u/joebraga2

One thing I have noticed in American political discussions is how often “liberal,” “left-wing,” “progressive,” and “conservative” are treated almost as interchangeable labels, even though historically and internationally they describe different political traditions.

Outside the United States, liberal does not necessarily mean left-wing. Liberalism historically has strong connections to individual rights, private property, constitutional government and market economics. A person can therefore be economically liberal while being politically center-right. Likewise, someone can be progressive without being a socialist.

The left itself is a spectrum. Social liberals, social democrats, democratic socialists, socialists and communists are not the same thing. Democratic socialism is also different from revolutionary socialism. Social democrats generally seek redistribution, stronger public services, labor protections and regulation while maintaining a capitalist economy.

The same problem exists on the right. Center-right liberals, conservatives, national conservatives, reactionaries, libertarians and anarcho-capitalists are not interchangeable either. They may agree on particular policies while starting from completely different political philosophies.

This becomes especially confusing with the word “conservative.”

Conservatism in the Burkean tradition is fundamentally concerned with institutions, continuity, inherited practices and skepticism toward abrupt political transformation. It does not simply mean opposition to social change or adherence to religious morality.

And wanting to preserve institutions while allowing gradual reform is fundamentally different from wanting to restore an idealized social order from the past.

The first can reasonably be called conservatism.

The second has another perfectly useful political name: reactionary politics.

Religion complicates this even further. Religious politics cannot simply be placed at one point on the left-right spectrum. Christianity, for example, has been associated historically with conservative and reactionary movements, but also with Christian democracy, Catholic social teaching, abolitionism, the American civil-rights movement and liberation theology in Latin America.

Economics adds another dimension. Someone can be socially progressive and economically liberal. Someone else can be socially conservative while supporting a strong welfare state, trade unions or protectionism. Nationalism, social policy, economic policy and attitudes toward institutions do not necessarily move together.

This is why I find the American political vocabulary so restrictive.

The American two-party system compresses an enormous ideological spectrum into two electoral coalitions. As a result, people who would probably belong to several different parties in a multiparty democracy all end up being described simply as either “liberals” or “conservatives.”

You can see this inside the Democratic Party itself: centrists, social liberals, progressives and politicians associated with democratic socialism can operate under the same party label despite substantial disagreements over economics.

The same applies to Republicans: traditional institutional conservatives, religious conservatives, economic libertarians, nationalists, protectionists and reactionaries can coexist under one party.

So my point isn't that Americans are using English “incorrectly.” Political terminology naturally develops differently in different countries.

My point is that American political terminology should not be treated as a universal ideological map.

Once you compare American politics with Latin America or Europe, the simple equation

liberal = left / conservative = right

starts breaking down very quickly.

A lot of people who call themselves conservatives are actually reactionaries, not Burkean conservatives

This may be particularly unpopular among the modern American and Latin American right, but I think the word “conservative” has become so broad that it often describes completely different political traditions.

One of the foundational thinkers of modern political conservatism is Edmund Burke. Burkean conservatism is fundamentally concerned with institutions, historical continuity, prudence and gradual reform. It is skeptical of attempts to radically reconstruct society because institutions contain accumulated historical experience.

That is not the same thing as believing that society has morally deteriorated and therefore needs to be returned to some idealized previous social order.

The latter is much closer to reactionary politics.

This distinction matters because today “conservative” is frequently used to describe a package containing religious traditionalism, opposition to progressive social change, economic liberalism, nationalism and support for a particular political movement.

But none of those things necessarily implies the others.

A political conservative can support a welfare state.

An economic liberal can be socially progressive.

A nationalist can support extensive state intervention and industrial policy.

A religious traditionalist can oppose free-market liberalism.

And someone who wants to reverse social changes in order to restore a supposedly superior past can be reactionary without being particularly conservative in the Burkean institutional sense.

The same problem exists when people talk about “the right” as though it were a single ideology.

Center-right liberals, institutional conservatives, national conservatives, libertarians, populist radicals, reactionaries and anarcho-capitalists can all be placed somewhere on the political right while disagreeing profoundly about economics, institutions, religion, nationalism and the role of the state.

Latin America provides an especially interesting example because religious traditionalism has become deeply intertwined with political identity. Brazil historically had Catholic traditionalist and reactionary movements, while Pentecostal and later Neo-Pentecostal movements developed through different religious histories and eventually became increasingly politically influential.

These traditions can now cooperate on moral and electoral issues, but that does not mean they all originated from the same political philosophy.

I therefore think we should stop automatically translating:

religious + traditional values + right-wing = conservative.

Conservatism, religious traditionalism and reaction are overlapping concepts, but they are not synonyms.

And wanting to preserve institutions while allowing gradual reform is fundamentally different from wanting to restore an idealized social order from the past.

The first can reasonably be called conservatism.

The second has another perfectly useful political name: reactionary politics.

A lot of people who call themselves conservatives are actually reactionaries, not Burkean conservatives

This may be particularly unpopular among the modern American and Latin American right, but I think the word “conservative” has become so broad that it often describes completely different political traditions.

One of the foundational thinkers of modern political conservatism is Edmund Burke. Burkean conservatism is fundamentally concerned with institutions, historical continuity, prudence and gradual reform. It is skeptical of attempts to radically reconstruct society because institutions contain accumulated historical experience.

That is not the same thing as believing that society has morally deteriorated and therefore needs to be returned to some idealized previous social order.

The latter is much closer to reactionary politics.

This distinction matters because today “conservative” is frequently used to describe a package containing religious traditionalism, opposition to progressive social change, economic liberalism, nationalism and support for a particular political movement.

But none of those things necessarily implies the others.

A political conservative can support a welfare state.

An economic liberal can be socially progressive.

A nationalist can support extensive state intervention and industrial policy.

A religious traditionalist can oppose free-market liberalism.

And someone who wants to reverse social changes in order to restore a supposedly superior past can be reactionary without being particularly conservative in the Burkean institutional sense.

The same problem exists when people talk about “the right” as though it were a single ideology.

Center-right liberals, institutional conservatives, national conservatives, libertarians, populist radicals, reactionaries and anarcho-capitalists can all be placed somewhere on the political right while disagreeing profoundly about economics, institutions, religion, nationalism and the role of the state.

Latin America provides an especially interesting example because religious traditionalism has become deeply intertwined with political identity. Brazil historically had Catholic traditionalist and reactionary movements, while Pentecostal and later Neo-Pentecostal movements developed through different religious histories and eventually became increasingly politically influential.

These traditions can now cooperate on moral and electoral issues, but that does not mean they all originated from the same political philosophy.

I therefore think we should stop automatically translating:

religious + traditional values + right-wing = conservative.

Conservatism, religious traditionalism and reaction are overlapping concepts, but they are not synonyms.

And wanting to preserve institutions while allowing gradual reform is fundamentally different from wanting to restore an idealized social order from the past.

The first can reasonably be called conservatism.

The second has another perfectly useful political name: reactionary politics.

Seit meinem letzten Update ist ein Muster noch deutlicher geworden.

Die chinesischen Hersteller reagieren auf Handelsbarrieren und Überkapazitäten der traditionellen Autoindustrie nicht nur mit neuen eigenen Fabriken.

Sie nutzen zunehmend bestehende Werke westlicher Hersteller.

Geely ist dafür inzwischen vielleicht das beste Beispiel.

In Spanien haben Ford und Geely eine Joint-Venture-Lösung für das Ford-Werk in Valencia vereinbart. Dort sollen künftig sowohl Ford- als auch Geely-Modelle gebaut werden.

Jetzt kommt der nächste Schritt: Ab 2028 sollen auch Fahrzeuge anderer Geely-Marken in europäischen Volvo-Werken produziert werden.

Interessanterweise verfolgt Geely praktisch dieselbe Strategie bereits in Brasilien.

