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Early Friction

The first armed clash between the two powers occurred in the Ferghana Valley (located across modern day Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) in 715. The Umayyad Caliphate used to have a Tibetan army as an ally, but this all ended with a minor victory for the Chinese army. The same happened two years later when the Chinese sent an army of Qarluq mercenaries, who defeated the Arabs and Tibetans.

In 750, Abu al Abbas al Saffah (who later became known as the founder of the Abbasid Caliphate) led a massive rebellion specifically, the Abbasid Revolution against the ascendant Umayyad Caliphate from Khorasan, a province in northeastern Iran. After an ultimate victory at the Battle of the Zab and eliminating the surviving members of the Umayyad family, Al Saffah sent his forces to reinforce the Caliphate's frontiers, including Central Asia. The forces faced plenty of regional powers here, and China's Tang Dynasty was no exception.

The Trigger: The Feud Over Chach

Ergo, the decisive clash at the Talas River was precipitated by another dispute in Ferghana. The King of Ferghana had a border dispute with the neighboring ruler of Chach (modern day Tashkent, Uzbekistan). He appealed to the Chinese, who sent General Gao Xianzhi (Kao Hsien chih), who had been successful in battles in Gilgit and the Ferghana region, to help Ferghana's troops. Gao besieged Chach, offered the Chachan king safe passage out of his capital, then reneged on his word and beheaded him. The Chachan king's son escaped and reported the incident to the Abbasid Arab ruler Abu Muslim in Khorasan.

Abu Muslim rallied the Abbasid troops at Merv and dispatched an expeditionary force further east under the direct command of General Ziyad ibn Salih. Ziyad ibn Salih was determined to teach General Gao a lesson and incidentally, to assert Abbasid power in the region.

The Battle Lines

In July of 751, the armies of the two great empires met at Talas (current Kyrgyz/Kazakhborder), While older chronicles contain heavily exaggerated claims such as Arab accounts putting the Chinese at 100,000, or Chinese estimates placing the Abbasid army at 200,000 troops (a figure that is almost certainly impossible from a logistical standpoint)—modern scholarship generally points to much smaller numbers. Today, historians estimate that the Tang army was roughly 20,000–30,000 strong, while the Abbasids fielded roughly 20,000–40,000 troops.

The armies clashed for at least five days, that’s what Chinese annals say, while Arabic records are silent on duration. Both of the armies relied heavily on cavalry. The Tang military combined Chinese weapons, the crossbow, and armored infantry with Central Asian horsemen by utilizing the stirrup.

The Qarluq Defection

Qarluq mercenaries and the retreating Ferghana allies originally supported the Chinese, but then defected to the Abbasids during the battle. They attacked the Tang army from close quarters while the main Abbasid forces attacked from the front. The Tang troops were unable to hold their positions, and the commander of the Tang forces, Gao Xianzhi, admitted that defeat was unavoidable. He managed to escape with some of his Tang regulars with the help of General Li Siye.

When it comes to the Qarluq Turks—precisely the role they played in the battle and the question of whether they were traitors or not—it still remains a mystery. Chinese historians link the defeat of the Tang army directly to the betrayal of the Qarluq mercenaries. Whatever the case, the Qarluq attack signaled the beginning of the end for Gao Xianzhi's army.

The Aftermath

The Abbasids chose not to pursue or invade China proper, as the daunting geography—requiring them to march a massive force over the brutal Tian Shan mountains and through the vast western deserts—was completely beyond their logistical capacity. On the other side, the Tang Dynasty’s subsequent decline was not caused by the Battle of Talas itself, but rather by the catastrophic An Shi (An Lushan) Rebellion that erupted internally in 755.

Gao Xianzhi was actually preparing to organize another Tang army to head back into Central Asia when the rebellion broke out. Because the internal civil war threatened the heart of the empire and saw the capital captured, the Tang were forced to permanently recall all their Central Asian garrisons back to China proper. This effectively ended Tang military dominance in Central Asia and prevented any sustained attempt to re-establish their former influence.

The Lasting Ramifications

The Battle of Talas is the only major pitched battle known between the Abbasid Caliphate and the Tang Empire, and the Muslim armies were victorious. The Muslims chose not to pursue the Chinese beyond Central Asia. Instead, they were put in a position to permanently extend their Islamic influence throughout Central Asia and its silk routes.

