I am not aware of any off campus placement I couldnt get any info by contacting seniors through linkedin

The branch strength was 60 out of which 48 have been placed few I am aware of 4 off campus placement not included in the stats I have no information regarding the remaining 8

There is no consistency in what seniors say regarding placement at all.

" ECE has only 55 percent placement" - contacted placecom for last years cycle said it had 70-75 percent placement so I dont know who is lying.

" There are no core electronics companies " - went to meet 3rd years said intel nvdidia( 2 female only) logicfruit ( ece only) ntx ( ece only) infenion (4) people were hired then why are people saying there are no core companies

According to another 3rd year senior Texas had blacklisted us but now its lifted and apparently its coming back this year?

Above guy is saying only 2 companies have given above 15lpa roles just yesterday in a post that got deleted because a guy provided too much info regarding placement said that 2 companies + 3-4 in pipeline are there that are offering above 15 +or 20 +lpa ctc - infact in that same comment another senior flagged him and told him not to provide such info before placement is over. ( I think it was eternal congnizant flipkart and eatclub)

Seniors dont give company list them themselves dont know who is coming and who is not they dont even make a single placement tracker and then everyone is clueless about what is happening.

Here's a detailed breakdown of the mechanics — with the important caveat upfront that "loophole" is doing a lot of work here, and I'll flag clearly what's established fact, what's the tribunal's own finding, and what's contested/on appeal.

The setup: guarantee, default, insolvency

Chandra personally guaranteed borrowings by Essel Group companies. When those companies defaulted, Indiabulls Housing Finance moved the NCLT in 2022 under Section 95 for proceedings against Chandra as a personal guarantor, and the plea was admitted in 2024. Twenty-three creditors filed a combined ₹22,006.57 crore in claims against him personally. Bar and Bench

The vote: who actually decided the outcome

Five entities — Veena Investments, Direct Media Distribution Ventures, World Crest Advisors LLP, Lemonade Capital Advisors LLP, and Corpcall Capital Advisors LLP — together held a decisive bloc of the voting share (reported at roughly 61–62%) and all voted in favour of Chandra's ₹6.25–6.5 crore settlement offer. The repayment plan secured support from creditors representing 80.81 per cent of the voting share, while the creditors opposing it together represented less than 20 per cent — and that majority only existed because this bloc voted yes; without them, support reportedly fell well short of the threshold. Ascendants

Creditors opposing the plan alleged that several votes in its favour came from entities connected to Chandra and should therefore not have been counted, specifically naming these five entities and alleging they fall within the debtor's associate or related-party category. Shafaqna India

The tribunal's own finding on the connection

This is the striking part: the NCLT's third member did not deny a link existed. According to detailed reporting on the order, the tribunal recorded that these entities were controlled, directly or indirectly, by people related to Chandra — the ownership chain traced through his brother Jawahar Goel's family, running from Veena Investments through Essel Corporate Resources to Direct Media Distribution Ventures to World Crest Advisors (which it reportedly majority-owned). One of the five, Direct Media Distribution Ventures, was originally incorporated under a different name tied to an Indian Cricket League franchise Chandra himself had launched.

So the factual proximity was acknowledged. What sank the objection was that this proximity didn't meet the narrow legal test in Section 79(2)(g).

Why the legal test failed — the two technical gaps

He held that only entities in which the debtor, alone or with associates, owns more than 50 per cent of the share capital or controls the board qualify as associates, and that mere family connection or indirect influence was insufficient. Two specific drafting gaps in the statute made this possible: Corporate Law

1. The "company" wording excludes LLPs. Section 79(2)(g) only captures a "company" the debtor controls. Several of the five entities were structured as Limited Liability Partnerships, not companies — so even if control existed in substance, they fell outside the literal text.
2. The "immediate family" definition is narrow. The statute's family test covers spouse, dependent children, and dependent parents. It does not reach siblings. Since the ownership chain traced to Chandra's brother's family rather than to Chandra directly, the objectors would have needed the tribunal to aggregate a brother's shareholding into the debtor's — something the statute's text doesn't support.

Sharma noted: "Excluding a creditor from voting deprives it of an important statutory right affecting its financial interests. Such a disability cannot be imposed on the basis of suspicion or conjecture. The burden lies upon the party asserting disqualification to establish, through cogent and reliable evidence, that the statutory requirements are satisfied." Corporate Law

The structural gap this exposes

Corporate insolvency under the IBC has Section 29A, which explicitly bars a defaulting promoter (and connected persons, more broadly defined) from bidding to take back control of the company. Part III of the Code — which governs personal guarantors like Chandra — has no equivalent provision. It relies solely on the narrower Section 79(2)(g) "associate" test, which was written for a different purpose and doesn't carry the same broad related-party sweep. That asymmetry between the corporate chapter and the personal-guarantor chapter is the real "loophole," if there is one — not any single act by Chandra.

What's disputed and unresolved

• This is not a finding of wrongdoing by Chandra. The tribunal explicitly declined to equate "connected" with "associate" — it said the statute, as written, didn't authorize disqualifying these votes, and that widening the definition is Parliament's job, not a bench's.
• The bench itself was split. A Judicial Member and Technical Member gave conflicting opinions, requiring a third member to break the tie; the dissenting Technical Member had accepted the related-party objection. Bar and Bench
• It's not final. The matter goes back to the original Division Bench for a formal order, and the ruling followed a split verdict. Bar and Bench
• Multiple banks are considering appeal. HDFC Bank told reporters it is exploring an appeal before the NCLAT, having voted against the plan and standing to recover only about 3.2 per cent of its claim; other objecting banks include RBL, Canara, Axis, RBL, and Union Bank of India. Shafaqna India
• Chandra disputes the "loophole" framing entirely, arguing the group's actual liabilities were closer to ₹45,000 crore (already ~₹43,000 crore repaid at the group level), that the ₹22,006 crore figure double-counts claims already pursued against the borrowing companies, and that his personal guarantee exposure — not the group's overall debt — is what's properly before the tribunal. He's called for an independent audit to settle the numbers.

Bottom line: what happened isn't best described as Chandra actively "using" a loophole in the sense of an illegal maneuver — it's that a bloc of entities with a real, tribunal-acknowledged family/ownership connection to him voted decisively in his favor, and the statute's technical definition of "associate" (company-only, immediate-family-only) wasn't broad enough to capture that connection and strip their votes. Whether that's a loophole exploited or simply an outdated statute doing exactly what it says is precisely the question now headed to appeal.