depending on what White chooses (this may be his last multi-year contract opportunity so he might opt out). They have 3 draft picks before ‘28 FA so those might be on the books if Celtics don’t trade those picks or decline their player options (or possibly stash an international player).

Salary cap is projected to be $183M so they can theoretically have $35M-$98M of cap space before any player exceptions.

**Notable UFA (many after a player option)**

Jokic, Giannis, AD, KAT, Mitchell, Siakam, Zion

**Notable player options for 2028-2029**

Luka, Bam, Anounoby, Brunson, NAW

Also RFA such as Stephon Castle and McCain.

They also now have 4 picks to trade during 2028 offseason along with 3 own swaps and 2 Philly swaps.

Aside from Celtics ducking tax and trying to sell high, this might be why they would be picky on which players were coming back in a trade. They might have limited themselves to players with 2 years or less, or on great rookie contracts. That could help explain the dog shit value of the trade.

Since nothing big is gonna happen today apparently I thought this would be a good space to gauge how others feel about LeBrons career choices. There’s a million different posts about LeBron and Golden State but that it is even considered as a possibility sort of does my head in.

LeBron is my goat and I think he has surpassed any and every expectation anyone has ever had for him. The reinventions, the jumper development, etc. etc. He quite clearly is one of (and for me) the best basketball players ever. However, I never really understood a lot of choices he made. Choices, that, I my opinion, pretty much made sure that he would always be compared to Jordan instead of carving out his own unique legacy.

Most obviously, the choice of #23 has irked me since forever. I get being a kid and being inspired by Mike. But once he came into the league, why would he insist on wearing the one number that forever will be tied to one person and one person only. I really think this is an unprecedented level of deference from someone who was touted as highly as LeBron. If you think about it, I can’t think of any other high profile player (outside of AD) who has worn that number. And for good reason. 23 transcends basketball, it is synonymous with Michael Jordan. Even giving him the benefit of the doubt and assuming that he had this much belief in himself that he could become Jordan’s equal in terms of number recognition, that would still have been a really idiotic calculation on his part, realistically, 10 rings wouldn’t have erased the cultural legacy Jordan has tied to that very number.

Even more so, while his decision to sign for Nike might have been the most sensible financially, it once again put him in the same ecosystem that Jordan built. The Nike x Jordan collab basically created sneaker culture and there was never a shot that any LeBrons would exceed the impact the AirJordans have had.

Right at the start of his career, that’s two choices that invariably signaled that LeBron was in Mikes footsteps instead of carving out his own path. Some might not care about that as much and see it as tangential only. But in terms of branding, those are probably the most significant choices any athlete can make and in both instances LeBron decided to follow someone else instead of separating himself from the boogeyman comparison to who would follow his whole career. Steph made underarmour popular for a while, Kobe obviously had his own sneaker thing going on at first as well. Even players far less talented than LeBron have had outsized cultural impacts especially because their branding choices were decidedly unique. KD is 35, Luka is 77, Dirk is 41, Duncan is 21. LeBron is what? He’s obviously not 23 and he’s also not 6 since Silvers idiotic idea to retire Russel league-wide.

If he truly went to Golden State, this would another example of LeBron mishandling his own career arc for no good reason. Granted, the Heat years, the Cavs comeback, those were great for his narrative. That would be erased if he joined the team that beat him in three finals. It advances my greater point that we look at these rumors and think ‘yes, that’s something LeBron might do’.

Once again, I understand if others might not care much about this. But to me, the NBA was always about narratives, rivalries, the uniqueness of legends. And I just don’t think LeBron has been particularly good at ensuring that his iconic career really stands the test of time.

I’d love to hear other opinions about this though.

I used Basketball Reference’s game-by-game data to compare how the Celtics performed with and without Jayson Tatum. I broke the games down by opponent strength and looked at offensive rating, defensive rating, net rating, assist percentage, and pace.