Geely hat 26,4 % von Renault do Brasil übernommen. Gemeinsam investieren Renault und Geely 3,8 Milliarden Reais in den bestehenden Renault-Komplex in São José dos Pinhais bei Curitiba. Auch dort wird also keine komplett neue chinesische Fabrik gebaut – chinesisches Kapital und chinesische Plattformen werden in eine bestehende westliche Produktionsstruktur integriert.

Und Geely ist nicht allein.

In Spanien produziert Chery gemeinsam mit Ebro auf dem Gelände des ehemaligen Nissan-Werks in Barcelona.

In Brasilien wiederum wird das ehemalige Troller-Werk von Ford im Bundesstaat Ceará als Mehrmarkenwerk wiederverwendet und soll unter anderem Fahrzeuge von MG/SAIC produzieren.

Das verändert meiner Meinung nach die gesamte Diskussion über chinesische Autos.

Die Frage lautet zunehmend nicht mehr:

„Wie viele Autos importiert Europa aus China?“

Sondern:

„Wer wird die vorhandene europäische Produktionskapazität in Zukunft tatsächlich nutzen?“

Wenn ein chinesisches Modell in einem ehemaligen Nissan-Werk, einem Ford-Werk oder sogar einem Volvo-Werk gebaut wird, mit europäischen Mitarbeitern und europäischen Zulieferern, dann reicht die klassische Unterscheidung zwischen „chinesischem Import“ und „europäischem Auto“ irgendwann nicht mehr aus.

Vielleicht ist das eigentliche Ergebnis der europäischen Zölle deshalb nicht weniger chinesische Autoindustrie in Europa.

Vielleicht wird die chinesische Autoindustrie dadurch einfach europäischer.

A lot of people who call themselves conservatives are actually reactionaries, not Burkean conservatives

This may be particularly unpopular among the modern American and Latin American right, but I think the word “conservative” has become so broad that it often describes completely different political traditions.

One of the foundational thinkers of modern political conservatism is Edmund Burke. Burkean conservatism is fundamentally concerned with institutions, historical continuity, prudence and gradual reform. It is skeptical of attempts to radically reconstruct society because institutions contain accumulated historical experience.

That is not the same thing as believing that society has morally deteriorated and therefore needs to be returned to some idealized previous social order.

The latter is much closer to reactionary politics.

This distinction matters because today “conservative” is frequently used to describe a package containing religious traditionalism, opposition to progressive social change, economic liberalism, nationalism and support for a particular political movement.

But none of those things necessarily implies the others.

A political conservative can support a welfare state.

An economic liberal can be socially progressive.

A nationalist can support extensive state intervention and industrial policy.

A religious traditionalist can oppose free-market liberalism.

And someone who wants to reverse social changes in order to restore a supposedly superior past can be reactionary without being particularly conservative in the Burkean institutional sense.

The same problem exists when people talk about “the right” as though it were a single ideology.

Center-right liberals, institutional conservatives, national conservatives, libertarians, populist radicals, reactionaries and anarcho-capitalists can all be placed somewhere on the political right while disagreeing profoundly about economics, institutions, religion, nationalism and the role of the state.

Latin America provides an especially interesting example because religious traditionalism has become deeply intertwined with political identity. Brazil historically had Catholic traditionalist and reactionary movements, while Pentecostal and later Neo-Pentecostal movements developed through different religious histories and eventually became increasingly politically influential.

These traditions can now cooperate on moral and electoral issues, but that does not mean they all originated from the same political philosophy.

I therefore think we should stop automatically translating:

religious + traditional values + right-wing = conservative.

Conservatism, religious traditionalism and reaction are overlapping concepts, but they are not synonyms.

And wanting to preserve institutions while allowing gradual reform is fundamentally different from wanting to restore an idealized social order from the past.

The first can reasonably be called conservatism.

The second has another perfectly useful political name: reactionary politics.

Porsche baut bis 2035 rund 9.000 Stellen ab, Mercedes erhöht den Kostendruck auf seine deutschen Werke und expandiert gleichzeitig in Ungarn und Polen. Volkswagen will seinen TRATON-Anteil mittelfristig von 87,5 % auf 75 % + 1 Aktie reduzieren. �

Reuters +2

Gleichzeitig passiert auf der anderen Seite etwas, das ich für wichtiger halte als die üblichen Diskussionen über chinesische Importzölle:

Die Chinesen beginnen direkt in Europa zu produzieren.

BYD startet Ende 2026 in Ungarn. Chery produziert mit Ebro in Barcelona. Stellantis und Leapmotor bauen in Zaragoza und wollen Madrid ausbauen. SAIC/MG plant seine erste EU-Fabrik in Galicien. Und Ford hat gerade mit Geely eine JV für das Werk Valencia gegründet. �

Reuters +3

Das ist also zunehmend nicht mehr:

Europa vs. chinesische Importe

sondern:

europäische Produktion mit chinesischem Kapital, chinesischen Plattformen, chinesischen Batterien und teilweise europäischen Traditionsherstellern als Partner.

Das angebliche BYD/VW-Aktien-und-Technologie-Abkommen konnte ich übrigens weiterhin nicht belastbar bestätigen. Die bestätigte große VW-Kooperation dieser Art ist mit XPeng.

Meine eigentliche Frage:

Ist das für euch nur ein normaler Restrukturierungszyklus – oder beginnt hier eine dauerhafte Margen- und Machtverschiebung innerhalb der europäischen Autoindustrie?

Denn wenn chinesische Hersteller irgendwann nicht mehr durch Zölle gestoppt werden können, weil ihre Autos aus Ungarn oder Spanien kommen, wird die bisherige Schutzlogik ziemlich interessant.

Seit meinem letzten Beitrag über die sinkende Preissetzungsmacht deutscher Autobauer sind ein paar Dinge passiert, die ich noch interessanter finde als einzelne Rabatte.

Porsche will bis 2035 insgesamt rund 9.000 Stellen abbauen. Gleichzeitig sollen allerdings 2,1 Mrd. Euro in Zuffenhausen und Weissach investiert werden. Es geht also nicht um einen einfachen Rückzug, sondern um eine deutlich kleinere und effizientere Struktur. Porsche leidet besonders unter dem Einbruch in China; im ersten Halbjahr 2026 lagen die China-Auslieferungen rund ein Drittel unter dem Vorjahr.

Bei Mercedes sieht man etwas Ähnliches. Die Kosten werden massiv gesenkt, die deutschen Werke stehen unter höherem Produktivitätsdruck, während Mercedes gleichzeitig zusätzliche Kapazitäten in günstigeren europäischen Standorten wie Ungarn und Polen aufbaut. Im zweiten Quartal fielen die Mercedes-Verkäufe in China um rund 30 %.

Parallel dazu bauen chinesische Hersteller zunehmend innerhalb Europas.

BYD will im vierten Quartal 2026 in Szeged in Ungarn mit der Autoproduktion beginnen. Interessanterweise wurde das Türkei-Projekt zunächst pausiert; BYD bezeichnet Ungarn derzeit als Priorität Nummer eins und sucht bereits nach einem zweiten europäischen Produktionsstandort.

In Spanien entsteht gleichzeitig fast ein zweites chinesisch-europäisches Zentrum:

Chery/Ebro baut in Barcelona, Leapmotor wird zusammen mit Stellantis in Zaragoza produzieren und erhält weitere Produktionsmöglichkeiten in Madrid, SAIC/MG plant seine erste EU-Fabrik in Galicien, und Ford hat gerade eine gemeinsame Produktionsgesellschaft mit Geely für das Werk Valencia angekündigt.

Das finde ich besonders interessant, weil hier nicht mehr nur chinesische Autos nach Europa exportiert werden.

Chinesische Hersteller beginnen, europäische Fabriken zu bauen oder vorhandene europäische Werke und Lieferketten zu nutzen.

