u/wenitte

Abstract
Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) represent one of the most consequential possible transformations of the international monetary system since the transition from metallic money to modern sovereign currencies. Yet despite widespread experimentation, governments across Africa, Europe, Asia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Latin America remain hesitant to move from research and pilot programs toward universal deployment.
This hesitation is understandable. CBDCs raise questions about privacy, cybersecurity, monetary sovereignty, financial stability, bank disintermediation, technological dependence, operational resilience, and the appropriate relationship between governments and private payment networks. The problem, however, is that many of these debates implicitly treat CBDCs as isolated national technologies rather than components of a future global monetary network.
This paper proposes a different analytical framework: Mathematical Futurology.
Mathematical Futurology treats technological systems as evolving networks whose future value is determined not merely by the capabilities of individual components, but by the interactions among those components. Under this framework, the strategic value of a CBDC grows dramatically when it becomes interoperable with other CBDCs.
The resulting proposition is straightforward:
Every sovereign government should ultimately possess a CBDC, and sovereign CBDCs should be capable of interoperating through a neutral, secure, programmable and internationally governed settlement infrastructure.
This paper proposes the LIGDI blockchain as a conceptual candidate for such an infrastructure.
LIGDI is envisioned not as a replacement for national currencies or central banks, but as a common technological layer through which independently issued sovereign currencies can communicate, settle and exchange value. The objective is therefore not a single world currency. It is a network of sovereign digital currencies.
The mathematical-futurological argument is that the global economic value of such an architecture can grow approximately with the number of interoperable monetary relationships rather than merely with the number of CBDCs themselves. A fragmented world containing (N) independent CBDC systems has potentially (O(N^2)) bilateral interoperability relationships. A common settlement layer can reduce this complexity toward (O(N)) infrastructure integrations.
The result could be a fundamentally different global payments architecture: faster cross-border settlement, reduced reconciliation costs, programmable international commerce, more efficient remittances, improved monetary interoperability and potentially greater monetary sovereignty for smaller economies.
The imperative, therefore, is not simply to digitize money.
It is to connect digital sovereign money.

I. Introduction: The Coming Monetary Transition
Money is undergoing a technological transformation.
For centuries, sovereign monetary systems were fundamentally physical. Coins and banknotes embodied the state’s monetary authority. The twentieth century transformed money into increasingly electronic forms, with commercial bank deposits, payment cards, electronic transfers and automated clearing systems becoming dominant.
The twenty-first century introduces another possibility:
money that is natively digital, programmable and potentially interoperable across borders.
The CBDC is the institutional expression of this possibility.
A CBDC is fundamentally different from a private cryptocurrency. It is a digital representation of sovereign central-bank money. The Bank for International Settlements reported in 2025 that 91% of 93 surveyed central banks were exploring retail CBDCs, wholesale CBDCs, or both. (Bank for International Settlements)
The question facing governments is therefore no longer whether digital money is coming.
Digital money is already here.
The question is:
What architecture will govern the next generation of sovereign money?
There are two broad possibilities.
The first is fragmentation.
Every country develops its own CBDC platform, technological standards, identity architecture, APIs, settlement mechanism and cross-border protocols.
The second is interoperability.
Countries retain complete monetary sovereignty but use a common infrastructure for exchanging and settling sovereign digital currencies.
This paper argues that the second model is superior.
The proposed infrastructure is called LIGDI.

II. The Central Paradox of CBDCs
Governments are simultaneously interested in CBDCs and afraid of them.
This apparent contradiction is rational.
A central bank can see enormous potential in digital sovereign money while simultaneously recognizing that poorly designed digital money could destabilize the financial system.
The CBDC therefore presents a paradox:
[
\text{Potential Benefit} \uparrow
\quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad
\text{Potential Systemic Risk} \uparrow
]
The more powerful the technology becomes, the greater the consequences of its design.
This explains why central banks have generally adopted an experimental rather than revolutionary approach.
The BIS found that wholesale CBDC experimentation is generally more advanced than retail CBDC experimentation. (Bank for International Settlements)
The IMF likewise emphasizes that CBDC implementation must be tailored to national circumstances and requires governments to evaluate financial stability, payments competition, legal questions, financial integrity and operational resilience. (International Monetary Fund)
The hesitation is therefore not evidence that CBDCs are technologically irrelevant.
It is evidence that money is too important to redesign casually.
The Mathematical Futurology argument begins precisely here.