When it comes to the results of the battle for the Tang Dynasty, only a small percentage of the soldiers survived. Chinese records claim that roughly 2,000 soldiers returned to their territory in Central Asia. Gao Xianzhi himself was one of the few who escaped the slaughter. In addition, a number of Chinese soldiers were captured and taken back to Samarkand (in modern day Uzbekistan) as prisoners of war. Modern historians note that these Chinese prisoners may have helped transmit advanced paper-making techniques to Samarkand, contributing to the wider spread of papermaking across the Islamic world, which served as one of the major catalysts that helped fuel the upcoming Islamic Golden Age.

It’s easy to understand why the Battle of Talas in 751 between the Abbasid army and the Chinese army is often said to be one of the most important battles in Central Asian history. Although the battle itself was a localized military confrontation, it had significantly impressive consequences and ramifications on the future.

One of the major reasons for the defeat of the Tang Chinese in the battle of Talas was the extreme difficulty in supply. Rather than moving entirely through an empty desert, Tang armies in Central Asia had to be supplied through an immensely complex chain consisting of the Hexi Corridor, various oasis cities, military colonies, local taxation, and Silk Road depots. The broader issue was the extreme distance and complexity of maintaining frontier forces over such vast geographic spans. Another reason was the alliance between the Arabs and the Turks. Most of the Chinese allies were located in the far east and could contribute little to the battle.

An interesting final fact is that the commander of the Chinese army in the battle of Talas, called Gao Xianzhi in Chinese, was actually of Korean descent.

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>Benazir Bhutto won a small victory last week in her long-running battle with the government of Prime Minister Mian Mohammed Nawaz Sharif over charges of corruption: a Pakistani court unfroze her declared assets, which had been frozen at the government’s request in April. But there have been setbacks for her as well.

>A judge in Switzerland two weeks ago recommended that Bhutto be prosecuted on charges of money laundering. And for nearly two years her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, has languished in a Karachi jail on accusations of involvement in the 1996 death of Bhutto’s brother Mir Murtaza. Pakistani prosecutors have been poring over her finances as well as the record of her two terms as Prime Minister for evidence of wrongdoing.

>Throughout the ordeal, Bhutto has stoutly maintained her innocence. In a lengthy May 18 story, TIME detailed the government’s seemingly relentless campaign against the former Prime Minister and her husband. That account did not please Bhutto. So we asked her to write an article giving her side of the story.

Her response:

In 1988, at the age of 35, I became the first woman leader of the Muslim world when I was democratically elected as Prime Minister of Pakistan. My victory at the polls was no fluke, but rather the product of 11 long years of struggle. My role in the fight to restore democracy following its overthrow and the death of my father at the hands of the military dictator General Zia ul Haq is now part of history.

I twice held the office of Prime Minister–between 1988 and 1990, and again from 1993 to 1996. During these two stints in office, the government of my Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) greatly enhanced the standing of Pakistan both internally and in the eyes of the world. Among other accomplishments, my government projected Islam as a religion of moderation.

My speeches at major international conferences–on population planning in Cairo and on women’s rights in Beijing–united women in the East and the West. I galvanized the economy by encouraging foreign investment and actually paid off some of the principal on the country’s huge foreign debts. My programs to eliminate polio and reduce the population growth rate from a staggering 3.1% to 2.6% earned the gratitude of my countywomen. I restored the writ of government in Pakistan, giving the country stability, peace and prosperity, with an economic growth rate that hit 6%. All of this is now forgotten.

When my government ended in 1996, one of the complaints against it was corruption. A similar charge had been leveled against the government of Mian Mohammed Nawaz Sharif when he was dismissed as Prime Minister in 1993. Unsubstantiated allegations of corruption are simply a convenient catch-all phrase thrown in among many other reasons whenever a government in Pakistan is dismissed.

The current regime assumed office in February 1997. It is headed by Mr. Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the other main political party in Pakistan and the bitter rival of the PPP. Since assuming office, notwithstanding the enormous economic and other problems facing the country, the Nawaz Sharif government has adopted a one-point agenda: the elimination of the opposition party in Pakistan, with a view toward promoting one-party rule and thwarting the democratic process that I had done so much to guarantee. This agenda has focused on leveling false allegations against me and my husband, Senator Asif Ali Zardari, accompanied by a well-orchestrated media trial that a celebrity-hungry press finds exciting.