NO TATUM — vs Top Offensive Net Rating

\*\*Top 10:\*\* W-L: 7-10 | ORtg: 113.85 | DRtg: 115.97 | Net: -2.12 | Pace: 93.93 | AST%: 55.48

\*\*11-20:\*\* W-L: 16-5 | ORtg: 123.74 | DRtg: 115.08 | Net: +8.66 | Pace: 94.80 | AST%: 56.62

\*\*21-30:\*\* W-L: 18-6 | ORtg: 122.53 | DRtg: 108.44 | Net: +14.09 | Pace: 95.03 | AST%: 59.87

NO TATUM — vs Top Defensive Rating

\*\*Top 10:\*\* W-L: 14-5 | ORtg: 119.67 | DRtg: 113.01 | Net: +6.66 | Pace: 95.17 | AST%: 58.38

\*\*11-20:\*\* W-L: 15-11 | ORtg: 119.52 | DRtg: 114.50 | Net: +5.02 | Pace: 95.51 | AST%: 56.56

\*\*21-30:\*\* W-L: 12-5 | ORtg: 123.14 | DRtg: 109.79 | Net: +13.35 | Pace: 92.76 | AST%: 58.21

NO TATUM — vs Net Rating

\*\*Top 10:\*\* W-L: 8-9 | ORtg: 116.19 | DRtg: 117.77 | Net: -1.58 | Pace: 94.18 | AST%: 54.20

\*\*11-20:\*\* W-L: 14-3 | ORtg: 120.78 | DRtg: 107.48 | Net: +13.30 | Pace: 95.56 | AST%: 59.31

\*\*21-30:\*\* W-L: 13-4 | ORtg: 124.19 | DRtg: 109.11 | Net: +15.08 | Pace: 94.35 | AST%: 60.44

WITH TATUM — vs Offensive Rating

\*\*Top 10:\*\* W-L: 4-3 | ORtg: 121.46 | DRtg: 116.76 | Net: +4.70 | Pace: 91.63 | AST%: 60.19

\*\*11-20:\*\* W-L: 7-2 | ORtg: 119.77 | DRtg: 110.93 | Net: +8.84 | Pace: 98.49 | AST%: 60.80

\*\*21-30:\*\* W-L: 4-0 | ORtg: 126.07 | DRtg: 108.17 | Net: +17.90 | Pace: 95.50 | AST%: 61.48

WITH TATUM — vs Defensive Rating

\*\*Top 10:\*\* W-L: 7-2 | ORtg: 122.51 | DRtg: 113.26 | Net: +9.25 | Pace: 94.78 | AST%: 57.96

\*\*11-20:\*\* W-L: 3-2 | ORtg: 112.68 | DRtg: 108.78 | Net: +3.90 | Pace: 96.50 | AST%: 61.92

\*\*21-30:\*\* W-L: 4-0 | ORtg: 132.30 | DRtg: 114.08 | Net: +18.22 | Pace: 97.08 | AST%: 65.08

WITH TATUM — vs Net Rating

\*\*Top 10:\*\* W-L: 5-4 | ORtg: 117.86 | DRtg: 113.74 | Net: +4.12 | Pace: 93.12 | AST%: 58.28

\*\*11-20:\*\* W-L: 7-1 | ORtg: 125.30 | DRtg: 113.31 | Net: +11.99 | Pace: 97.51 | AST%: 60.81

\*\*21-30:\*\* W-L: 2-0 | ORtg: 130.60 | DRtg: 107.45 | Net: +23.15 | Pace: 93.55 | AST%: 68.35

The biggest takeaway is that Boston consistently posted better net ratings and records against stronger opponents when Tatum played. The offense also generally had a higher assist percentage with him on the floor, suggesting better ball movement and creation. My interpretation is that Brown is at his best as an elite No. 2 option rather than the primary offensive engine for extended stretches. This isn’t meant to diminish Brown’s value, he’s still an excellent player, but the data suggests the Celtics function most effectively when Tatum is leading the offense. I’m also a bit concerned for brown If he’s traded to a team without spacing, we have never seen how brown handles playing with a non borderline elite spacing system when he’s been a star to super star.