III. Mathematical Futurology
Mathematical Futurology can be defined as the study of future technological and institutional systems using mathematical models of:
network effects,
scaling,
feedback loops,
probability,
optimization,
complexity,
interoperability,
technological diffusion,
systemic risk,
and long-term equilibrium.
Traditional policy analysis often asks:
“Does this technology work?”
Mathematical Futurology asks a different question:
“What happens when this technology becomes one component of a much larger interconnected system?”
This distinction is critical.
A single CBDC might produce modest benefits.
One hundred interoperable CBDCs could produce transformational benefits.
The difference is a network effect.

IV. The Network Effect of Sovereign Money
Suppose there are (N) countries.
If every CBDC operates independently, every country wishing to directly interoperate with another country may require a bilateral technical, legal and operational arrangement.
The number of possible bilateral relationships is:
[
E = \frac{N(N-1)}{2}
]
For (N=200):
[
E = \frac{200(199)}{2}
]
[
E = 19,900
]
Nearly twenty thousand potential bilateral relationships exist.
This is an enormous coordination problem.
Every relationship may require:
technical integration,
legal agreements,
foreign-exchange mechanisms,
compliance rules,
identity standards,
cybersecurity protocols,
settlement procedures,
dispute resolution,
liquidity arrangements,
data-sharing agreements,
and operational monitoring.
The complexity grows approximately quadratically:
[
O(N^2)
]
This is the CBDC interoperability problem.

V. The LIGDI Solution
LIGDI proposes changing the topology.
Instead of:
[
CBDC_A \leftrightarrow CBDC_B
]
[
CBDC_A \leftrightarrow CBDC_C
]
[
CBDC_B \leftrightarrow CBDC_C
]
and so forth,
the architecture becomes:
[
CBDC_A \rightarrow LIGDI \leftarrow CBDC_B
]
[
CBDC_C \rightarrow LIGDI \leftarrow CBDC_D
]
The blockchain becomes a common settlement and interoperability layer.
Conceptually:
[
\boxed{
\text{National CBDCs}
\rightarrow
\text{LIGDI}
\rightarrow
\text{National CBDCs}
}
]
The countries remain sovereign.
Their currencies remain sovereign.
Their central banks remain sovereign.
Their monetary policies remain sovereign.
LIGDI simply becomes the interoperability layer.
The infrastructure problem can consequently move toward:
[
O(N)
]
rather than:
[
O(N^2)
]
Each country primarily needs to integrate with the common infrastructure rather than separately engineer thousands of bilateral relationships.
This is the fundamental mathematical argument for LIGDI.

VI. Africa: Inclusion, Fragmentation and Monetary Sovereignty
Africa may ultimately have some of the strongest reasons to pursue interoperable CBDCs.
The continent contains numerous currencies, monetary jurisdictions, payment systems and economic communities.
At the same time, Africa has demonstrated extraordinary innovation in mobile money.
The IMF’s research on Sub-Saharan Africa emphasizes that mobile money and fast-payment systems are already important foundations of the regional payments ecosystem. It also concludes that CBDCs can complement those systems where there are identifiable market failures or strategic public-interest reasons. (International Monetary Fund)
The BIS has similarly identified financial inclusion, payment efficiency and monetary-policy considerations as important motivations for African central banks, while also noting concerns about cybersecurity, cross-border spillovers, operational burdens and informality. (Bank for International Settlements)
The African CBDC problem therefore cannot simply be:
“How do we create digital versions of African currencies?”
It should be:
“How do we create digital African currencies capable of communicating with one another?”
Consider the potential:
[
\text{Naira}
\leftrightarrow
\text{Cedi}
\leftrightarrow
\text{CFA}
\leftrightarrow
\text{Rand}
\leftrightarrow
\text{Shilling}
]
through a standardized settlement layer.
This could eventually transform:
African trade,
remittances,
regional commerce,
government procurement,
development finance,
agricultural payments,
infrastructure investment,
and cross-border entrepreneurship.
The mathematical opportunity is especially large because the cost of fragmented financial systems falls disproportionately on smaller economies.
LIGDI could therefore become an infrastructure for African monetary interoperability without requiring monetary unification.
That distinction is crucial.
A Ghanaian cedi would remain a cedi.
A Nigerian naira would remain a naira.
A South African rand would remain a rand.
The currencies would simply become technologically interoperable.