I am being tried under laws that did not exist when I was Prime Minister. The allegations largely involve unsubstantiated charges of corruption under the new Ehtesab (Accountability) Act 1997, passed with retroactive effect. Such laws are against the principles of natural justice. Complaints of alleged corruption under the Act are routed through the chairman of the Ehtesab Bureau, Saifur Rehman, who conveniently happens to be both a Senator from the PML and a close associate of the current Prime Minister. Hence the legal maxim that no man should be a judge in his own cause has been thrown out the window. Some Pakistanis have gone to the courts and to the press in attempts to expose the Senator’s brutal efforts to coerce them into committing perjury.

Ninety percent of cases investigated have been against my party workers and me. The real irony, however, is that the chairman of the Ehtesab Bureau is himself a loan defaulter whose company in the last budget benefited from the reduction in the duty imposed on the import of luxury cars, which happens to be his business. No doubt this was his reward for his campaign of victimization against my party and me under the guise of the Ehtesab Act.

Despite all the misleading statements emanating from the government, no investigations are being carried out against me by authorities in Britain. In Switzerland, authorities are investigating false allegations leveled against me by the Pakistani government. The High Court of Sindh province has stayed the Pakistani government from either corresponding with Swiss officials or pursuing the inquiry there until its legality has been determined. The government of Pakistan, one of the poorest countries in the world, has reportedly spent around $18 million in these desperate attempts to implicate me in false cases abroad. Yet the efforts have so far proved unsuccessful.

In Pakistan itself, only a few complaints have been filed against me under the Ehtesab Act, even though government investigators have gone through nearly every executive action of my two periods in office with a fine-tooth comb. Let me summarize these accusations, for which charges have not yet been framed:

• PIA. I have been accused of making illegal appointments at Pakistan International Airways. This case has nothing to do with financial impropriety. Interestingly, an identical reference–with full supporting evidence–was filed against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif but has not been referred to any court. Initially, I was not referred to in this case. I was added later on, when one of the people originally accused agreed to falsely implicate me in return for the case being dropped against him.
• Assets Misdeclaration. I have been accused of misdeclaring my assets when filing nomination papers for the 1997 elections. Again, this case does not involve financial impropriety. The official disinformation campaign has it that I own 11 properties in the United States, even though the government’s own detectives have confirmed that the properties are not mine. The public prosecutor admitted before the Lahore High Court that there is not a single piece of direct evidence linking me to bank accounts frozen by Switzerland.
• ARY Gold. I have been accused of granting monopoly rights for the import of gold to a firm called ARY Gold in return for receiving commissions. In fact, the contract was awarded after open tender in which only one company met the requirements. I played no role in selecting the successful bidder. Once again, I was not initially accused but named only later, after various witnesses were coerced into giving false statements against me in return for favors.
• Tractors. I have been accused of receiving commissions for the award of contracts to various tractor companies. Ironically, I am blamed for increasing the subsidized price of tractors for poor farmers from 110,000 rupees [about $2,200 at current exchange rates] to 150,000 [$3,000]. Yet today in the open market similar tractors are selling for 400,000 rupees [$8,000].
• PSI Companies. I am accused of favoritism in the awarding of customs inspection contracts to a Swiss firm. Yet the contracts were initially negotiated by the Nawaz Sharif government in 1992. They were awarded through open tender by the Revenue Department, which in 1994 put forward its choice to a committee that included me, the Adviser on Finance, the Law Minister and other government functionaries, who approved it unanimously. The pre-shipment inspection companies managed to enhance revenue collection to the benefit of the country by millions of rupees.

The evidence in all the above cases would be unlikely to get past the grand jury stage in the United States, let alone see a courtroom. The cases are based on political victimization that in any mature democracy would have no place in a court of law. This much-publicized victimization, however, is not just serving the political purpose of undermining the opposition in Pakistan. It is also furthering the government’s campaign to draw people’s attention away from the real issues facing the country, such as the collapse of the economy and the disharmony among the provinces, which are polarizing daily.