Boston may not get their ideal outcome but I think if anyone can turn post-athletic Zion into a two way star, it’s Boston.

I know Trey Murphy is the one everyone’s going to talk about, but I don’t see it. I would argue that Trey on his contract is more valuable than Jaylen on his. So no Try Murphy.

No, this is Zion and Herb for Jaylen. Exact same salary. Hauser, Missi, and/or Bey could also be included to even things out.

Boston would add an elite POA defensive quarterback and another great ball handler and Boston with Zion is king of all drive-and-dish offenses.

It would be ideal for the Pelicans too. Queen gets unblocked.

PG: Murray
SG: Jaylen
SF: Trey
PF: Queen
C: Missi

With Bey, Fears, Poole, Karlo and a mish mash of young wings to compete for PT on the bench.

The Pelicans would still have Murray, Poole, and Bey (more than max salary combined) to obtain a long-term solution at center

Celtics
PG: White
SG: Herb
SF: Tatum
PF: Zion
Ce: Queta

With Hauser, Pritchard, Hugo, Walsh on the bench.

Herb and Zion would be amazing additions in Boston. Jaylen would be an amazing fit with Queen and Fears

Shaq prime was dominant from his Orlando days to his Lakers days and Shaq was even more unstoppable during his 3 peat years.

But things got weird after the 3rd chip in ‘02, by the 02-03 season and the 03-04 season Shaq weight dramatically changed with the weight ballooning to close to 400 pounds, had a toe injury and the tension Shaq had with Kobe starting growing rapidly during those 2 years.

I want to know if it was possible for Shaq’s prime to continue after ‘02 and if Shaq couldve won more chips with the Lakers being that dominant force in ‘03 and ‘04. Could Shaq 5 peated if he was in better shape or the tension between Shaq & Kobe was too high for that to be possible? Did Kobe really make the Lakers lose the ‘04 Finals with his bad shot selection or was Shaq at fault too with his defense being really bad in that series?

I felt like Shaq shouldve won as many chips as MJ and I felt Shaq was harder to guard than MJ in his prime especially during those 3 peat years. Was Shaq’s prime being almost over after ‘02 out of his control or was it in his control to prevent the prime from being over?

People said Shaq was back in his prime in the ‘04-05 season in Miami by being 2nd in MVP behind Nash but I felt like Shaq didnt seem like the same dominant force in Miami like he was with the Lakers.

Leave your thoughts on this, I want to know people’s opinion on this

I wonder how much the new lottery rules are affecting off-season decisions, I think it changes a lot of the decision-making process for how you construct a team for the next season. With the previous rules, you were essentially trying to either construct a playoff-level team, or the worst team in the league, because those were really the two best ways for the season to be a net positive for the team. Playoffs for obvious reasons, and tanking for the best lottery odds.

Now with the flattened lottery odds and relegation, every team is incentivized to be as good as possible, even if that doesn't mean making the playoffs. I feel like that might encourage GMs to be more proactive about making moves for good players, because even if it's a bad fit, they still raise the team's floor and that's basically all that matters now.

I think it also changes how you value certain players as assets, guys like Ja or Zion—who could see their stock improve a lot if they get moved to a new system—don't have the added risk of lifting you out of the better lottery odds. It drastically simplifies the math for determining if a trade/signing was a good idea or not, since you don't have to consider the opportunity cost of moving out of the best lottery odds: If the move doesn't take you to the playoffs, who cares, you've got the same lottery odds as before, and if the player you landed improved their PR, you can flip em for a profit.

Still don't know why the Hornets traded LaMelo tho, like even using this logic I can't see the reason. They must think his ankles are jello or something.

Everyone should by now understand Milwaukee took the lesser trade package and Miami built a clunky non fitting team.

Well how about Miami and the Celtics make it a 3 team trade effectively to where Miami ends up with Jaylen Brown and those two first round picks.