VII. Europe: Monetary Integration Without Technological Fragmentation
Europe represents perhaps the clearest example of the tension between national sovereignty and monetary integration.
The European Union has already created one of the world’s most sophisticated multinational monetary structures.
The digital euro project illustrates the seriousness with which European institutions are approaching digital public money.
The ECB currently anticipates that, assuming legislation is completed, the Eurosystem could be ready for potential first issuance around 2029. A pilot is planned for the second half of 2027. (European Central Bank)
Europe’s concern is not merely technological.
It is strategic.
The ECB explicitly connects digital euro development with monetary sovereignty, payment-system resilience and the preservation of public money in an increasingly digital economy. (European Central Bank)
A LIGDI architecture could extend this logic beyond the euro area.
Imagine:
[
Digital\ Euro
\rightarrow LIGDI
\rightarrow Digital\ Pound
]
or:
[
Digital\ Euro
\rightarrow LIGDI
\rightarrow Digital\ Yen
]
without requiring either central bank to surrender monetary authority.
Europe could consequently treat interoperability as an extension of monetary sovereignty rather than its destruction.

VIII. Asia: The Laboratory of Digital Sovereign Money
Asia is particularly important because several Asian economies have pursued ambitious experiments in digital sovereign money and cross-border settlement.
The region includes some of the world’s largest economies, most technologically sophisticated payment markets and fastest-growing digital economies.
The mathematical-futurological opportunity is enormous.
Suppose Asian CBDCs become interoperable.
A transaction between two Asian businesses could potentially move through a chain such as:
[
CBDC_A
\rightarrow
FX\ Conversion
\rightarrow
LIGDI
\rightarrow
CBDC_B
]
The objective would be to minimize:
[
T = t_{payment}+t_{FX}+t_{settlement}+t_{reconciliation}
]
where:
(t_{payment}) = payment-processing time,
(t_{FX}) = foreign-exchange processing time,
(t_{settlement}) = settlement time,
(t_{reconciliation}) = reconciliation time.
A properly engineered distributed settlement layer could seek to reduce the aggregate value of:
[
T
]
while simultaneously reducing transaction costs.
The result would not necessarily be a single Asian currency.
It would be something more subtle:
a common digital monetary infrastructure supporting many currencies.

IX. The United States: The Question of Necessity
The American case is fundamentally different.
The United States already possesses an enormous, sophisticated payments ecosystem.
Consequently, the argument for a U.S. CBDC cannot simply be:
“Digital payments are useful.”
Americans already have digital payments.
The stronger argument concerns the future architecture of money.
The Federal Reserve states that it has made no decision to pursue or implement a CBDC and has studied potential benefits and risks. (Federal Reserve)
From a Mathematical Futurology perspective, however, the United States must consider a strategic possibility.
Suppose other major economies eventually operate CBDCs while the United States does not.
The international monetary system could become increasingly populated by digital sovereign currencies while the dollar remains primarily represented internationally through existing commercial banking and payment infrastructure.
That does not automatically threaten the dollar.
But it creates an architectural asymmetry.
A future digital monetary system might contain:
[
Digital\ Yuan
]
[
Digital\ Euro
]
[
Digital\ Yen
]
[
Digital\ Pound
]
[
Digital\ Real
]
and hundreds of other digital currencies.
The question then becomes:
Where does the digital dollar fit?
From a mathematical-futurological standpoint, the answer cannot be left entirely to historical momentum.
The dollar’s future network effect may depend partly on whether it participates in the architecture of digital settlement.

X. The United Kingdom: Sovereignty and Interoperability
The British case presents another interesting paradox.
The United Kingdom possesses a globally important currency and sophisticated financial infrastructure.
A digital pound could therefore become not merely a domestic payment instrument but a potential component of future international settlement.
The central strategic question is whether digital currencies become isolated national technologies or interoperable components of global finance.
A LIGDI model would allow Britain to preserve:
[
Monetary\ Sovereignty_{UK}
]
while increasing:
[
International\ Interoperability_{UK}
]
The two variables do not necessarily have to be opposites.
That is one of the most important propositions of this paper.