Gleichzeitig reduzieren traditionelle Hersteller ihre Kapazitäten, Arbeitsplätze oder Beteiligungen. Volkswagen hält beispielsweise noch 87,5 % an TRATON und hat bereits offiziell angekündigt, diesen Anteil mittelfristig auf 75 % plus eine Aktie reduzieren zu wollen. Das ist allerdings kein neues Krisenprogramm von heute, sondern ein bereits länger angekündigtes Ziel zur Erhöhung des Streubesitzes. TRATON selbst ist derzeit sogar profitabel und steigerte im ersten Halbjahr 2026 sein bereinigtes operatives Ergebnis um 12 %.

Was ich dagegen weiterhin nicht bestätigen konnte, ist ein angeblicher Deal, bei dem BYD Volkswagen-Technologie gegen VW-Aktien tauschen oder einen größeren Anteil an Volkswagen kaufen würde. Die bestätigte chinesische Technologie- und Beteiligungspartnerschaft der Volkswagen-Gruppe ist vor allem die mit XPeng, nicht BYD.

Deshalb meine Frage an euch:

Sehen wir gerade nur eine normale zyklische Bereinigung nach Pandemie, EV-Boom und China-Schwäche?

Oder entsteht hier tatsächlich eine neue industrielle Struktur, in der deutsche Hersteller Produktion und Beschäftigung reduzieren, während chinesische Hersteller ihre Technologie und zunehmend auch ihre Produktion direkt in Europa verankern?

Und falls Letzteres: Was bedeutet das langfristig für die Margen und Bewertungen von VW, Porsche, Mercedes und BMW?

I’ve been following the Brazilian automobile market and I’m interested in the economics behind what appears to be happening.

For years, a relatively small group of established manufacturers dominated most of the mass market. Recently, several Chinese manufacturers have entered or expanded aggressively, particularly with EVs and hybrids.

At the same time, established manufacturers have begun offering much larger discounts on some models.

This raises a question about pricing power versus production cost.

Suppose an incumbent previously sold a car for 150,000 BRL but, after new competitors enter, begins regularly selling it for 120,000–130,000 BRL.

There seem to be several possible explanations.

The manufacturer may have had substantial pricing power and is now accepting a smaller margin.

It may temporarily be selling near variable cost to clear inventory.

Dealers or manufacturers may be subsidizing discounts.

Or the previous price may have reflected fixed costs that become increasingly difficult to recover as volumes decline.

What I’m trying to understand is what economic theory and historical evidence suggest happens next.

If several new competitors enter simultaneously and continue competing against each other, can this permanently reduce industry-wide margins?

Or would we normally expect consolidation, exit of weaker firms and eventually a return to higher margins?

The automotive transition seems especially interesting because the new competitors are not merely selling another brand of the same product. Electrification also changes powertrains, supply chains, maintenance requirements and potentially consumer expectations about equipment.

So my question is:

When technological disruption and new market entry happen together, how can we distinguish a temporary price war from a structural reduction in incumbent firms’ pricing power?

I’m Brazilian, and something interesting is happening in our car market.

For a long time the progression for private buyers was fairly predictable: cheap 1.0 naturally aspirated car → better equipped 1.0 turbo / larger combustion car → compact SUV.

EVs were basically outside that ladder because they were too expensive.

Chinese manufacturers are changing that. Cars from BYD, GWM, GAC, Geely, Chery/Omoda and others are increasingly overlapping in price with conventional compact cars and small SUVs from VW, GM, Stellantis, Hyundai and Toyota.

And I think this matters more than simply “Chinese brands gaining EV market share.”

If someone looking at a well-equipped 1.0 turbo realizes that for a relatively small additional amount they can get a BEV or a proper hybrid, the conventional upgrade path itself starts breaking down.

Fuel cost makes this even more noticeable here. Gasoline in many Brazilian cities is around the equivalent of a significant household expense, while charging at home can make the per-km cost of a BEV dramatically lower.

Traditional manufacturers are reacting with much larger discounts and more aggressive pricing. That doesn’t prove every previous price was pure profit — inventory, taxes, exchange rates and production costs matter — but it does show that competition is reducing pricing power.

I don’t think ICE cars are disappearing. Cheap manuals still make sense for fleets, rental companies, work vehicles and people without charging.

But for private buyers, I wonder whether the 1.0 turbo automatic is starting to lose its position as the default upgrade.

Have you seen the same thing happening in other emerging markets?

Mich interessiert inzwischen weniger die Frage, ob chinesische Elektroautos „besser“ als deutsche Autos sind.

Spannender finde ich, was sie mit unserer Preiswahrnehmung machen.

In Brasilien kann man diesen Effekt momentan sehr deutlich beobachten.

Noch vor wenigen Jahren war die typische Aufstiegskette ungefähr:

einfacher 1,0-Liter-Sauger → stärkerer Verbrenner → Turbo → Automatik → Crossover/SUV.

Für mehr Ausstattung, mehr Leistung und mehr Komfort wurde jeweils deutlich mehr verlangt.

Jetzt tauchen chinesische BEVs und Hybride in Preisbereichen auf, in denen vorher relativ gewöhnliche Verbrenner standen.

Und plötzlich werden bei etablierten Modellen Rabatte möglich, die vorher kaum vorstellbar waren.

Genau das finde ich interessanter als die übliche Debatte über „China-Subventionen gegen deutsche Industrie“.

Natürlich spielen chinesische Industriepolitik, Skaleneffekte, vertikale Integration und die Batterie-Lieferkette eine Rolle.

Aber für den Käufer bleibt eine konkrete Veränderung:

Der Referenzpreis verschiebt sich.

Wenn ein Elektroauto für einen ähnlichen Preis mehr Leistung, umfangreiche Assistenzsysteme, Kameras und niedrigere Betriebskosten bietet, muss ein klassischer Verbrenner seinen Preis plötzlich stärker rechtfertigen.

Das heißt nicht, dass Verbrenner verschwinden müssen.

Für bestimmte Nutzerprofile bleiben sie sinnvoll.

Aber der Verbrenner verliert möglicherweise seine bisherige Rolle als selbstverständlicher nächster Schritt beim Fahrzeugkauf.

Und genau deshalb glaube ich, dass es langfristig nicht nur um Marktanteile bei Elektroautos geht.

Es geht um die Preissetzungsmacht der etablierten Hersteller.

Wenn Kunden anfangen zu fragen

„Was bekomme ich für 30.000 oder 40.000 Euro?“

statt

„Welchen VW, BMW oder Mercedes bekomme ich für 30.000 oder 40.000 Euro?“

ändert sich der Wettbewerb grundlegend.

Meine Frage an euch:

Sehen wir nur einen vorübergehenden Preiskampf, oder verändert chinesische Konkurrenz dauerhaft das Preis-Leistungs-Verhältnis, das europäische Käufer von einem Auto erwarten?

Estava pensando na discussão sobre espectro, 6 GHz e obrigações das operadoras e cheguei a uma proposta que gostaria de jogar para discussão, principalmente para quem trabalha com telecom.

Concordo que não faz sentido criar regulação excessiva simplesmente para favorecer as grandes teles. Ao mesmo tempo, espectro precisa de coordenação e harmonização internacional, inclusive pelo trabalho da UIT/UIT-R. A fragmentação excessiva de frequências entre países já criou problemas de compatibilidade de aparelhos e redes no passado.

Mas acho que existe outra discussão que recebe pouca atenção: o que fazer com os vazios econômicos de cobertura, especialmente em rodovias?

Existem trechos em que simplesmente não há densidade populacional, atividade econômica ou tráfego suficiente para justificar economicamente uma ERB convencional. Construir torre, instalar rádio, fornecer energia e backhaul e manter tudo funcionando para atender uma quantidade pequena de usuários pode simplesmente não fechar a conta.