The fit between Jaylen Brown and Bam would be lightyears better than Giannis + Bam. Miami would have another 2 first rounders to fill out the roster.

JB would get to lead a team. Giannis ends up in a place he wants to be and can actually compete right away.

Tell me how this isn't a much bigger win-win-win for all parties involved. Giannis wins with this trade, JB gets what he wants, the fans get way more exciting ball to watch. Celtics and Heat have way more competitive teams.

Seems to make almost too much sense to the point it would never happen. But just think about for a minute.

This is a follow-up to my recent post ranking the best players of the 2025–26 season.

Several people asked in DMs where the top players from this season fit historically. Since this project evaluates every NBA season using the same underlying framework, I figured it would be useful to post my highest-graded single-season peaks of the 21st century.

The central question remains the same:

How much does this player increase a typical good team’s probability of winning the championship?

As in the original post, these estimates are produced through a synthesis of statistical evidence and film study. I will not make traditional arguments for players, and the goal is not to reward awards, team success, narrative, longevity, or career accomplishment.

It is to estimate the predictive championship value of a given season’s version of a player.

The methodology is identical to the one described in the original post, so I will not repeat the full explanation here. This ranking uses the same offensive, defensive, and net-impact framework, calibrated to approximate added championship probability and adjusted for playoff portability, scalability with other talent, and contextual factors such as teams, schemes, coaching, etc.

Each player is listed in the following format:

Player (plausible ranking range) (OFF, DEF, NET)

The ranking range reflects uncertainty. A range of (2-8), for example, means that while I have the player ranked at a particular spot, I could construct reasonable optimistic or pessimistic arguments that would place him anywhere from second to eighth overall.

The point estimates should be read as estimated central values rather than exact measurements. Many players have overlapping probability distributions and are difficult to separate cleanly.

This year’s version of the list has two new entries: Victor Wembanyama and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, who moved up from last year. We also have a new candidate -- Cade Cunningham -- who I do not have on the final list, but who belongs in the next category of players with a reasonable argument to be on it.

General interpretation of NET estimates

• 7.0+ — GOAT-level peak; roughly a top-3 peak ever
• 6.0+ — All-time great peak; roughly a top-12 peak ever
• 5.4–6.0 — Strong MVP-level season
• 4.6–5.4 — Solid MVP-level season
• 4.0–4.6 — Weak MVP-level season
• 3.0+ — Solid All-NBA-level season
• 1.5+ — All-Star-level season

Best NBA Single-Season Peaks Since 2000

1. ’13 LeBron James (1–2) (5.6, 1.6, 7.2)
2. ’00 Shaquille O’Neal (1–5) (5.25, 1.75, 7.0)
3. ’25 Nikola Jokić (2–8) (6.2, 0.2, 6.4)
4. ’16 Stephen Curry (2–8) (6.2, 0.2, 6.4)
5. ’04 Kevin Garnett (2–8) (2.9, 3.4, 6.3)
6. '03 Tim Duncan (3–12) (3.0, 3.1, 6.1)
7. ’26 Victor Wembanyama (3-14) (2.3, 3.6, 5.9)
8. ’09 Dwyane Wade (5–14) (5.1, 0.75, 5.85)
9. ’22 Giannis Antetokounmpo (6–16) (3.2, 2.6, 5.8)
10. ’08 Kobe Bryant (7–17) (5.15, 0.45, 5.6)
11. ’16 Kevin Durant (7–17) (5.0, 0.6, 5.6)
12. ’24 Joel Embiid (7–17) (3.8, 1.8, 5.6)
13. ’16 Chris Paul (7–18) (4.7, 0.8, 5.5)
14. ’26 Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (7–18) (5.0, 0.5, 5.5)
15. ’17 Kawhi Leonard (8–18) (4.0, 1.4, 5.4)
16. ’05 Steve Nash (8–18) (5.7, −0.3, 5.4)
17. ’09 Dirk Nowitzki (9–18) (4.9, 0.4, 5.3)
18. ’20 Anthony Davis (10–21) (2.4, 2.7, 5.1)
19. ’24 Luka Dončić (17–21) (5.1, −0.25, 4.85)
20. ’03 Tracy McGrady (15–24) (4.6, 0.2, 4.8)
21. '19 James Harden (18–24) (5.0, −0.25, 4.75)
22. ’11 Dwight Howard (20–30) (1.65, 2.65, 4.3)
23. ’05 Manu Ginóbili (20–31) (3.4, 0.9, 4.3)
24. ’16 Draymond Green (20–34) (1.0, 3.2, 4.2)
25. ’25 Jayson Tatum (22–36) (3.0, 1.0, 4.0)
26. ’19 Paul George (22–37) (2.6, 1.3, 3.9)

