Photo taken at sea.
Notice the four Flettner rotors first & the bow form.
Interesting to see these efficiency ideas showing up together in one frame.
Wind assistance is the visible part, but hull form, speed, routing, maintenance and actual operation matter just as much.
This piece looks at why one ship may carry only slime while another starts building hard fouling, even in the same operating area. From a Master’s side, the answer is rarely just the local environment. Coating age, idle days, trading pattern and antifouling margin all matter.
Article: https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/29/slime-or-barnacles-why-ships-foul-differently-in-hormuz/
Question for discussion: Do you think hull fouling is still treated too much as a dry-dock issue, instead of an operational performance issue?
Hormuz remains open, but this week’s movement shows a controlled-exit environment rather than routine commercial passage.
The brief connects IMO evacuation routing, the EVER LOVELY strike, reduced tanker confidence, and the growing risk of sanctions enforcement reaching the Master’s shipboard record.
Full Weekly Brief: https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/28/hormuz-exit-control-master-sanctions-risk-june-28-2026/
Taken during STS operations. One of those moments where the deck lights, evening sky, and weather line all sit in the same frame.
I wrote this DeepDraft article in 2018, when GPS spoofing at sea was still treated by many as a technical curiosity. It does not read that way anymore.
A false position on ECDIS does not need alarms, noise, or obvious failure. It only needs one dangerous condition: a bridge team that accepts the screen without challenge.
GNSS interference is now part of the operating environment in several sea areas. The bridge still has to prove the ship’s position by method, not by display confidence alone. Radar fixing. Visual bearings. Parallel indexing. Dead reckoning. Professional doubt.
Old skills. Current risk.
Full article:
https://thedeepdraft.com/2018/02/09/gps-spoofing/
Short visual from the latest DeepDraft article.
The shadow fleet is usually discussed through ships, flags, sanctions, AIS gaps and insurance.
But there is a crew-risk side to it too. The trade may be planned ashore, while the exposure often lands on the bridge.
Full article:
https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/22/the-shadow-fleets-human-firewall/
Question:
Where should the line be drawn between a Master’s onboard responsibility and the commercial risk created ashore?
I wrote this after looking at recent sanctions enforcement cases involving shadow-fleet tankers.
The usual discussion is about old ships, weak flags, AIS gaps, doubtful insurance and opaque ownership. But once enforcement arrives, the person physically exposed is often the Master onboard.
He controls navigation, records, AIS conduct, VDR preservation and lawful orders. He does not control the oil sale price, banking route, ownership chain, flag history or sanctions screening done ashore.
Full article:
https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/22/the-shadow-fleets-human-firewall/
Discussion question:
Where should the line be drawn between a Master’s shipboard accountability and the commercial/legal risk created ashore?
Hormuz traffic is moving again, but the operating picture remains conditional: permit control, route coordination, insurance caution, mine-clearance concerns, and conflicting closure claims.
This week’s analysis also looks at the Settebello deaths as a recruitment and crew-risk accountability failure, not a simple conflict-zone casualty.
Full Weekly Brief: https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/21/deepdraft-weekly-maritime-brief-june-21-2026-hormuz-reopens-under-permit-control-as-crew-risk-accountability-tightens/
Shelf cloud, lightning, and sunset near Zuid-Beierland, Netherlands.
Photo credit: Wesley Hogervorst.