Minha proposta seria mudar a própria lógica da obrigação de universalização.

Do antigo STFC para a universalização da conectividade IP

Historicamente, universalização significava levar STFC até locais onde comercialmente talvez não compensasse. Daí a importância que já tiveram telefones públicos e outras obrigações associadas à telefonia fixa.

Hoje, acho mais lógico perguntar:

por que universalizar especificamente telefonia, quando aquilo de que uma pessoa realmente precisa é conectividade?

Em determinados vazios econômicos rodoviários, em vez de obrigar Vivo, TIM e Claro a instalar novas ERBs, poderia existir uma infraestrutura neutra de acesso IP, operada por uma prestadora de SCM, concessionária ou provedor regional.

Não estou falando de colocar um roteador doméstico num poste.

Seria uma rede outdoor carrier-grade, projetada especificamente para rodovias, utilizando APs/nós distribuídos, antenas adequadas, gerenciamento centralizado, QoS, redundância e capacidade dimensionada não apenas pelo tráfego médio, mas pelos horários de pico da rodovia.

O backhaul poderia utilizar fibra onde disponível e enlaces de rádio onde fossem economicamente mais adequados. Dependendo do trecho, poderia haver uma arquitetura distribuída/mesh entre nós.

Imagine, por exemplo, duas áreas atendidas por ERBs separadas por 30, 40 ou 60 km, com um grande vazio econômico entre elas. A questão não seria fazer um único AP Wi-Fi alcançar 60 km. A questão seria descobrir quantos nós seriam necessários e qual arquitetura teria menor CAPEX/OPEX para garantir conectividade nesse corredor sem construir outra ERB celular convencional.

E não precisaria existir uma rede para cada operadora

Aqui entra a parte que considero mais interessante.

Essa infraestrutura poderia funcionar como uma espécie de neutral host Wi-Fi rodoviário.

Em vez de Vivo, TIM e Claro construírem três infraestruturas paralelas, haveria uma única rede de acesso. Tecnologias que já existem, como Passpoint/Hotspot 2.0, EAP-SIM/EAP-AKA e conceitos semelhantes ao OpenRoaming, poderiam servir de base para autenticar automaticamente os assinantes.

Ou seja: o usuário está no 4G/5G da Vivo, TIM ou Claro, entra em um vazio de cobertura e encontra essa infraestrutura Wi-Fi. O telefone poderia reconhecer automaticamente uma rede autorizada e autenticar o assinante usando sua identidade móvel/SIM, sem portal cativo e sem precisar digitar senha.

O AP não precisaria necessariamente ter três chips. A identidade do usuário poderia ser validada pela integração entre a infraestrutura neutra e as operadoras.

Para dados, o usuário simplesmente continuaria conectado à Internet. Para voz, poderia haver integração com Wi-Fi Calling/IMS, quando suportada.

Não estou afirmando que a transição 4G/5G → Wi-Fi → 4G/5G seria automaticamente tão transparente quanto um handover entre duas células. Isso exigiria integração entre terminais, operadoras e infraestrutura. Mas boa parte dos componentes tecnológicos necessários já existe.

Onde entra o 6 GHz?

Eu defenderia preservar bastante espectro não licenciado justamente porque Wi-Fi não deveria ser visto apenas como “Internet dentro de casa”.

6 GHz poderia participar dessa arquitetura principalmente onde fosse necessária maior capacidade, inclusive com configurações outdoor específicas permitidas pela regulamentação. Para alcance maior, outras bandas ou enlaces dedicados provavelmente seriam mais adequados.

Ou seja, não estou defendendo que 6 GHz sozinho cubra dezenas de quilômetros. Estou defendendo uma arquitetura multibanda e distribuída na qual espectro não licenciado também possa servir como infraestrutura de telecomunicações.

Isso é uma das razões pelas quais não gosto da ideia de tratar todo espectro novo automaticamente como candidato a IMT/SMP.

A obrigação deveria ser de conectividade, não necessariamente de tecnologia

Para mim, esse é o ponto principal.

Em vez de o Estado determinar:

“a operadora móvel precisa instalar uma ERB aqui”

poderia determinar:

“este corredor rodoviário precisa oferecer determinado nível mínimo de conectividade, disponibilidade e capacidade.”

A solução poderia então ser escolhida de acordo com a economia daquele trecho.

Onde existe demanda suficiente: 4G/5G convencional.

Onde não existe retorno econômico para outra ERB: infraestrutura neutra outdoor de acesso IP.

SCMs e provedores regionais poderiam inclusive disputar a implantação e operação desses corredores, aproveitando fibra e infraestrutura que já possuam nas proximidades.

Os pontos poderiam utilizar estruturas existentes de concessionárias, postos, pedágios, bases operacionais, áreas de descanso, acessos municipais e, onde necessário, instalações próprias.

Isso separaria duas coisas que hoje frequentemente são tratadas como se fossem iguais: cobertura comercial e cobertura social.

Não vejo por que precisamos exigir três redes celulares paralelas em um trecho onde talvez nenhuma delas seja economicamente sustentável, se uma infraestrutura compartilhada conseguir garantir comunicação para os assinantes das três.

No fundo, estou propondo atualizar a ideia do antigo orelhão

Décadas atrás, a preocupação era:

“uma pessoa não pode ficar isolada porque não existe telefone neste lugar.”

Hoje deveria ser:

“uma pessoa não pode ficar isolada porque não existe conectividade neste lugar.”

Se alguém estiver numa rodovia remota, pouco importa se aquela conexão chega diretamente por uma ERB da sua operadora ou por uma infraestrutura neutra interoperável. O importante é conseguir acessar Internet, mensageria, mapas, serviços públicos, comunicação de emergência e, quando tecnicamente possível, telefonia pelo IMS/Wi-Fi Calling.

Então deixo a pergunta principalmente para quem trabalha com redes:

em trechos rodoviários onde uma nova ERB não se sustenta economicamente, uma arquitetura neutral-host baseada em SCM + backhaul + nós Wi-Fi outdoor interoperáveis com as SMPs poderia ter CAPEX/OPEX significativamente menor?

E, se tecnicamente for possível, por que nossas obrigações de cobertura não poderiam ser mais tecnologicamente neutras, cobrando conectividade em vez de necessariamente cobrar mais uma ERB?

ZL;NG: Brasilien wird gerade zu einem ziemlich interessanten Live-Experiment für die Autoindustrie. Chinesische Hersteller bringen BEVs, HEVs und PHEVs genau in die Preisbereiche, in denen traditionelle Hersteller bisher normale Verbrenner verkauft haben. Plötzlich tauchen Rabatte von 10, 15 oder über 20 Prozent auf.

Meine These ist nicht:

„Der Verbrenner ist tot.“

Meine These lautet:

Die Preismacht der etablierten Hersteller wird angegriffen.

Ein bisschen Kontext zum brasilianischen Markt:

Wenn ich von einem Einstiegsauto spreche, meine ich nicht Corolla, Golf oder einen kompakten SUV.

Brasilien verkauft seit Jahrzehnten Autos mit:

1,0-Liter-Saugmotoren

historisch sowohl Vier- als auch Dreizylinder

oft nur ungefähr 70–80 PS

Handschaltung

kleiner Hatchback-Karosserie

Fiat Mobi, Renault Kwid, Citroën C3, VW Polo Track oder die einfachsten Chevrolet-Onix-Versionen sind typische Beispiele.

Und selbst solche sehr einfachen Autos kamen teilweise in Richtung 90.000–100.000 R$.

Dann kamen die Chinesen.

BYD, GWM, GAC, Geely, Omoda/Jaecoo, Leapmotor, MG/SAIC usw. haben zunächst nicht direkt den billigsten 1.0-Handschalter angegriffen.