High-End Argument Tier

The following players did not make the final top 26, but have sufficiently strong optimistic cases that I believe they deserve mention.

Holding the evaluations of the players above constant, I can construct a reasonable high-end interpretation that places each of these players somewhere inside the top 26:

• Jason Kidd
• Jimmy Butler
• Russell Westbrook
• Paul Pierce
• Ray Allen
• Pau Gasol
• Deron Williams
• Damian Lillard
• Jalen Brunson
• Cade Cunningham
• Baron Davis

Honorable mentions as well to Allen Iverson, Derrick Rose, and Blake Griffin, who form the natural extension of this same general tier and narrowly missed the final cut.

Open to discussion and questions, as always.

We are heading into the 2026 offseason and I cant help but notice a depressing trend that goes beyond pure basketball strategy. The punitive nature of the second apron is fundamentally changing how we view team building and player development.

Look at teams that drafted incredibly well over the last five to seven years. Instead of being rewarded for elite scouting and patience, they are facing an artificial roster cliff. You find a late first roudn gem, develop him into a high impact starter, and suddenly his rookie extension makes your cap sheet completely unsustainable. You are forced to dump him for future assets just to stay compliant with league rules.

This definetly creates a bizarre conflict for the sport. We always say we want parity and for front offices to build the right way through the draft. But when a front office actually achieves that perfection, the financial mechanics dismantle their roster. It feels like we are rewarding tax accounting rather than basketball operations. Players who buy into a franchise culture and peak at the right time are treated as liabilities that need to be erased when the math gets tight.

Does anyone else feel like the league swung the pendulum too far? They wanted to stop superteams formed through free agency but ended up punishing organic, drafted growth. It is getting hard to invest emotionally in a young core when you know the current collective bargaining agreement will shatter them regardless of their success on the hardwood. I would love to hear thoughts on how this impacts fan loyalty long term.

I was discussing Dillon Mitchell with a Cetlics fan and one of the things he pointed out was that he shot 19% from 3 in his college career and 48.8% from the FT line. If this was just some big man, it would be overlooked but the interesting part is that Dillon Mitchell is a 6'8, 205 pound forward. The first player I thought of was Andre Roberson and it fit him to the T in terms of body frame. The biggest difference is Dillon Mitchell is a hyper athletic player while also being a good defender.

Andre Roberson was a 25% 3PT shooter and 46.8% FT shooter in the NBA. He was a decently good at back door cuts but his offensive game was nearly nonexistent. Roberson wasn't an uber athletic player but he had a decent touch around the time whenever he was there. Roberson, infamously, set the NBA record for lowest FT% in an NBA series where he went 3-21 (14.3%) against the Houston Rockets in 2017. How does an NBA player manage to shoot 14% from the FT line? In this same series, Roberson went a disgusting 2-12 from the line in a 4 point loss to the Rockets. The Thunder went on to lose the series in 5.

In that same series, Roberson averaged 3.4 blocks per game and 2.4 steals per game including 5 straight games of 3+ blocks and had at least 5 stocks in every game that series. That year, Roberson also finished 5th in DPOTY and All Defensive 2nd team.