With the freezing of foreign currency accounts and the unjustified cancellation of power projects following its nuclear tests, the government in one fell swoop destroyed investor confidence and trust in Pakistan. The result, economists agree, is likely to be hyperinflation, with all the social and economic consequences that accompany it. Worryingly, petroleum prices have already increased by 25%, and every day foodstuffs like bread, cooking oil and ghee (clarified butter) are rising in price.

If the government’s handling of the economic situation was a blunder of monumental proportions, then its dealings with India have been a true disaster. As I write this article, heavy shelling continues along the Line of Control in Kashmir, and the specter of war between the two traditional rivals is again rearing its ugly head. Such tensions are unlikely to lead to an early signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by either country. That situation will keep the economy-squeezing effect of the sanctions firmly around Pakistan’s neck. As the nation nears the 21st century, the answers to our problems with India, including Kashmir, are likely to lie only in diplomacy, not in aggression and saber-rattling.

The policies of this government have also continued to undermine the concept of federalism upon which Pakistan and its constitution are based. Such policies seem geared to favor the Prime Minister’s home province, Punjab, at the expense of the others. By reopening the contentious Kalabagh Dam issue, the government has created greater tensions among the provinces, at precisely the time when it should have been seeking greater unity and solidarity.

My only hope is that the government can put aside its petty vendetta against the opposition party, and me in particular, and wake up to the needs of the nation before it is too late.

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Abu Hurairah (May Allah be pleased with him) said:

>The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) said, "The Hour will not come to pass before the River Euphrates dries up to unveil the mountain of gold, for which people will fight. Ninety-nine out of one hundred will die (in the fighting) and every man amongst them will say: 'Perhaps I may be the only one to remain alive."'
Another narration is: "The time is near when the River Euphrates will dry up to unveil a treasure of gold. Whosoever may be alive at that time, should not take anything of it." Source

The images I provided from The Death of Bilgames show that the water of the Euphrates River was diverted so that Gilgamesh could be buried with his treasures. I think this is connected to the Prophet’s hadith stating that the Euphrates will dry and uncover a mountain of gold.

any thoughts ?

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India has no native state so rich, potent and extensive as Hyderabad which is about the size of the United Kingdom and there last week the Royal Family of the Asatia Dynasty celebrated the Silver Jubilee of “The Richest Man in the World,” Lieut. General His Exalted Highness Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan, the Nizam of Hyderabad & Berar. 

Because the scheduled Coronation Durbar next winter of British King & Emperor George VI has had to be canceled by His Majesty (TIME, Feb. 15), there is no immediate prospect for the world to see such another Indian spectacle of pomp and power as that of the Jubilee Durbar which began in Hyderabad with warlike display of 10,000 Hyderabad troops last week and will close Feb. 26 when the Nizam prays in the public gardens of the Great Mosque, entertains the eminent Indian theologians of his Dominions, and throws open the characteristic and important Hyderabad Departmental Progress Exposition. 

Some Indian sovereigns are lecherous, champagne-quaffing wastrels with a taste for French women and English horses which they spectacularly gratify from Monte Carlo to Epsom Downs and Hollywood, but decidedly the Nizam is different, and by an honored Hyderabad tradition no Nizam has ever left India no matter how good a reason might exist for doing so. Ever since Hyderabad stood aloof from the great Indian Mutiny of 1857, its Royal Family have been accorded by British Royalty special honors and the Nizam now has the official status of “Faithful Ally.” This gracefully implies that his exalted highness is not so much the inferior as the colleague of His Majesty the Emperor of India — and, during the World War, the dry, grave “Richest Man in the World” contributed to Britain some $100,000,000 cash plus untold supplies and Hyderabad army units. 

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Jadidist: Another intellectual group of native society, namely the Jadidsts, was under the Tatar cultural influence. These progressive/ modern people were in favour of the reform, especially in the field of education.

>So far as the genesis of the Jadid movement is concerned, it can be traced, with introduction of the Phonetics known as ‘Usul-I Jadid’, meaning new method of teaching, reading and writing instead of understanding the subject in Muslim religious school system of Maktabs and Madrasahs. 