Sie sind ein oder zwei Segmente darüber eingestiegen.

Plötzlich stand einem klassischen Verbrenner der etablierten Hersteller ein chinesisches Auto gegenüber mit:

BEV

HEV

PHEV

Automatik

ADAS

großem Infotainment

mehr Leistung und Drehmoment

mehr Ausstattung

und teilweise erstaunlich ähnlichem Preis.

Damit beginnt der Preisdruck von oben nach unten.

Chinesisches BEV/HEV/PHEV wird günstiger

→ traditioneller Neuwagen bekommt Rabatt

→ junge Gebrauchte verlieren Preismacht

→ gebrauchte Mittelklasse wird billiger

→ diese Autos konkurrieren plötzlich mit neuen Kleinwagen

→ irgendwann muss sogar der einfachste 1.0 billiger werden.

China muss also nicht morgen ein Elektroauto für 10.000 Euro nach Brasilien oder Europa exportieren.

Die Chinesen können den gesamten Markt von oben zusammendrücken.

Ein aktuelles brasilianisches Beispiel:

Fiat Fastback Impetus MHEV:

173.490 R$ → 134.990 R$

Fast 40.000 R$ weniger.

Bedeutet das, dass Stellantis vorher 40.000 R$ Reingewinn pro Auto gemacht hat?

Natürlich nicht.

Der Rabatt kann aus vielen Quellen kommen:

Herstellermarge

Händlermarge

Werksbonus

Inzahlungnahme

Lagerabbau

Finanzierung

bewusst niedrigerer Marge

oder im Extremfall sogar temporär akzeptierten Verlusten

Aber genau das ist interessant.

Jahrelang hörten brasilianische Verbraucher, hohe Autopreise seien hauptsächlich das Ergebnis von:

Steuern

Wechselkurs

Produktionskosten

Logistik

„Custo Brasil“

Diese Faktoren existieren.

Aber sobald die Konkurrenz stark genug wurde, begannen Preise, die vorher fast unveränderbar wirkten, plötzlich stark zu fallen.

Der alte Listenpreis war also offensichtlich keine Naturkonstante.

Er hing auch davon ab:

Wie viel akzeptiert der Kunde?

und

Wie stark ist die Konkurrenz wirklich?

Selbst die etablierten Hersteller sprechen inzwischen offen über den chinesischen Druck.

Fabio Rua, ein GM-Vizepräsident in Südamerika, hat öffentlich gesagt, dass westliche Hersteller von China lernen und ihre Entscheidungen beschleunigen müssen.

Und genau deshalb interessiert mich die Sache auch aus Sicht von Volkswagen, Stellantis, Mercedes, BMW, GM usw.

Die interessante Börsenfrage lautet nicht:

„Wird BYD Volkswagen vernichten?“

Sondern:

Wie viel Marge und Preismacht müssen die etablierten Hersteller opfern, um wieder konkurrenzfähig zu werden?

Brasilien hat zusätzlich einen interessanten Sonderfall:

Ein großer Teil des Absatzes traditioneller Hersteller läuft über:

Mietwagenfirmen

Firmenflotten

Direktverkauf

staatliche Flotten

Aber eine Mietwagenfirma ist kein Endkunde.

Ihr Geschäftsmodell hängt stark vom Restwert der Fahrzeuge ab.

Sinken durch chinesische Konkurrenz die Neuwagenpreise, geraten auch Gebrauchtwagenpreise unter Druck.

Sinken die Restwerte stark genug, wird auch das Modell schwieriger, riesige Stückzahlen über Flotten und Vermieter abzusetzen.

Dann müssen die Hersteller wieder stärker um den privaten Käufer kämpfen.

Und ich behaupte ausdrücklich nicht, dass Verbrenner verschwinden müssen.

Je nach Einsatz können:

ICE

HEV

PHEV

BEV

alle sinnvoll sein.

Mir geht es nicht um technologische Ideologie.

Mir geht es um Preissetzungsmacht.

Früher konnten etablierte Hersteller stärker danach bepreisen, was der Kunde maximal akzeptiert.

Jetzt zwingt chinesische Konkurrenz sie zunehmend dazu, danach zu bepreisen, was der Wettbewerber ihnen noch erlaubt.

Also, Mauerstraße:

Nur ein temporärer Rabattkrieg – oder beginnt hier eine strukturelle Margenerosion bei VW, Stellantis & Co.?

ZL;NG: Brasilien wird gerade zu einem ziemlich interessanten Live-Experiment für die Autoindustrie. Chinesische Hersteller bringen BEVs, HEVs und PHEVs genau in die Preisbereiche, in denen traditionelle Hersteller bisher normale Verbrenner verkauft haben. Plötzlich tauchen Rabatte von 10, 15 oder über 20 Prozent auf.

Meine These ist nicht:

„Der Verbrenner ist tot.“

Meine These lautet:

Die Preismacht der etablierten Hersteller wird angegriffen.

Ein bisschen Kontext zum brasilianischen Markt:

Wenn ich von einem Einstiegsauto spreche, meine ich nicht Corolla, Golf oder einen kompakten SUV.

Brasilien verkauft seit Jahrzehnten Autos mit:

1,0-Liter-Saugmotoren

historisch sowohl Vier- als auch Dreizylinder

oft nur ungefähr 70–80 PS

Handschaltung

kleiner Hatchback-Karosserie

Fiat Mobi, Renault Kwid, Citroën C3, VW Polo Track oder die einfachsten Chevrolet-Onix-Versionen sind typische Beispiele.

Und selbst solche sehr einfachen Autos kamen teilweise in Richtung 90.000–100.000 R$.

Dann kamen die Chinesen.

BYD, GWM, GAC, Geely, Omoda/Jaecoo, Leapmotor, MG/SAIC usw. haben zunächst nicht direkt den billigsten 1.0-Handschalter angegriffen.

Sie sind ein oder zwei Segmente darüber eingestiegen.

Plötzlich stand einem klassischen Verbrenner der etablierten Hersteller ein chinesisches Auto gegenüber mit:

BEV

HEV

PHEV

Automatik

ADAS

großem Infotainment

mehr Leistung und Drehmoment

mehr Ausstattung

und teilweise erstaunlich ähnlichem Preis.

Damit beginnt der Preisdruck von oben nach unten.

Chinesisches BEV/HEV/PHEV wird günstiger

→ traditioneller Neuwagen bekommt Rabatt

→ junge Gebrauchte verlieren Preismacht

→ gebrauchte Mittelklasse wird billiger

→ diese Autos konkurrieren plötzlich mit neuen Kleinwagen

→ irgendwann muss sogar der einfachste 1.0 billiger werden.

China muss also nicht morgen ein Elektroauto für 10.000 Euro nach Brasilien oder Europa exportieren.

Die Chinesen können den gesamten Markt von oben zusammendrücken.

Ein aktuelles brasilianisches Beispiel:

Fiat Fastback Impetus MHEV:

173.490 R$ → 134.990 R$

Fast 40.000 R$ weniger.

Bedeutet das, dass Stellantis vorher 40.000 R$ Reingewinn pro Auto gemacht hat?

Natürlich nicht.

Der Rabatt kann aus vielen Quellen kommen:

Herstellermarge

Händlermarge

Werksbonus

Inzahlungnahme

Lagerabbau

Finanzierung

bewusst niedrigerer Marge

oder im Extremfall sogar temporär akzeptierten Verlusten

Aber genau das ist interessant.

Jahrelang hörten brasilianische Verbraucher, hohe Autopreise seien hauptsächlich das Ergebnis von:

Steuern

Wechselkurs

Produktionskosten

Logistik

„Custo Brasil“

Diese Faktoren existieren.

Aber sobald die Konkurrenz stark genug wurde, begannen Preise, die vorher fast unveränderbar wirkten, plötzlich stark zu fallen.