So you have a player who was basically a complete offensive liability at all ends of it (shooting, FT%, passing), a great hustle player (very good on the offensive glass) and an all world defender yet he basically started almost every single game for 4 years straight up until his career ending injury. ( I know he attempted to come back with one last stint with OKC and then Brooklyn but it was like a total of 150 minutes in 2 seasons). And what's even more interesting is this type of player wasn't just playing in the dead ball era or an era where spacing was nonexistent; he was starting in an era where the NBA began to value spacing more than ever.

Do you think a player like that would be able to be playable today? If so, how good would that type of player need to be on hustle and defense and make up for the fact that they're an offensive liability?

The 2026 draft is officially wrapped, which means front offices are about to start dumping contracts to clear cap space and minutes for the new guys.

I was curious who is actually on the chopping block, so I ran a model that tracks a player's actual on-court production against their current cap hit to see who is severely overpaid.

Based on the numbers, here are a couple of guys who are massive "Sells" right now:

• Patrick Williams (CHI): The Bulls just took Caleb Wilson at No. 4 overall. Meanwhile, the model shows Patrick Williams holding a brutal $-15.8M efficiency deficit. He’s only producing about $2.3M in actual value. He is officially dead weight blocking Wilson's path and they need to move him ASAP.
• Deandre Ayton (LAL): With the draft over and Austin Reaves just agreeing to a massive $185M max extension, the Lakers' cap situation is on fire. Ayton is a huge reason why. The math shows his actual on-court production is only worth about $15.2M, but his cap hit is $33.6M (giving him an $-18.5M efficiency deficit). If LA wants to flesh out the roster around Reaves' new deal next week, Ayton has to be the first one traded.

Who do you guys think is the most obvious trade casualty this week?

Cleveland P34: Meleek Thomas: a young high ceiling shooting guard who has potential to develop into a high level starting center and as is right now is a good athlete with a lighting quick jumper which should give him value off the bat as he develops the rest of his game

Clippers P36: Baba Miller: one of the funnest prospects in this class and also has a insanely high ceiling due to his skill set and intangibles but unfortunately that's been the case sense hes joined the NCAA in his freshman season at FSU aswell so hopefully he can put it all together now in a nba system

OKC P41: Otega Oweh: to me this was there best pick of the three they made this draft and is a perfect lu Dort long term replacement as hes very strong can score the ball and plays good on ball defense

Tor P50: Jaden Bradley: my nba comparison for him coming in was Jamal shead a player who's been a steal for the raptors and should continue to and I think Jaden Bradley will follow a very similar path

Orl P51: Izaiah Nelson: a great prospect who should be a beast on the defensive side of the ball and has 2 way potential has great upside and to me is a less skilled Johnathan Isaac but to get that type of potential that late is great

LAC P55: Nick Martinelli: a guy who projects to be a hard working role player and that could break the rotation one day and be a winning contributor for them on a cheap contract

What grade do you give each team for this trade? Miami gets their superstar and Bucks get a haul. Seems like a win win.

Miami Heat Receive:

Giannis Antetokounmpo (2x NBA MVP, 2021 Finals MVP)

Bobby Portis (Veteran forward)

Milwaukee Bucks Receive:

Tyler Herro (Guard)

Jaime Jaquez Jr. (Forward)

Kel'el Ware (Center)

Kasparas Jakučionis (Guard)

3 First-Round Picks: Unprotected selections in 2031 and 2033, plus the No. 13 overall pick in the upcoming NBA draft

1 Future Pick Swap: 2030 first-round pick swap1

Second-Round Pick: 2033 second-round selection

I get that the Giannis trade is a huge topic and will be covered extensively by so many people, but one thing I do want to know is how Milwaukee is going to handle the next like, 5 years, as they don't own their own draft capital until 2031.

Obviously, they have a couple of picks in the draft tonight, and those are, in my opinion, huge potential pieces for this team moving forward, it feels like they pretty much need one of these picks if not both to be cornerstone pieces of the future. I could be wrong and they could miss on both, but it definitely doesn't seem like they have a lot of room for error anymore.