XI. Latin America: The Remittance and Inclusion Equation
Latin America presents a different but equally compelling case.
The region has significant cross-border financial activity and historically high costs associated with remittances and certain international transfers.
Research on CBDCs in Latin America and the Caribbean has emphasized motivations including financial inclusion, efficiency and the safety of domestic payment systems. (ScienceDirect)
Imagine a future in which:
[
Digital\ Peso
\leftrightarrow
LIGDI
\leftrightarrow
Digital\ Dollar
]
could occur through standardized infrastructure.
The mathematical objective becomes the minimization of:
[
C_{transfer}
]
where:
[

C_{transfer}
C_{intermediary}
+
C_{FX}
+
C_{compliance}
+
C_{settlement}
+
C_{reconciliation}
]
Reducing those components could increase the effective value received by households and businesses.
The same architecture could potentially connect Latin America to Africa, Europe and Asia.
Thus:
[
Latin\ America
\rightarrow
LIGDI
\rightarrow
Africa
]
could become as technically natural as:
[
New\ York
\rightarrow
Domestic\ Payment\ Network
\rightarrow
Chicago
]
is today.

XII. Why Governments Hesitate
If the mathematical case appears powerful, why are governments hesitant?
Because the costs are also nonlinear.
1. Cybersecurity
A global CBDC infrastructure would become an extraordinarily valuable target.
Its attack surface could be represented conceptually as:
[
R_{cyber}=f(V,S,C)
]
where:
(V) = system value,
(S) = system complexity,
(C) = connectivity.
The more valuable and interconnected the infrastructure, the more consequential successful attacks could become.
Therefore, LIGDI cannot simply be “a blockchain.”
It would need to be treated as critical global financial infrastructure.

2. Monetary Sovereignty
Governments fear that shared infrastructure could eventually become shared monetary authority.
That fear is rational.
LIGDI must therefore explicitly separate:
[
Settlement\ Infrastructure
]
from:
[
Monetary\ Policy
]
The blockchain should not determine:
interest rates,
money supply,
reserve requirements,
inflation targets,
currency issuance,
or fiscal policy.
Those remain sovereign functions.

3. Privacy
CBDCs create a difficult optimization problem:
[
Privacy + Compliance + Transparency
]
cannot simply be maximized independently.
Increasing transaction visibility can improve anti-money-laundering capabilities while potentially reducing financial privacy.
Therefore the objective should be:
[

\max U
\alpha P
+
\beta S
+
\gamma C
]
where:
(P) = privacy,
(S) = security,
(C) = compliance,
subject to legal and constitutional constraints.
A LIGDI architecture would need privacy-preserving technologies rather than assuming that all transactions should be publicly observable.

XIII. The Financial Stability Problem
Perhaps the greatest economic objection concerns commercial banks.
If citizens can hold risk-free central-bank money directly, they might move deposits from commercial banks into CBDCs.
In an extreme scenario:
[
Deposits_{banks}
\rightarrow
CBDC
]
could accelerate during financial crises.
This could produce a digital bank run.
Therefore a sophisticated LIGDI architecture should not assume unlimited CBDC balances.
Possible mechanisms include:
holding limits,
tiered remuneration,
transaction limits,
offline functionality,
intermediated wallets,
emergency liquidity mechanisms.
The ECB’s digital euro design, for example, contemplates holding limits partly to preserve financial stability and maintain the role of banks in providing credit. (European Central Bank)
Mathematical Futurology therefore does not mean “deploy technology immediately.”
It means optimizing the system against its future failure modes.

XIV. The LIGDI Architecture
A theoretical LIGDI system could contain several layers.
Layer 1: Sovereign Issuance
Each central bank controls its own CBDC.
[
CB_i \rightarrow CBDC_i
]
Layer 2: Identity
A privacy-preserving identity layer determines whether participants are authorized to transact.
Layer 3: Settlement
LIGDI provides the distributed settlement environment.
Layer 4: Foreign Exchange
Algorithms and regulated liquidity providers facilitate currency conversion.
Layer 5: Smart Contracts
Programmable contracts automate legitimate financial processes.
Layer 6: Governance
An international governance structure establishes protocol rules without controlling national monetary policy.
The architecture therefore resembles:
[
\boxed{
Sovereignty
+
Interoperability
+
Security
+
Programmability
}
]
rather than:
[
\boxed{
Global\ Currency
}
]
That distinction should be foundational.