Young Central Asian intellectuals, who had good religious knowledge, started advocating the reformation of dogmatic understanding of religion. Reform, according to them, was revival of Islam that the prophet and his followers had practiced, anIslam, which was different from religious dogmas that were prevailing in the 18th -19th centuries.

>These arguments of the reformists angered traditionalists (qadimists) who were in favour of maintaining status quo. First Muslim reformists such as Jamalluddin Afghani, Muhaamad Abduh, Rashid Rida and Dr. Muhammad Iqbal were advocating that the “gate of ijtihad (exercise of independent judgment) is open for renovation which helps the Muslim people to solve the problems of the community” 

Initially, a group of native intelligentsia, the Jadidists, started their reform movement first in the field of education and proposed a radical reorganisation of the old educational system.
In other words it can be said that the fundamental object of this movement was to modernize the Central Asian society under the Tatar cultural influence. It was a kind of social and cultural reform movement led by native progressive intellectuals of the region. The Jadidists were critics of religious fanaticism.

They stood for fighting religious fanaticism of the masses by spreading new secular literature and developing European type of schools. They also started talking about the requirement of substitution of obsolete Muslim schools and seminaries with new method schools.

Jadidists supported the development of science and culture, advocated the publishing of newspapers in the native language, the opening of cultural and educational institutions, which helped in the consolidation of democratic forces of the native society. The main aim of this movement was to reform the traditional Muslaim religious educational system of Turkistan.

They introduced arithmetic, algebra, geography and science subjects in the new method school. They attempted to change traditional Maktabs and Madrasahs by introducing a new method ofstudy. However, the movement ended in failure. The Jadidists also began compiling new alphabets and special text-books for the new method of study. Following this, the followers of the movement started opening “new method schools in many of the cities of Central Asian region”

The first Jadid School was opened in Andijan in 1889 and during the subsequent decade spread to all major cities of the region. 

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One of the little-known chapters of history was the widespread famine in Iran during World War I, caused by the British presence in Iran. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Britain became the main foreign power in Iran and this famine or--more accurately--‘genocide’ was committed by the British. The document in the American Archives, reporting the widespread famine and spread of epidemic disease in Iran, estimates the number of the deceased due to the famine to be about 8-10 million during 1917-19 (1), making this the greatest genocide of the 20th century and Iran the biggest victim of World War I (2). 

It should be noted that Iran had been one of the main suppliers of food grains to the British forces stationed in the empire’s South Asian colonies. Although bad harvest during these two years made the situation worse, it was by no means the main reason why the Great Famine occurred. Prof. Gholi Majd of Princeton University writes in his book, The Great Famine and Genocide in Persia, that  American documents show that the British prevented imports of wheat and other food grains into Iran from Mesopotamia, Asia, and also the USA, and that ships loaded with wheat were not allowed to unload at the port of Bushehr in the Persian Gulf. Professor Majd argues that Great Britain intentionally created genocide conditions to destroy Iran, and to effectively control the country for its own purposes. Major Donohoe describes Iran of that time as a “land of desolation and death” (3). But this event soon became the subject of a British cover up.

Britain has a long record of its several attempts to conceal history and rewrite it in their own favor. The pages are filled with conspiracies that were covered up by the British government to hide its involvement in different episodes that would tarnish the country’s image. One of the clear examples is the “Jameson Raid”; a failed coup against Paul Kruger’s government in South Africa. This raid was planned and executed directly by the British government of Joseph Chamberlain under the orders of Queen Victoria (4) (5). In 2002, Sir Graham Bower's memoirs were published in South Africa, revealing these involvements that had been covered up for more than a century, focusing attention on Bower as a scapegoat for the incident (6).

The records that were destroyed to cover up British crimes around the globe, or were kept in secret Foreign Office archives, so as to, not only protect the United Kingdom's reputation, but also to shield the government from litigation, are indicative of the attempts made by the British to evade the consequences of their crimes. The papers at Hanslope Park also include the reports on the "elimination" of the colonial authority's enemies in 1950s Malaya; records that show ministers in London knew of the torture and murder of Mau Mau insurgents in Kenya and roasting them alive (7). These records may include those related to Iran’s Great Famine. Why were these records that cover the darkest secrets of the British Empire destroyed or kept secret? Simply because they might ‘embarrass’ Her Majesty’s government (8).