Der alte Listenpreis war also offensichtlich keine Naturkonstante.

Er hing auch davon ab:

Wie viel akzeptiert der Kunde?

und

Wie stark ist die Konkurrenz wirklich?

Selbst die etablierten Hersteller sprechen inzwischen offen über den chinesischen Druck.

Fabio Rua, ein GM-Vizepräsident in Südamerika, hat öffentlich gesagt, dass westliche Hersteller von China lernen und ihre Entscheidungen beschleunigen müssen.

Und genau deshalb interessiert mich die Sache auch aus Sicht von Volkswagen, Stellantis, Mercedes, BMW, GM usw.

Die interessante Börsenfrage lautet nicht:

„Wird BYD Volkswagen vernichten?“

Sondern:

Wie viel Marge und Preismacht müssen die etablierten Hersteller opfern, um wieder konkurrenzfähig zu werden?

Brasilien hat zusätzlich einen interessanten Sonderfall:

Ein großer Teil des Absatzes traditioneller Hersteller läuft über:

Mietwagenfirmen

Firmenflotten

Direktverkauf

staatliche Flotten

Aber eine Mietwagenfirma ist kein Endkunde.

Ihr Geschäftsmodell hängt stark vom Restwert der Fahrzeuge ab.

Sinken durch chinesische Konkurrenz die Neuwagenpreise, geraten auch Gebrauchtwagenpreise unter Druck.

Sinken die Restwerte stark genug, wird auch das Modell schwieriger, riesige Stückzahlen über Flotten und Vermieter abzusetzen.

Dann müssen die Hersteller wieder stärker um den privaten Käufer kämpfen.

Und ich behaupte ausdrücklich nicht, dass Verbrenner verschwinden müssen.

Je nach Einsatz können:

ICE

HEV

PHEV

BEV

alle sinnvoll sein.

Mir geht es nicht um technologische Ideologie.

Mir geht es um Preissetzungsmacht.

Früher konnten etablierte Hersteller stärker danach bepreisen, was der Kunde maximal akzeptiert.

Jetzt zwingt chinesische Konkurrenz sie zunehmend dazu, danach zu bepreisen, was der Wettbewerber ihnen noch erlaubt.

Also, Mauerstraße:

Nur ein temporärer Rabattkrieg – oder beginnt hier eine strukturelle Margenerosion bei VW, Stellantis & Co.?

Num post de hj aqui do sub tem um vídeo de um cara que comprou um GWM Ora 5isso resume bem uma coisa que venho falando há algum tempo: talvez o maior benefício da entrada das chinesas no Brasil nem seja todo mundo comprar carro chinês.

É fazer quem não quer carro chinês pagar menos no Volkswagen, Chevrolet, Fiat, Toyota, Hyundai etc.

Durante muito tempo, a lógica parecia ser:

1.0 aspirado manual: quase R$ 100 mil.

SUV compacto 1.0 turbo: R$ 130–150 mil.

Versão um pouco mais equipada: R$ 160 mil.

Híbrido ou elétrico: “produto de luxo”.

Aí começaram a aparecer BYD, GWM, GAC, Geely, Omoda/Jaecoo, Leapmotor e companhia oferecendo elétrico, HEV e PHEV pelo preço que as tradicionais cobravam em muito carro a combustão convencional.

Resultado?

De repente começaram a aparecer R$ 10 mil, R$ 15 mil, R$ 20 mil e até dezenas de milhares de reais em bônus e desconto.

O imposto diminuiu nessa mesma velocidade?

Não.

A fábrica ficou 30% mais eficiente de uma semana para outra?

Também não.

Então havia espaço no preço.

E isso é o que eu acho mais interessante nessa história.

Não precisa nem comprar o chinês para ganhar com a concorrência chinesa.

Se você comprar um Onix, Polo, T-Cross, Nivus, Corolla, HR-V ou qualquer outro tradicional depois que a montadora reduziu preço para responder aos chineses, você também foi beneficiado pela entrada deles.

Gain para o consumidor.

Loss para quem estava acostumado a precificar olhando até onde o brasileiro aceitava pagar.

E isso ainda pode ficar mais interessante porque boa parte das tradicionais brasileiras sustenta volume com venda direta, CNPJ, locadoras e frotas.

A Fiat é um exemplo muito bom. A Strada é fundamental para a liderança da marca e tem enorme peso em venda direta. Mobi e versões básicas do Argo também têm participação fortíssima nesse mercado.

Ou seja, olhar apenas o ranking geral e dizer “marca X é líder porque o consumidor prefere” pode enganar bastante. Nem todo emplacamento é um CPF entrando numa concessionária e escolhendo aquele carro pelo preço de varejo.

Minha aposta é que a verdadeira guerra vai acontecer justamente no CPF.

Porque uma locadora consegue negociar lote, desconto e condição especial.

O CPF olha:

“Esse 1.0 custa R$ 100 mil e esse elétrico/híbrido muito mais equipado custa R$ 115–130 mil?”

A diferença começa a ficar pequena demais.

E aí começa o efeito dominó:

chinês novo mais barato → tradicional zero precisa baixar → seminovo tradicional perde preço → usado médio começa a pressionar o popular zero → 1.0 pelado também precisa baixar.

Hoje a concorrência chinesa é direta principalmente de uns R$ 100–120 mil para cima.

Mas mesmo o popular já começa a sentir indiretamente.

Se algum dia começarem a trazer para cá elétricos chineses realmente baratos, na faixa equivalente aos Wuling e outros compactos vendidos na China, aí a pancada chega diretamente no pé-de-boi.

E tem uma experiência que eu adoraria ver.

Todo mundo diz:

“Carro no Brasil é caro por causa de imposto.”

Beleza.

Então tira.

Zera ou reduz brutalmente os impostos de BEV, HEV e PHEV e deixa também os carros manuais básicos praticamente desonerados.

Depois olha o preço.

Se R$ 20 mil de imposto desaparecerem e o carro ficar só R$ 8 mil mais barato, descobrimos rapidamente onde foram parar os outros R$ 12 mil.

Seria o maior experimento de formação de preço do mercado automotivo brasileiro.

No fim das contas, talvez a China esteja fazendo aquilo que décadas de reclamação sobre “carro caro no Brasil” não conseguiram:

obrigando as montadoras a mostrar até onde realmente conseguem baixar o preço quando aparece concorrência.

O verdadeiro loss talvez não seja comprar um GWM/BYD e ele desvalorizar.

Talvez tenha sido comprar um 1.0 pelado por R$ 100 mil antes de a concorrência chegar.

Something very interesting is happening in Brazil's car market.

BYD, GWM, GAC, Geely and other Chinese manufacturers are becoming serious competitors, particularly in retail sales to private buyers, and established manufacturers have suddenly started offering discounts that would have seemed impossible a few years ago.

I don't think Chinese cars are automatically better, and I don't want Volkswagen, Chevrolet, Fiat, Toyota, Honda or Renault to disappear.

I want them fighting each other for customers.

Look at what happened to entry-level prices

I compared some 2020 prices with their 2026 equivalents and adjusted the old prices for Brazilian inflation.

Car/equivalent

2020

2020 adjusted to 2026

2026 MSRP

Recent offer

Fiat Mobi 1.0

R$46,490

~R$64,900

R$85,490

R$72,490

Renault Kwid 1.0

R$46,990

~R$65,600

R$82,790

R$61,990

VW Gol → Polo Track

R$55,760

~R$77,800

R$96,690

R$86,990

Fiat Argo 1.0

R$60,390

~R$84,300

R$91,290

—

Chevrolet Onix 1.0

R$58,590

~R$81,800

R$102,890

—

Peugeot 208 1.2 → 1.0

R$54,690

~R$76,300

R$106,990

R$96,990

Obviously, modern cars aren't identical to their 2020 equivalents.

