On 20 July, eight days after the 10th anniversary of the arbitral award in the Philippines’ case against China, Philippine and Chinese personnel clashed near Second Thomas Shoal (Opens in new window) in the South China Sea. Manila said Chinese coast guard personnel struck a Filipino sailor near the grounded BRP Sierra Madre, which it considers a lawful outpost. Beijing said Philippine boats rammed its patrol craft and attacked Chinese personnel within Chinese territory.

A map can specify where the encounter took place, but it can cast one side as the lawful occupant and the other as the intruder.

Maps can appear to be neutral or objective reference material. Some maps mark overlapping claims or disputed territory. Others reproduce one government’s position without qualification. Borders, labels, and colours can make a government’s claim to authority look like a geographic fact. Each map reflects choices about what to include and how much uncertainty to display.

For much of history, governments exercised authority over towns, ports, and routes while their reach weakened across vast stretches of land and water. As governments sought to exercise authority such as by collecting revenue or building military fortifications, they needed clearer ways to show where their control ended and another government’s began. This need for administrative clarity encouraged more standardised ways of depicting space. Early modern maps increasingly supplied that picture (Opens in new window), representing political authority as bounded territory separated by lines. The image was cleaner than the reality: claims overlapped, frontiers remained porous, and physical control often faded well before the edge of the territory shown on paper.

>

That representation could also move ahead of conditions on the ground. Colonial governments drew boundaries around places where their presence remained thin or contested. A claim incomplete in practice could appear complete on paper, giving officials a territorial framework they could later seek to enforce.

Full Article: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-maps-harden-territorial-claims

The Philippine Army is reportedly pursuing up to nine additional BrahMos coastal missile batteries, potentially transforming Manila’s limited shore-strike capability into a distributed archipelagic denial network confronting Chinese maritime power.

The prospective acquisition, organised under the Integrated Shore-Based Anti-Ship Missile System initiative, would supplement three BrahMos batteries already operated by the Philippine Marine Corps, multiplying launch positions, salvo density, and geographic coverage.

No Philippine authority has publicly confirmed a final nine-battery order, signed contract, or approved quantity, making the reported expansion an evolving requirement whose scale remains dependent upon negotiations, budgeting, and formal authorization.

Nevertheless, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr said the Philippines is “in the process of actually procuring more,” while Ambassador Josel F. Ignacio highlighted operational satisfaction and interest in broader industrial cooperation.

If implemented at maximum scale, the programme would move BrahMos from a concentrated Marine capability toward a joint Army-Marine fires architecture spanning Luzon, Palawan, and other strategically exposed approaches across the archipelago.

That force posture supports the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept, which redirects the Armed Forces of the Philippines from internal security toward external defence, dispersed basing, maritime awareness, and survivable long-range precision fires.

Its military significance rests on combining mobile launchers, networked sensors, command vehicles, reloaders, and supersonic missiles into concealed “shoot-and-scoot” units capable of threatening surface forces before rapidly displacing from counterstrike zones.

The reported expansion responds to Chinese water-cannon attacks, blocking, ramming incidents, and sustained pressure around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, although missiles cannot independently resolve confrontations occurring below armed-conflict thresholds.

Instead, BrahMos changes escalation calculations by placing valuable Chinese warships and supporting vessels within potential engagement envelopes, forcing commanders to consider dispersion, air defence, electronic warfare, surveillance, and pre-emptive targeting requirements.

For Manila, this represents deterrence through denial rather than naval parity, exploiting island geography to impose operational costs on a materially superior adversary without financing an unaffordable blue-water fleet of comparable size.

For Beijing, additional batteries could complicate access from the Luzon Strait to the western approaches of Palawan, while reinforcing Philippine positions connected to Taiwan contingencies and wider United States alliance planning.

Indonesia is prioritising military and police capacity-building in its defence cooperation with Cambodia this year rather than supplying additional weapons, as Jakarta seeks to ensure Cambodian personnel can operate the military equipment provided in previous years more effectively.

Krishnajie Partadiredja, chargé d’affaires ad interim of the Indonesian embassy in Phnom Penh, noted that defence cooperation remained a key pillar of the longstanding relationship between the two ASEAN countries.