XV. The Mathematics of Global Adoption
Suppose each country has probability (p) of joining an interoperable CBDC network.
For (N) countries, the expected number of participants is:
[
E[N_{CBDC}] = Np
]
But the economic value of the network may not grow linearly.
If the number of useful monetary relationships grows approximately with:
[
\frac{N(N-1)}{2}
]
then:
[
V(N) \propto N^2
]
under an idealized network-effect assumption.
This produces a powerful policy implication:
The twentieth country joining the network may create more systemic interoperability value than the twentieth country would create if CBDCs remained isolated.
The network becomes increasingly valuable as participation grows.
This is the classic logic of network economics.

XVI. A Global Digital Monetary Graph
We can represent the global economy as a graph:
[
G=(V,E)
]
where:
[
V = {CBDC_1,CBDC_2,\ldots,CBDC_N}
]
and each edge represents an interoperable economic relationship.
In a fragmented architecture:
[
E \approx \frac{N(N-1)}{2}
]
In a hub-and-spoke interoperability architecture:
[
E \approx N
]
The infrastructure therefore changes the topology of global money.
This is perhaps the deepest argument for LIGDI.
It does not merely make payments faster.
It changes the mathematical structure of the international monetary system.

XVII. From Bilateralism to Monetary Internet
The Internet succeeded partly because individual networks adopted common protocols.
The global financial system could eventually undergo an analogous transition.
The Internet did not require:
[
One\ Computer
]
It required:
[
Common\ Protocols
]
Similarly, global CBDC interoperability does not require:
[
One\ Currency
]
It requires:
[
Common\ Settlement\ Protocols
]
LIGDI can therefore be conceptualized as a kind of monetary Internet protocol.
The analogy is not exact.
Money is vastly more politically sensitive than packets of information.
Nevertheless, the underlying network principle is similar:
[
Interoperability
\rightarrow
Network\ Expansion
\rightarrow
Network\ Utility
\rightarrow
Network\ Adoption
]

XVIII. The Case for Universal CBDCs
The strongest version of the argument is therefore not:
Every country needs a CBDC because CBDCs are technologically fashionable.
It is:
Every sovereign government should eventually possess a digital representation of its central-bank money because an increasingly digital economy requires public money to remain technologically interoperable with the infrastructure through which economic activity occurs.
This is particularly important if private stablecoins, tokenized deposits and other digital financial instruments continue to expand.
The BIS reports that central-bank interest in CBDCs has also been influenced by developments in stablecoins and cryptoassets. (Bank for International Settlements)
The state therefore faces a strategic choice.
It can allow the future digital monetary architecture to be dominated primarily by private networks.
Or it can ensure that sovereign money remains a first-class participant.
Mathematical Futurology strongly favors the latter.

XIX. But LIGDI Should Not Become a Global Monetary Government
There is an important limit to the argument.
LIGDI should not become:
a world central bank,
a global monetary authority,
a supranational treasury,
an institution capable of independently creating sovereign money,
or an entity capable of dictating national monetary policy.
Its purpose should be infrastructural.
The ideal principle is:
[

Power_{LIGDI}
Interoperability
]
not:
[

Power_{LIGDI}
Monetary\ Sovereignty
]
This distinction would be essential for political legitimacy.

XX. Governance of LIGDI
A global financial blockchain would require extraordinarily sophisticated governance.
A hypothetical structure could include:
Sovereign Council
Central banks and monetary authorities participate in governance.
Technical Council
Cryptographers, distributed-systems engineers and cybersecurity experts maintain the protocol.
Legal Council
International financial-law experts establish standards for cross-border settlement.
Privacy Council
Independent experts evaluate civil-liberties and data-protection implications.
Emergency Council
A narrowly defined mechanism handles catastrophic technical incidents.
Governance should be:
[
Multilateral + Transparent + Auditable + Limited
]
rather than concentrated in a single state or corporation.

XXI. The Principle of Sovereign Interoperability
The most important political principle could therefore be called:
Sovereign Interoperability
A country should not have to surrender its currency in order to participate in the global digital economy.
Instead:
[

National\ Sovereignty

+

Common\ Infrastructure
Sovereign\ Interoperability
]
This model could be particularly valuable to smaller countries.
A major economy can afford to construct enormous financial infrastructure.
A small island state cannot necessarily do so.
A common infrastructure could therefore democratize access to sophisticated financial technology.