A famine occurred in Ireland from 1845 until 1852 which killed one fourth of the Irish population. This famine was caused by British policies and faced a large cover up attempt by the British government and crown to blame it on ‘potatoes’ (9). The famine, even today, is famous in the world as the “potato famine” when, in reality, it was a result of a planned food shortage and thus a deliberate genocide by the British government (10).

The true face of this famine as a genocide has been proven by historian Tim Pat Coogan in his book The Famine Plot: England’s Role in Ireland’s Greatest Tragedy published by Palgrave MacMillan (11). A ceremony was planned to take place in the US to unveil Coogan’s book in America, but he was denied a visa by the American embassy in Dublin (12).

Therefore it becomes obvious that Britain’s role in Iran’s Great famine, which killed nearly half of Iran’s population, was not unprecedented. The documents published by the British government overlook the genocide, and consequently, the tragedy underwent an attempted cover-up by the British government. The Foreign Office “handbook on Iran” of 1919 mentioned nothing related to the Great Famine. 

Julian Bharier, a scholar who studied Iran’s population, built his “backward projection” estimation of Iran’s population (13) based on reports from this “handbook” and, as a result, ignored the effect of the Great Famine on Iran’s population in 1917. Bharier’s estimations were used by some authors to deny the occurrence of the Great Famine or to underestimate its impacts. 

By ignoring Iran’s Great Famine in his estimations, Bharier’s work faces four scientific deficiencies. Bharier does not consider the loss of population caused by the famine in his calculations; he needs to ‘adjust’ the figure of the official census in 1956 from 18.97 million to 20.37 million, and this is despite the fact that he uses 1956 census as his primary building block for his “backward projection” model. He also ignores the official growth rates and uses his personal assumptions in this regard, which is far lower than other estimates. Finally, although Bharier frequently cites Amani’s estimates (14), in the end Bharier’s findings contradict that of Amani’s; notably Bharier’s population estimate for 1911 is 12.19 million while Amani put this figure at 10.94 million. 

Despite deficiencies in the population estimates offered by Bharier for the period of the Famine and its earlier period, his article offers useful data for the post-Famine period; this is because these figures are generated from 1956 backward. That is to say, numbers generated from 1956 to 1919 are thus credible because they do not include the period of famine. Moreover, this portion of Bharier’s data are also true to that of the American Legation. For example, Caldwell and Sykes estimate the 1919 population at 10 million, which is comparitive to Bharier’s figure of 11 million. 

Gholi Majd was not the first author to refute Bharier’s figures for this period. Gad G. Gilbar, in his 1976 article on demographic developments during the second half of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century, also considers Bharier’s estimates inaccurate for the period.

In an apparently biased review of Majd’s work, Willem Floor confirms Bharier’s model (15), despite its apparent deficiencies, and takes a mocking tone toward the well- documented work of Gholi Majd to undermine the devastation caused by the British-instigated famine in Iran, to the point of total denial of the existence of such a genocide. Floor also offers inaccurate or untrue information to oppose the fact that the British deprived Iranians from honey and caviar in the north, as he argues caviar was haram (religiously prohibited), while no such fatwa has ever existed in Shia jurisprudence and all available decrees assert that caviar is halal or permissible under the Islamic law. There was a rumor made up by Russians at the time, saying that Caviar was haram and Britain made full use of this rumor.

Another criticism made by Floor was to question why Majd’s work does not use British archival sources. A more important question is why Majd should have used these sources when they totally ignore the occurrence of the famine in Iran. The fact that Majd used mainly US sources seems to be reasonable on the grounds that the US was neutral toward the state of affairs in Iran at the time, and made efforts to help by feeding them (16).

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They were forced to literally prostrate themselves before the Emperor, pay a heavy imperial fine of 150,000 rupees, and promise better behavior before their trading privileges were restored.

At first I thought of putting screenshots of pages but anyways this is better summarised.
Aurangzeb was just like any other king, one could say he was more pious and rigid in his policies compared to his ancestors but the modern narratives overwhelmingly show him anti Hindu, sikh but that wasn’t the case. Below are some of the points from Audrey Truschke’s book. I could point out how Muslims or other religions or caste people were treated under various empires but it’ll again be just a whataboutism rather than actually understanding Aurangzeb better.