Speaking in an August 17 interview during celebrations held at the embassy to mark the 81st Anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Indonesia, he explained that cooperation this year will focus on strengthening human resources.

“Defence and military cooperation is one of the backbones of cooperation between Indonesia and Cambodia,” he reiterated.

“For this year, the cooperation being implemented between the two countries is capacity development. The Indonesian government provides training for military personnel, as well as the police,” he added.

Partadiredja said Indonesia regarded such training as important for strengthening the capabilities of Cambodia’s security forces.

He was responding to questions about the future direction of bilateral defence cooperation and whether Jakarta planned to provide Cambodia with additional, or more advanced, military equipment.

He explained that while Indonesia had previously provided military equipment, predominantly small arms and ammunition from state-owned defense manufacturer PT Pindad, its current priority was ensuring Cambodian personnel had the skills required to properly operate it.

“This year, we are still more focused on capacity development because the weapons provided two years ago require additional training,” he said.

The defence cooperation forms part of a broader relationship between Cambodia and Indonesia that he described as progressing well across diplomatic, economic and other sectors.

The two countries have maintained diplomatic relations for more than 67 years, while cooperation has expanded across multiple fields.

Partadiredja pointed to a series of recent high-level exchanges as evidence of the increasingly active relationship, including a visit by an Indonesian Senate delegation to Cambodia and a visit by Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Hun Many to Jakarta.

An Indonesian deputy foreign minister also visited Cambodia in late July, he noted.

Beyond political and security cooperation, bilateral trade has continued to expand, with Partadiredja saying trade between the two countries had shown an upward trend for three consecutive years.

“The trade value between Indonesia and Cambodia has exceeded $1 billion,” he said.

He said data for the first six months of this year also indicated positive growth compared with the corresponding period of the previous year.

According to Partadiredja, Indonesian products are gaining greater acceptance among Cambodian consumers, giving Jakarta confidence about the outlook for bilateral commerce.

He did not provide a specific January-June trade figure during the interview, noting that the embassy would need to verify the latest data before releasing it.

Indonesia is also seeking to translate growing trade into greater business and investment links.

Partadiredja said the Indonesian government, through its embassy in Phnom Penh, would continue working to strengthen mutually beneficial economic cooperation rather than being satisfied with achievements already recorded.

As part of that effort, the embassy plans to organise a “Sousdey Indonesia” event on September 19-20 to introduce Indonesian products to Cambodian consumers and strengthen commercial connections between businesses from the two countries.

Indonesian businesses have also shown interest in establishing a greater manufacturing presence in Cambodia.

The interview highlighted Indonesian food producer Indofood and its investment in Kampong Speu province as an example of Indonesian companies looking beyond exports towards local production in the Cambodian market.

Tourism is another sector Jakarta wants to expand, with Partadiredja describing it as an important component of bilateral cooperation.

The embassy is considering organising a familiarisation (FAM) trip in October for a group of Cambodian journalists to visit tourism destinations in Indonesia, in an effort to increase awareness of the country’s tourism offerings among Cambodian travellers.

At the same time, Jakarta wants to see more direct air links connecting major destinations in the two countries.

Partadiredja said Indonesia was continuing to encourage additional direct flights between Cambodia and Indonesia, including routes connecting Phnom Penh with Jakarta and Bali, as well as Siem Reap with Bali.

He expressed his hopes that improved air connectivity would stimulate travel in both directions rather than benefiting only Indonesian tourism.

The combination of defence training, expanding trade and investment, high-level exchanges and efforts to improve tourism connectivity reflects a broader push by the two ASEAN members to deepen a diplomatic relationship established more than six decades ago.

Partadiredja it clear, however, that Jakarta’s immediate emphasis is on strengthening the ability of Cambodian personnel to make effective use of existing resources, rather than providing another round of military hardware.

Source: Southeast Asian Gallery

American special operations forces are ready to step up warfighting-readiness exercises with counterparts in the Philippines and other countries in Asia to further strengthen a security alliance and help deter a major conflict in the region, a U.S. military official said Thursday.

Adm. Frank Bradley, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, is in the Philippines after a trip to South Korea. He will then head to Japan for talks with military officials.

He is the latest American military top brass to visit key Asian allies in recent weeks to reassure them of Washington’s commitment to the region given the U.S. preoccupation with the war in Iran.