They still have a couple of bad contracts on the books like Kuzma and Turner, there's a chance those guys get flipped but at this point it seems like they need to either let them expire or at the bare minimum try and see if one of them has an improved season to try and move down the road.

My post timing on this might not be the best since Herro could very well be moved tomorrow, I would imagine he lands them some assets but nothing too substantial. At this point I definitely think Milwaukee is going to want as many swings at the bat as they can get during these next couple of years, I could see them trying to trade back with a pick and maybe trying to acquire an extra asset, but again I could be wrong.

Free agency definitely looks to be important for them moving forward and although they're a small market, I could see them utilizing the new CBA to maybe overpay someone who could've gone elsewhere. Just a really interesting and probably experimental future here for the Bucks.

I’ve been thinking about the reported terms of Micah Nori’s contract and I can’t shake the feeling that something is off.

Portland just spent months searching for its next head coach. They interviewed a long list of candidates, talked about finding the right leader for the next phase of the rebuild, and ultimately landed on Nori—a guy who has spent years earning respect around the league and finally gets his first head coaching opportunity.

Then reports come out that the deal is essentially one guaranteed year with team options after that.
If that’s accurate, what message does that send?

The Blazers are one of the youngest teams in the NBA. Scoot Henderson is still developing. Shaedon Sharpe is still developing. Donovan Clingan is still developing. Whoever they draft this week will be developing. This isn’t a roster that’s supposed to win 50 games next season. Rebuilds require patience. Player development requires patience. Culture building requires patience.

So why hire a first-time head coach and immediately put him on what feels like a probationary contract?

The part that bothers me isn’t whether Nori is the right hire. He might be great.
The part that bothers me is that this feels like an organization keeping one foot out the door.
If you’re asking a coach to build the foundation of your next contender, shouldn’t you be willing to show some commitment yourself?

Maybe this is a reflection of ownership uncertainty. Maybe it’s a front office that wants maximum flexibility. Maybe there are details we don’t know.
But from the outside looking in, it feels like Portland wants all the benefits of a long-term rebuild without making a long-term commitment to the person leading it.

And that’s usually how organizations end up restarting the clock every two or three years.
Am I reading too much into this, or does this feel like a bad signal for the direction of the franchise?

With the Giannis trade finally happening one of the biggest questions coming into the draft is who should the bucks draft at the 10th spot and the 13th spot. Now espn has Brayden Burries and Karol Lopez. In my opinion I think that the bucks might move hero to move a couple of spots. Truth be told I don’t know too much about the players going into the draft. But I would like to know who do you think is going to be drafted in this loaded draft class?

Earlier this week, I made a post that sais what my projected playoffs would be. This was pre Giannis trade and still the rankings were genuinely horrible. Here is my revamped seed rankings for next season. Again I have like two months of experience watching the NBA so these are very unknowledgeable predictions, but I hope you guys can provide feedback

1. Celtics. This might be a hot take over the Knicks or Pistons, but here’s my opinion. The Knicks are an incredibly clutch team and obviously the best competition team, but I don’t really see them as a regular season team. It’s just imo Brown doesn’t prioritize and as the 3rd seed they became the first team to win the NBA cup and the finals (I know the cup has only been for 3 years but still). If they can keep Tatum and Brown fully healthy I don’t see how they don’t get at least the second seed. In the regular season, they outrebounded all teams in the east as well as having the fewest turnovers while holding opponents to the fewest points in the east. And JB is still in his prime and Tatum is still getting there.

2. Knicks. I think the reigning champions will be the second seed in the east over the pistons, though I think it will be close. Again, amazing competition team but I think second seed feels right for them. When you look at reg season stats last year, they finish roughly slightly above average in everything (like 4-6th in east), and I think that’s their strength. They’re an all around team with two all stars

3. Pistons. Right now, I see them as a very capable team who wants a rematch in the playoffs, but putting them over the Celtics and the Knicks just feels unrealistic in total wins. The reason they got such a good record last season is they were a lockdown defense team who got a crazy amount of steals and blocks per game and shot really efficiently from the floor, but the other two teams just look so dominant compared to them.

