An autonomous region in northern Iraq for religious minorites based on current demographics of the region. The region is named after the historical Yazidi emirate of Dasin (Sheikhan emirate) that lasted from the 800s to 1830s. The largest city would be Sinjar with a population of 200thousand 90% being Yazidis, followed by Bashiqa with a population of 60thousand 70% being Yazidi, 20% Christian and 10% Muslim.
A curfew has been imposed in the town of Khazlaniya in the countryside of Damascus. The curfew was imposed after clashes broke out between young people from Deir Ezzor and residents of the town.
This led to a widespread security intervention and a curfew was declared.
According to sources from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR):
The incident began in the town center with a verbal argument between two young people.
This argument then quickly turned into a gang fight in which guns and bombs were used.
As a result of the clashes, two young people were seriously and slightly injured, and a car was burned during the fighting.
There were also bilateral attacks on the homes of the warring parties in the town.
This issue led to increased tension and fears of an escalation of the conflict.
They label the displaced Kurds as PKK members to justify the killings. Local Kurds fled Sere Kaniye following the Turkish invasion. Turkey subsequently settled displaced Arabs from other parts of Syria.
These Arab settlers refuse to leave and continue to threaten Kurds seeking to return to their homes.
Masrour Barzani:
Today we opened the Hanging Gardens of Babylon Park in Ankawa district. Ankawa has always been a symbol of coexistence, and we hope this park will become a place for everyone to enjoy time together.
I am happy to see our homeland developing day by day. Together, we will try to create a more prosperous Kurdistan for our people and our visitors.
Madad Relief and Development along side Julis Operations Room and others have built 7 power stations, wells and water pumps in the villages of: Al Ghariyah, Dibin, Imtan, Al Hwayya, Nijran and Al Jnenih in Suwayda.
https://www.facebook.com/share/1AQCrBcTSw/
Aleppo province: SOHR sources in Afrin countryside have reported that farmlands planted with olive have been seized in the village of Jiqmaq Kabir in Raju district by individuals who previously worked in the economic committees of Turkish-backed “Syrian National Army” factions.
According to SOHR sources, the land was taken under the pretext that owners had not completed official documentation. Shortly after seizing the land, those individuals brought in agricultural machinery and started cultivation.
SOHR sources have also reported that some of those involved moved recently to the area, including members who joined the transitional government’s Ministry of Defence. They are taking advantage of the lack of legal documentation for land ownership over complications that the real owners faced. This issue dates back to previous periods when laws under Al-Assad regime prevented the registration or documentation of land in border areas.
These developments have sparked tension and anger among villagers, who see them as a seizure of their agricultural property. They warn that continued incidents will negatively affect local stability and deepen concerns among residents and displaced people. They also say that such incidents hinder any potential agreements of safe and voluntary return, especially with the absence of guarantees to protect property and avoid disputes.
Residents have called on relevant authorities in Afrin to intervene urgently to stop these practices, restore rights, and put an end to repeated land seizures in the area.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights stresses the need to address this issue seriously and humanely, to consider the situation of affected residents and to stop any practices that increase their suffering. SOHR also calls for finding lasting solutions that protect residents’ rights and reduce tensions, helping to provide a safer and more stable environment that allows for voluntary and safe return of displaced people.
Civil Defense: Our teams responded yesterday, Friday, to 165 fires across Syria, including 40 fires in fields and agricultural crops and 125 scattered fires in homes, commercial shops, weeds, and trees, with no injuries recorded
“We are now completely burned out. Everything has become expensive, there are no basic necessities of life, and unemployment has increased significantly. During the days of the SDF, all young people had salaries and jobs, and personally, I and everyone else used to get gasoline at the cheapest price and in sufficient quantities for us.”
From the Umm al-Zaytun crossing in the northern countryside of Suwayda, Suwayda Press monitors the movement of entry and exit on the Damascus-Suwayda road through the checkpoint of the Internal Security Forces in Suwayda.
Suwayda Press correspondent reported that the movement is normal and routine, pointing out that what was published yesterday regarding a "dense displacement of families" from Suwayda was misleading information; rather, a dense movement was recorded to bring in goods, as a result of the closure of the Damascus-Suwayda road for three days.
Suwayda Press camera was able to reach an advanced site that reveals the occupied village of al-Matuna and the crossing controlled by the Public Security Forces affiliated with the transitional authority, and it was clearly evident that a large number of goods transport vehicles are waiting for permission to enter Suwayda.
These same vehicles were photographed by pro-regime media outlets as being part of the alleged displacement movement from Suwayda, only to appear in the video today during their return to Suwayda loaded with goods.
Nearly all internally displaced people from Shahba region south of Afrin have returned to their homes.
Footage circulating online shows large numbers of chicks being discarded in a junkyard, highlighting the severe challenges facing the agricultural sector.
The scenes have sparked outrage, with many condemning the waste and the apparent disregard for the lives of the animals.
Syrian Kurds face a bind that operates on two levels, and the levels cut in opposite directions: they are peripheral where it matters to the Syrian centre, and urban where it matters within their own territory.
The first level concerns the relationship between Kurdish political geography and the Syrian state's historic centres of gravity. Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama were where Syrian national politics was made: where elites formed, where institutions acquired legitimacy, where national narratives were contested and eventually settled. Kurds were present in those cities, but as a minority and largely on the cities' own terms. Those who put down roots in the major urban centres tended toward assimilation into the broader Syrian social fabric. Their politics developed instead in border towns, smaller cities and rural areas far from the central spaces where Syrian statehood was being built. This meant the movement entered the post-2011 period at a structural disadvantage in exactly the registers that matter most for political claims: intellectual standing, institutional legibility and elite representation. Being peripheral to the cities that produce national politics is not simply a geographical inconvenience. It shapes what kind of actor you are permitted to be.
What that peripherality produces, beyond limitation, is dependency on movements built elsewhere. The two dominant currents in Syrian Kurdish politics each took their organisational and ideological shape from movements next door: one from the Iraqi Kurdish establishment built around the KDP and the Barzani lineage, the other from the Turkish Kurdish movement built around the PKK. The appeal was structural before it was ideological. Iraqi and Turkish Kurds inhabit much larger urban settlements, from Sulaymaniyah and Erbil to Diyarbakır and Wan, where Kurdish elite formation, intellectual life and party-political infrastructure had decades to develop on a scale Syrian Kurdish towns could not match. Syrian Kurdish politics inherited cadres, doctrines and frames of reference from those settings, and its two major poles have long resembled extensions of Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish movements more than products of a self-contained Syrian Kurdish tradition. Peripherality is not only about distance from Damascus. It is also about what fills the void when a movement cannot produce its own intellectual and institutional centre.
The full analysis: https://thenationalcontext.com/syrias-kurds-periphery-centre/
Link to download and view it in full quality: https://imgur.com/gallery/map-of-majority-christian-ezidi-settlements-ninewa-duhok-provinces-XIe6wXC