Bradley’s command, which has about 80,000 personnel and is based at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, undertakes the U.S. military’s most sensitive and dangerous covert operations. The majority of his forces are deployed in more than 80 countries worldwide, Bradley said.

He discussed with Filipino counterparts the Philippine military’s continuing effort to modernize, intensify combat exercises with the U.S. and other allies and broaden an arc of security alliances to deter China’s increasingly hostile actions in the South China Sea.

China and smaller rival claimant states, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, have been locked in tense territorial standoffs for decades in the disputed waters but confrontations have particularly flared between Chinese and Philippine forces.

Vietnam has begun construction on its largest and most advanced domestically designed anti-submarine frigate, marking a key milestone in Hanoi’s push to build a sovereign defense industry and reduce its historical dependence on Russian military imports.

Development officially commenced with a steel-cutting ceremony at government shipyard Song Thu Corporation’s facility in Da Nang.

Assembly of the multipurpose vessel is expected to take 36 months to complete, with state defense firm Viettel Group alongside state military factories supplying most of the warship’s weapons, components, and battle management capabilities.

The surface combatant will incorporate an active electronically scanned array radar, air-defense and anti-ship missiles, torpedo launchers, and a flight deck for a maritime helicopter.

Throughout the program, the Vietnam People’s Navy will act as the primary project owner overseeing system integration, testing, and handover of the platform.

“Becoming a strong maritime nation requires a capable navy commensurate with the country’s stature, one strong enough to safeguard national sovereignty over its seas and islands and protect national interests at sea,” said Senior Lt. Gen. Pham Hoai Nam, deputy minister of national defense for Vietnam.

The project aligns with a late July resolution from Vietnam’s Communist Party to expand maritime capabilities in response to Hanoi’s ongoing territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea.

Malaysia is accelerating planning for its Multi-Role Combat Aircraft programme as South China Sea uncertainty and vigorous combat-air modernisation by neighbouring countries expose the strategic limitations of the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s ageing fighter inventory and planned 2035 transition.

The shift does not constitute a fighter selection or compressed procurement decision, but advances requirements definition, budget positioning and industrial preparation under the Thirteenth Malaysia Plan as Southeast Asia’s airpower balance changes before formal evaluation begins around 2029 or 2030.

The Indonesian Navy is advancing its modernization effort with a new indigenous kamikaze unmanned surface vessel (USV) built to strengthen the country’s maritime strike capabilities.

Engineered by state-owned shipbuilder PT PAL, the USV can reach speeds of up to 55 knots (102 kilometers/63 miles per hour) while carrying a 150-kilogram (331-pound) warhead.

The vessel uses artificial intelligence for autonomous, real-time identification friend or foe (IFF), giving it the ability to distinguish potential targets without relying entirely on remote operators.

Long-range surface-to-surface and ground-based anti-ship missiles will help defend the country on both land and sea.

By Khang Vu

August 06, 2026

An air defense gun on display at a military museum in Binh Duong, Vietnam, Nov. 16, 2021.

Credit: Photo 268259835 © Duc Huy Nguyen | Dreamstime.com

Subscribe for ads-free reading

Already have an account? Log in.

You have reached the limit of 2 free articles this month.

Get to the bottom of the story

Subscribe today and join thousands of diplomats, analysts, policy professionals and business readers who rely on The Diplomat for expert Asia-Pacific coverage.

Get unlimited access to in-depth analysis you won't find anywhere else, from South China Sea tensions to ASEAN diplomacy to India-Pakistan relations. More than 5,000 articles a year.

• Unlimited articles and expert analysis
• Weekly newsletter with exclusive insights
• 16-year archive of diplomatic coverage
• Ad-free reading on all devices
• Support independent journalism

Subscribe Now View Subscription Options

Already have an account? Log in.

Authors

Guest Author

Khang Vu

Khang Vu is a visiting scholar in the Political Science Department at Boston College.

View Profile

Tags

• Asia Defense
• Security
• Southeast Asia
• Vietnam
• Anti-ship Missiles
• People's Army of Vietnam Navy
• Vietnam Artillery-Missile Command
• Vietnam defense policy
• Vietnam Military
• Vietnam People's Army (VPA)

Ad

Subscribe for ads-free reading