I. Factual Evidence Rebutting the "Anti Hindu Fanatic" Myth

• Hindu Representation in Government (Page 56):

> Between 1679 and 1707, Aurangzeb increased Hindu participation at elite levels of the Mughal administration by nearly 50%. Under his rule, Hindus rose to constitute 31.6% of the total Mughal nobility, a higher percentage than under any prior Mughal ruler.

• The 1659 Benares Farman (Page 80):

>In February 1659, Aurangzeb issued an imperial order (farman) commanding local officials to halt any interference with Hindu residents and Brahmin priests at ancient temples in Benares, directing that they be left alone to pray for the continuance of the Empire.

• Imperial Grants to Hindu Temples (Page 81):

>Land and monetary grants were given by Aurangzeb to Hindu institutions, including confirming revenue rights for the Umanand Temple in Assam, granting empty land on a Benares ghat to Ramjivan Gosain to build houses for "pious Brahmins and holy faqirs" (1687), and conferring eight villages and a chunk of tax-free land on Mahant Balak Das Nirvani to support the Balaji Temple in Chitrakoot (1691).

• Sponsorship and Protection of Jains (Page 82):

> Aurangzeb granted land at Shatrunjaya, Girnar, and Mount Abu to specific Jain communities in the late 1650s, and issued legal orders as late as 1703 prohibiting people from harassing the Jain leader Jina Chandra Suri.

• Rejection of Religious Litmus Tests (Page 58):

>When a Muslim from Bukhara petitioned the emperor to deny promotions to Persian Shias, Aurangzeb rejected the request in writing, stating:
"What connection have earthly affairs with religion? And what right have administrative works to meddle with bigotry? 'For you is your religion and for me is mine.'... Wise men disapprove of the removal from office of able officers."

• Waiving the Jizya Tax (Page 94):

>While he reinstated the non-Muslim poll tax (jizya), he systematically canceled it when it caused economic distress, waiving it for Hyderabad in 1688–89 due to drought, and remitting it for the entire Deccan region in 1704 in consideration of the toll of famines and war.

• Dedication of Hindu Epics to the Emperor (Page 47):

>Multiple poets dedicated their Persian translations of the Sanskrit Ramayana directly to Aurangzeb, including Chandraman's Nargisistan in the early 1690s and Amar Singh's Amar Prakash in 1705.

II. Factual Evidence Rebutting Aurangzeb's "Perfectly Just Muslim" Persona

• Overriding His Own Islamic Legal Code (Page 69):

>In 1700, during the siege of Satara Fort, a Mughal judge followed the Fatawa-i Alamgiri and offered captured Hindu rebels a full pardon if they converted to Islam. Dissatisfied with such leniency, Aurangzeb ordered the judge to "decide the case in some other way, that control over the kingdom may not be lost," resulting in the execution of all 13 prisoners (both Hindus and Muslims) before sundown.

• Brutal Crushing of His Own Family (Pages 27, 33, 35):

>To seize the throne, Aurangzeb besieged the Agra fort and cut off its water supply to force Shah Jahan into surrender (Page 27), keeping his father under house arrest for seven and a half years until his death (Page 35). He ordered the executions of his brothers Dara Shukoh and Murad Bakhsh, and ordered his nephew Sulayman Shukoh overdosed on opium water (Page 33).

• Warring Against Fellow Islamic States (Pages 69, 90):

>Driven by territorial expansion, Aurangzeb spent years besieging the wealthy Muslim sultanates of Bijapur (1685–86) and Golconda (1687) (Page 90), ignoring a delegation of Bijapuri theologians who pleaded with him to end the siege on the grounds that warring against fellow Muslims was unjust (Page 69).

• Politically Motivated Executions of Religious Figures (Pages 34, 54):

>Religious figures who challenged state interests were targeted with capital punishment. The Armenian Jewish mystic Sarmad was executed in 1661 for prophesying that Dara Shukoh would take the throne (Page 34), and the ninth Sikh Guru, Tegh Bahadur, was executed in 1675 because he militarily opposed Mughal state interests in the Punjab (Page 54).