4. Cavaliers. I don’t see them changing this much this offseason. with their first rounder basically being a second round pick along with having no additional picks, no major contracts expiring (other than harden but I don’t see Cleveland not renewing his contract even with his arrest) and no real trade rumors, I see this team staying basically where they were last year.

5. Hawks. I see a small bump from last year, primarily due to a young core aging another year as well as having the 8th pick in tonight’s draft. Them getting Wiggins is a plus too, but I don’t see anything absolutely crazy happening with this team, I see them continuing their trend of playing really well offensively and with good ball movement, but still having a relatively mediocre defense

6. Magic. With (hopefully) Wagner being healthy all season and their young players like Banchero getting another year of experience, I don’t see them getting the 6 seed as totally crazy. I still think them firing Mosley was an overreaction considering how far the team got, but hopefully Sweeney can contribute as much to the magic as he did to the spurs (associate coach but whatever)

7. Raptors. Honestly, you could switch this with the magic and I wouldn’t say you’re wrong. Both are young teams that held veteran teams to a 7 game series in the playoffs, and if they do get turner like they want I could see this team going to another 7 game series or even a crazy upset.

8. Hornets. Again, I might sound like a broken record but this is a team with incredible talent that’s just young and has like no playoff experience. With them finally hitting 0.500 after 4 seasons and an absolutely loaded backcourt (including the first rookie to ever lead the league in 3’s), their Tre ball excessive offense clearly has worked to some degree (except for the play in game lol). Assuming they draft a big today (hopefully Mara), I could see them developing their game and finally being a team that isn’t a highlight machine with nothing to show for it

9. 76er’s. The 76er’s are in a really unique spot considering their star player is in injury trouble, although I’m sure the rest of the team is capable of stepping up. I hope Maxey and VJ will have a great season this year because the east is only getting better.

10. Pacers. I don’t know why everyone thinks that this team suddenly becomes an instant lock to the playoffs when their star player returns from injuries, when he looks out of shape and hasn’t played in a professional game in about a year, I think this team finishes better than last year but not by much. And yes I understand they were injury riddled but every star player in the east at least got one game in the last season

11. Heat. I don’t care what you say, Giannis on this team doesn’t change much in my opinion. They traded away 4 players (including their best player still yet to reach his prime at 26) and their first rounder this year for a 30 year old pf who just got off an injury riddled season. Sure you have Bam and Giannis on the same team but Giannis‘s defense has slowly climbed towards the league average (pretty sure worse now) and he’s only getting older. They need to get to signing this offseason because a roster who’s only semi-good backcourt player is Wiggins. Oh wait, he’s gone because they don’t have enough salary. Honestly have absolutely no clue why Riley thought this was a good idea. Stretch what I said about free agency. This team has to get a miracle to save them because they don’t even have a lot of draft picks.

12. Wizards. Again, overhyped comeback team. The first overall pick doesn’t suddenly turn the worst team in the conference to a playoff loc, and while everyone aging a year is good for everyone, this is a comeback in the making, not a sudden jump from a .207 to 0.500. Do I think they will do a lot better? Yes . Do I think they become the team everyone thinks they will? No.

13. Bulls. I don’t really know much about them except for the fact that their offense is decent and their defense is ass. I do realize they have the 3rd best pick this draft but honestly I don’t know what will happen with this team. This is all just speculative, but I don’t see them climbing any higher even though their team is young

14. Bucks. The team that traded their franchise hero away for half the heat roster and like 5 picks. I think right now the bucks are aiming for that sweet spot of 4-6th worst in the league, and with them looking to trade Herro yet again I don’t see anything other than their wish coming true

15. Nets. Everyone knows it. They do have two first rounders and Randle now, but I just don’t see this team escaping the last spot when you look at the rest of the East