Ransomware Recovery: What happens when attackers target your Identity Provider configs?
In modern ransomware and wiper playbooks, attackers rarely jump straight to encrypting disk volumes or dropping payload binaries anymore.
Instead, the first thing they do after gaining administrative privileges is burn the bridges behind them: modifying identity provider configurations, disabling conditional access/sign-on policies or outright wiping SSO app integrations and MFA requirements. It’s an insanely effective tactic.
By messing with entra ID or Okta tenant settings, they create a two-fold problem: they guarantee persistence while simultaneously locking out internal IR teams who lose the ability to authenticate or elevate privileges to contain the breach.
We have solid, air-gapped immutable storage for our VM snapshots and S3 buckets, but during a recent threat modeling exercise, our SecOps team realized we have a massive blind spot around identity state restoration. If an attacker or malicious insider corrupts our identity control plane, standard data backups won't help there's no restore snapshot button for a broken cloud identity tenant. How is your team actually backing up, auditing and preparing to restore your core Identity Infrastructure against targeted sabotage or ransomware scenarios?
Are you maintaining version-controlled offline exports or using automated tools to enforce state baseline?