
Kerala's power crisis: What does the data tell us about 10 years of LDF rule?
Kerala's recent power crisis raises an important question: Was enough done between 2016 and 2026 to prepare for the state's growing electricity demand?
Let's look at the numbers.
- DEMAND GREW MUCH FASTER THAN KSEB'S OWN GENERATION
• 2015-16: Kerala consumed 19.46 billion units of electricity.
• 2024-25: Consumption reached 29.31 billion units.
• That's an increase of approximately 51%.
• Meanwhile, KSEB's own net generation rose from 6.74 to just 7.28 billion units — an increase of only 8%.
• The gap between consumption and KSEB generation widened from 12.72 to 22.03 billion units.
Important: This gap is NOT the same as an electricity shortage. Kerala covers most of it through power purchases and other generators within the state.
- WHAT HAPPENED TO CAPACITY EXPANSION?
• Kerala's total installed capacity increased from approximately 2,880 MW in 2015-16 to 4,412 MW in 2024-25.
• But KSEB-owned capacity increased from roughly 2,222 MW to only 2,410 MW.
• Much of the overall expansion came from solar and other non-KSEB capacity.
• Solar generation helps during the day. Evening peak demand requires storage, hydro or other dependable supply.
The important question is whether the government invested enough in dependable peak-hour capacity.
- THE 465 MW LONG-TERM CONTRACT CONTROVERSY
• Kerala signed agreements for 465 MW of electricity in 2014, before the LDF government took office.
• The electricity regulator cancelled them in May 2023 over procurement-rule violations.
• They were reinstated in December 2023, but the appellate tribunal subsequently overturned that decision in July 2024.
• KSEB had to seek alternative electricity at substantially higher prices.
This raises serious questions about contract compliance, procurement governance and contingency planning across the administrations involved.
- THE GUJARAT COMPARISON
During Narendra Modi's tenure as Gujarat Chief Minister:
• Installed power capacity increased from approximately 8,651 MW in 2001-02 to 18,270 MW in 2012-13.
• The Jyotigram scheme separated agricultural electricity feeders from other rural consumers.
• This enabled 24-hour electricity supply for non-agricultural rural uses, while agricultural supply followed a scheduled timetable.
However, Gujarat and Kerala have different fuel resources, geography and electricity demand patterns. Capacity growth alone does not establish complete electricity self-sufficiency.
- THE QUESTIONS THAT NEED ANSWERS
• What dependable generating capacity was commissioned during the LDF's ten years?
• Did long-term procurement adequately account for projected demand?
• Why did Kerala remain exposed to costly short-term power purchases?
• Was sufficient investment made in storage and peak-demand management?
• Which problems were inherited, which developed during the LDF period, and what is the present government doing to address them?
Kerala met almost all its recorded electricity demand in 2024-25. The issue is therefore not simply a permanent shortage of electricity.
The larger concern is the state's dependence on purchased power and its ability to secure enough electricity at affordable prices during peak hours.
A proper assessment of ten years of LDF rule should focus on these measurable outcomes rather than simply counting installed megawatts.
SOURCES:
Kerala Economic Review 2025: https://spb.kerala.gov.in/en/7036/
Gujarat Government — Industries in Gujarat 2014, Table 35: https://ic.gujarat.gov.in/documents/pagecontent/INDUSTRIES-INGUJ-2014-report.pdf
465 MW contract controversy: https://www.onmanorama.com/news/kerala/2024/07/27/kerala-kseb-higher-electricity-aptel-long-term-contracts.html