They have stricter safety and emissions requirements and generally more technology. COVID, semiconductor shortages, inflation and exchange rates genuinely increased costs.

But that doesn't explain everything.

A manufacturer can now suddenly discount a car by R$10,000 or R$15,000 without removing the airbags, infotainment system or other equipment.

What changed is competitive pressure.

The Kwid has even appeared below its inflation-adjusted 2020 price. Others remain considerably above their 2020 real prices.

So "cars became expensive because everything became expensive" is only part of the story.

But "just open the market" is also too simplistic

Brazil tried a major Chinese-car offensive before.

JAC Motors arrived aggressively, opened dealerships and offered inexpensive cars. Its presence later shrank dramatically.

What's happening now is different.

BYD, Geely and other Chinese groups have enormous scale, capital, battery technology and global manufacturing capacity. Several are investing in Brazilian production.

Sustainable competition requires more than simply allowing imports.

And even Chinese-car haters can benefit

You don't have to buy a BYD.

Buy a Volkswagen, Toyota, Chevrolet or Honda if you prefer.

But if BYD forces those companies to lower their prices, you still benefit.

And eventually lower new-car prices also put pressure on used-car prices.

Brazil should also redefine what an "affordable car" is

My unpopular proposal would be to create a permanent low-tax or zero-tax category for genuinely basic transportation.

Entry-level 1.0, 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6-liter cars would qualify.

And importantly, I would not treat an automatic transmission as a luxury item anymore.

The first affordable automatic version should qualify too.

That matters because the cheapest manual MSRP doesn't necessarily represent what Brazilian private buyers actually purchase. Extremely basic trims are disproportionately relevant to fleets, companies and rental-car operators.

Private buyers increasingly want automatics.

Affordable BEVs would receive the same treatment, subject to a price ceiling. Efficient affordable hybrids could qualify according to efficiency rather than engine displacement alone.

Higher trims would progressively lose the tax benefit.

What could this look like?

As a deliberately simplified illustration, removing roughly 24% from some current prices produces:

Car

Price used

Illustrative price

Renault Kwid

R$61,990

~R$47,100

Fiat Mobi

R$72,490

~R$55,100

VW Polo Track

R$86,990

~R$66,100

Fiat Argo

R$91,290

~R$69,400

Peugeot 208

R$96,990

~R$73,700

Chevrolet Onix

R$102,890

~R$78,200

This is not an estimate of manufacturing cost, nor am I claiming exactly 24% can simply be removed from every Brazilian car today. It's an illustration of the scale of taxation involved.

And yes, manufacturers could pocket some tax reductions if competition were weak.

That's exactly why I want both:

lower taxation on genuinely affordable transportation + aggressive competition.

I don't want Brazil protecting inefficient manufacturers indefinitely.

I don't want Brazil becoming merely an importer either.

And I definitely don't want an old oligopoly replaced by a Chinese oligopoly.

I want BYD pressuring Volkswagen, Volkswagen pressuring Chevrolet, Chevrolet pressuring Fiat, Toyota pressuring BYD — and someone pressuring the Chinese manufacturers if they eventually become complacent too.

I don't root for automakers. I want them fighting each other for my money.

I’m Brazilian, and after discussing Chinese competition and Volkswagen with Germans, I started wondering whether Americans have a particularly strong cultural attachment to pure internal-combustion cars.

I’m not asking whether everyone should suddenly buy a BEV. I’m including conventional hybrids (HEVs) and plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) in this discussion as well.

Brazil is currently going through a surprisingly fast change. Chinese manufacturers such as BYD and GWM have expanded rapidly, particularly with hybrids and EVs, and established manufacturers are being forced to respond.

What makes this especially interesting to me is that this isn't only something EV enthusiasts are saying.

A regional Vice President of GM in South America recently discussed how Chinese competition is putting pressure on established manufacturers to evolve. He also talked about personally using a Chevrolet Captiva EV and not wanting to return to a conventional combustion car.

That caught my attention because this isn't an executive from BYD or an EV startup. This is a senior regional executive of General Motors, one of America's own traditional automakers.

GM isn't saying that combustion engines will disappear tomorrow either. ICE vehicles will remain part of its portfolio, especially where they continue to make practical sense. The interesting question is what happens to ordinary passenger cars as electrified alternatives become competitive.

Brazil provides an interesting example.

Chevrolet still has a huge presence here with models such as the Onix, Onix Plus and Tracker. Most of its mainstream combustion cars use small turbocharged flex-fuel engines, while larger pickups and utility vehicles retain diesel engines.

At the same time, Chevrolet is expanding its EV range, including locally assembled electric models.

That creates an increasingly strange comparison for consumers. Someone shopping for a well-equipped conventional compact car or crossover can sometimes find an electrified vehicle at a surprisingly similar price.

And this isn't happening only in Brazil.

I recently asked Germans whether Chinese competition was changing their perception of Volkswagen. I expected much stronger resistance than I actually encountered.

There was certainly skepticism about Chinese cars, but many Germans focused instead on Volkswagen's prices and value for money. Some said Dacia is becoming what Volkswagen used to be. Others asked why they should buy a VW when a Škoda offers similar technology for less.

One German told me he intends to buy a BYD Seal 6 Touring because the actual deal available to him is around €34,000. He acknowledged concerns about Chinese cars himself, but his conclusion was essentially that the car fits his needs and is what he can afford.

That made me wonder whether the American debate sometimes treats a cultural preference as if it were purely a technical one.

Suppose you could choose between an ICE, HEV, PHEV and BEV with comparable size, practicality and performance.

If the electrified option offered more equipment and a lower total cost of ownership without compromising the things you actually need from the vehicle, would you still deliberately choose the pure ICE car?

If yes, why?

And more importantly: how much extra would you actually be willing to pay specifically to keep a pure combustion drivetrain?

I'm genuinely interested in whether Americans see this differently from consumers in Brazil and Germany.

I regularly follow the German press, and lately I have noticed a change in the way the German automotive industry is being discussed.

Volkswagen is still by far one of Germany’s most important and recognizable manufacturers, but more articles and comments seem to question whether some VW models — especially the better-equipped and higher-end versions — have become too expensive for what they offer.

At the same time, Chinese manufacturers such as BYD are expanding quickly. BYD is still relatively small in Germany, but its growth has been substantial, and the company is expanding its dealer, service and charging infrastructure. It reportedly wants to reach around 350 sales and service locations in Germany by the end of 2026. In the first half of the year, it registered more than 26,000 cars and reached approximately 1.8% of the German market.

This does not mean that BYD is already replacing Volkswagen in Germany. Volkswagen has a much stronger brand, a large customer base, an extensive network and a long history in the country. However, Chinese cars increasingly offer a great deal of standard equipment, powerful electric drivetrains and modern interiors at prices that invite comparison with established German models.

My question is mainly about consumer perception:

Are Germans beginning to feel that they are paying too much for Volkswagen models, especially after comparing them with Chinese alternatives?

Do people you know now seriously consider brands such as BYD, MG, XPeng, Leapmotor or Polestar, or are concerns about resale value, software, data protection, service availability and long-term reliability still strong enough to keep most buyers with German, European, Japanese or Korean brands?

I am also interested in whether this varies by generation. Are younger buyers less attached to Volkswagen and other German manufacturers than their parents were?

The broader situation also seems serious. German manufacturers have been losing substantial volume in China, while Chinese companies are expanding in Europe. Porsche’s deliveries have fallen considerably, particularly in China, and Volkswagen is restructuring its operations and reducing costs.

Recently, economist Moritz Schularick even suggested that Volkswagen might eventually be acquired by a Chinese manufacturer such as BYD. I understand that this is an extreme and highly speculative scenario, especially because Volkswagen’s ownership and voting structure would make such a takeover extremely difficult. Still, the fact that a prominent economist is publicly discussing it shows how dramatically the tone of the debate has changed.