XXII. A 2050 Mathematical-Futurology Scenario
Imagine the world in 2050.
Suppose 180 sovereign governments have digital currencies.
Without common infrastructure, the world could contain thousands of bilateral technological and regulatory arrangements.
With an interoperable settlement layer, the architecture could look like:
[
180\ CBDCs
\rightarrow
1\ Interoperability\ Layer
\rightarrow
Global\ Economy
]
A business in Senegal could theoretically pay a supplier in Brazil.
A European company could settle with an Asian manufacturer.
An African worker could receive compensation from a European employer.
A Latin American exporter could settle with an Asian importer.
A government could distribute benefits directly to eligible citizens.
A multinational corporation could program cross-border settlement into its supply chain.
All of these transactions could occur while national currencies remain sovereign.
This is the central future imagined by LIGDI.

XXIII. A New Equation for Global Monetary Infrastructure
The traditional monetary system can be conceptualized as:
[

Money
Currency
+
Banks
+
Payment\ Networks
+
Clearing
+
Settlement
]
The digital sovereign monetary system becomes:
[

Money
CBDC
+
Identity
+
Smart\ Contracts
+
Settlement
+
Interoperability
]
The LIGDI proposition adds another term:
[

Global\ Money
\sum CBDC_i
+
LIGDI
]
The crucial point is that LIGDI is not itself the money.
It is the infrastructure connecting the money.

XXIV. The Imperative
Governments should therefore stop asking only:
“Should we launch a CBDC?”
They should ask:
“What architecture should CBDCs collectively form?”
The first question is national.
The second is civilizational.
A fragmented CBDC world could reproduce the weaknesses of today’s fragmented international payment infrastructure.
An interoperable CBDC world could create an entirely new monetary architecture.
The difference could be enormous.
If:
[
V_{CBDC}
]
is the value of an isolated CBDC,
and:
[
V_{network}
]
is the value of an interconnected system,
then Mathematical Futurology predicts:
[
V_{network}
\sum_{i=1}^{N}V_{CBDC_i}
]
whenever network effects, reduced transaction costs, interoperability and increased economic activity outweigh the additional infrastructure and systemic risks.
That inequality is the core thesis.

XXV. Conclusion
The global CBDC debate is often presented as a question of technology.
It is actually a question of architecture.
Africa is thinking about inclusion and payment efficiency.
Europe is thinking about monetary sovereignty and public money.
Asia is experimenting with digital financial infrastructure.
The United States is weighing benefits against the maturity of its existing payment system.
The United Kingdom faces questions of monetary sovereignty and international financial connectivity.
Latin America has strong potential use cases involving inclusion, efficiency and cross-border payments.
Their circumstances differ.
Their currencies differ.
Their political institutions differ.
But they share one technological problem:
digital money becomes dramatically more valuable when it can interoperate.
The world therefore faces two possible futures.
Future A: Fragmented Digital Money
Hundreds of CBDCs.
Thousands of integrations.
Bilateral standards.
Duplicated infrastructure.
Persistent friction.
High interoperability costs.
Future B: Sovereign Digital Interoperability
Hundreds of sovereign CBDCs.
One interoperable settlement architecture.
Common protocols.
Programmable settlement.
Lower friction.
Greater monetary connectivity.
The LIGDI proposal belongs to Future B.
Its objective should not be to abolish national currencies.
It should not be to create a world currency.
It should not be to subordinate central banks to a blockchain.
Its objective should be much simpler:
[
\boxed{
\text{Make sovereign digital currencies interoperable.}
}
]
The ultimate vision is therefore:
[
\boxed{
\text{One Global Financial Network}
+
\text{Many Sovereign Currencies}
}
]
That is the monetary architecture that Mathematical Futurology suggests the world should begin designing today.
The imperative is not that every government blindly deploy a CBDC immediately.
The imperative is that every government seriously prepare for a world in which sovereign money is digital—and that governments design interoperability into that world from the beginning.
If LIGDI can satisfy the necessary requirements for security, privacy, resilience, governance, scalability, legal compatibility and monetary sovereignty, it could serve as one candidate architecture for that future.
The greatest mistake would be to digitize national currencies while leaving the global monetary system technologically fragmented.
The greater opportunity is to construct a network of sovereign digital currencies capable of functioning as a coherent global economic system.
That is the mathematical-futurological case for LIGDI.