So, beyond the headlines: do ordinary German consumers already perceive a real change in value for money, or is the Chinese competitive threat still much more visible in the media and financial markets than in actual purchasing decisions?

The official July 2026 figures are especially interesting because they show two very different rankings: the total market, which includes rental companies, corporate fleets and government purchases, and the retail market, which more closely represents cars bought by individual consumers.

Brazil registered 257,108 passenger cars and light commercial vehicles in July.

In the total market, the ranking was:

Fiat: 46,322 vehicles — 17.9% market share

Volkswagen: 41,951 — 16.2%

Chevrolet/GM: 29,196 — approximately 11.4%

BYD: 23,465 — 9.1%

Therefore, BYD did not quite overtake Chevrolet in the overall ranking. Chevrolet still sold 5,731 more vehicles and remained in third place.

However, the retail market tells a very different story.

BYD was the best-selling brand among retail customers, with 17,139 registrations and 12.6% of the entire Brazilian retail market. Volkswagen finished second with 16,587 vehicles and 12.2%.

This means approximately 73% of all BYD vehicles registered in July were sold through the retail channel: 17,139 out of 23,465 vehicles.

That distinction is important. Brazil’s overall rankings are heavily influenced by direct sales to rental companies, corporations and public fleets. A manufacturer can appear very strong in the total market while depending considerably on fleet purchases. BYD’s result, by contrast, shows unusually strong demand from people actually visiting dealerships and choosing the cars for their own use.

The model ranking is perhaps even more surprising.

The three best-selling cars in the Brazilian retail market were all Chinese electric vehicles:

BYD Dolphin: 5,861 retail sales

Geely EX2: 5,707

BYD Dolphin Mini: 5,537

The Volkswagen Tera was fourth with 4,470 units, while the Hyundai Creta finished fifth with 4,185.

The Chevrolet Tracker was the strongest Chevrolet model in retail, with 4,091 registrations. It represented 73.29% of the Tracker’s 5,582 total registrations, meaning that roughly three out of every four Trackers were bought through retail rather than direct or fleet sales.

The BYD models also had very high retail proportions:

• BYD Dolphin: 5,861 retail registrations out of 6,492 total — 90.28%

• BYD Dolphin Mini: 5,537 out of 7,265 — 76.21%

• BYD Song: 3,814 retail registrations, placing it among the ten best-selling retail models

The regular Dolphin alone represented 34.2% of BYD’s retail volume during the month.

In the overall model ranking, including both retail and direct sales, Chevrolet still had one of Brazil’s most popular cars. The Chevrolet Onix finished fourth with 9,312 registrations.

BYD, however, placed three models inside the national top ten:

• Dolphin Mini: 7,265 registrations

• Song family: approximately 6,834 registrations

• Dolphin: 6,492 registrations

This is remarkable because Brazil has traditionally been one of the world’s strongest markets for gasoline and ethanol flex-fuel vehicles. Only a few years ago, electric cars were treated as expensive niche products here.

Now, two BYD electric hatchbacks are selling more units to private customers than many locally manufactured combustion cars, while a Chinese electric and plug-in-hybrid manufacturer already controls 12.6% of the retail market.

BYD also registered 14,760 fully electric cars in July, representing 57.8% of Brazil’s battery-electric market. When plug-in hybrids are included, BYD accounted for 51.1% of all rechargeable vehicles sold in the country.

So the complete picture is more nuanced than simply saying that BYD became Brazil’s third-largest manufacturer.

It did not: Chevrolet remained third in the total market, with 29,196 registrations, while BYD finished fourth with 23,465.

But among retail customers, BYD finished first. Its cars also occupied two of the first three positions in the individual retail ranking, and around 73% of the company’s total volume came from that channel.

There is another important detail behind these numbers: Brazil’s overall ranking combines retail purchases with direct sales to rental companies, corporate fleets, government agencies and other institutional buyers.

This distinction considerably changes the picture.

Traditional manufacturers such as Fiat, Volkswagen and Chevrolet still receive a large part of their volume from direct sales. They have long-established relationships with rental companies and fleet operators, extensive service networks and several models developed specifically for commercial or professional use.

The Fiat Strada is the clearest example. It is usually described simply as Brazil’s best-selling vehicle, but it is a compact pickup and light commercial vehicle. A substantial part of its demand comes from companies, rural producers, service providers and fleet operators rather than ordinary families buying a personal car.

The same effect can be seen, to varying degrees, across models from Chevrolet and Volkswagen. A large fleet contract can add thousands of registrations in a single month, even though those vehicles were not individually chosen by private consumers.

BYD currently has a very different sales profile.

Of BYD’s 23,465 registrations in July, 17,139 came from the retail channel. That means approximately 73% of the brand’s vehicles were sold through retail, compared with a considerably greater dependence on direct and corporate sales among several traditional manufacturers.

This is why the two rankings tell different stories.

In the total market, Chevrolet remained third and BYD finished fourth. But among private retail customers, BYD was the leading brand in Brazil, with a 12.6% share.

Therefore, BYD’s result cannot be explained mainly by large purchases from rental companies or corporate fleets. Its position was driven mostly by individual consumers choosing its electric and plug-in-hybrid models.

This does not make the total ranking irrelevant. Direct sales are real sales and represent an important part of the Brazilian automobile industry. However, the retail ranking is often more useful for understanding what private buyers genuinely prefer.

In July, that preference produced an unusual result: a relatively new Chinese manufacturer led Brazil’s retail market, while several traditional manufacturers remained ahead in the overall ranking partly because of their stronger presence in fleet and corporate sales. For a country where electric cars were considered almost irrelevant only a few years ago, that is a major transformation.

Do people outside Brazil realize how quickly the Brazilian car market is becoming electrified?

A Fenabrave divulgou o consolidado de julho de 2026 e alguns números chamaram bastante a minha atenção.

Antes de tudo, é importante fazer uma distinção que muita gente acaba confundindo: o BYD Dolphin Mini é o automóvel de passeio mais vendido no varejo (CPF), enquanto a Fiat Strada continua sendo o veículo mais vendido no geral, considerando automóveis e comerciais leves, além das vendas para pessoas físicas e jurídicas.

No acumulado do ano, entre os automóveis vendidos no varejo, o ranking mostra:

• BYD Dolphin Mini em 1º lugar, com mais de 35 mil emplacamentos. • Hyundai Creta em 2º. • Volkswagen Tera em 3º. • BYD Song em 4º. • Chevrolet Tracker em 5º. • O Top 10 ainda conta com VW Nivus, VW Polo, BYD Dolphin, Chevrolet Onix e Geely EX2.

Outro ponto interessante é que as marcas chinesas continuam ampliando sua presença. A BYD já tem três modelos entre os dez primeiros, enquanto a Geely também entrou no Top 10 com o EX2.

Ao mesmo tempo, Volkswagen, Hyundai, GM, Fiat e Toyota continuam muito fortes, mostrando que a disputa está ficando cada vez mais equilibrada.

Uma curiosidade que sempre me chama a atenção é a liderança absoluta da Fiat Strada no ranking geral. Eu entendo que ela vende muito para empresas, produtores rurais, frotistas e locadoras, mas ainda assim impressiona o volume que ela alcança todos os anos. É um desempenho muito acima de qualquer automóvel de passeio.

Na opinião de vocês, por que a Strada consegue manter uma vantagem tão grande sobre todos os outros veículos? O mercado brasileiro realmente tem demanda suficiente para uma picape compacta vender tanto, ou o peso das vendas para CNPJ, frotas e locadoras explica praticamente toda essa liderança?

E olhando para os automóveis de passeio vendidos no varejo, vocês acreditam que o avanço das marcas chinesas é uma tendência permanente ou ainda estamos em um período de transição?