"A U.S. retaliatory attack against the Soviet Union would destroy 70 to 80 percent of its economic worth. The attacking force would consist primarily of U.S. strategic bombers and Poseidon/Polaris SLBMs, since most U.S. land-based ICBMs are assumed lost to a Soviet first strike. Bombers carry gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles having yields of about 1 Mt and 200 kt respectively. Poseidon SLBMs nominally carry up to 10 RVs of 40 kt each.

The attack would strike the full set of Soviet targets — strategic offensive forces, other military targets, economic targets, and cities. Population would in fact be struck, although killing people would not be an attack objective in itself. The objectives would be to cause as much industrial damage as possible and to make economic recovery as difficult as possible. The attacks might not be limited in time. Concentrations of evacuees would probably not be struck, but industries that recovered very quickly after the attack could be.

The immediate effects of the attack would be death and injury to millions of Soviet citizens, plus the destruction of a large percentage of Soviet economic and industrial capacity. As with the all-out Soviet attack, the executive branch studies provided a wide range of casualty estimates. Since the thrust of those analyses was to look at the potential effectiveness of Soviet civil defense, casualties were estimated under various assumptions related to the posture of the population.

If the Soviet population remained in-place, fatality estimates range from a high of 64 million to 100 million (26 to 40 percent of the Soviet population) to a low of 50 million to 80 million (20 to 32 percent).

The high-value range is due to the different data bases used by DOD and ACDA and the higher protection levels assumed by ACDA.

The low-value range results from the use of day-to-day alert status by the interagency intelligence study as compared to ACDA's use of generated forces, and the types of weapons used against the economic target base in the two studies.

With evacuation, the ACDA study estimated that fatalities would be reduced to 23 million to 34 million. It is difficult to judge whether these figures represent a high or low estimate. They could be considered as representing the low side because of the coarseness of Soviet data as used by ACDA. On the other hand, some would say that the evacuation scheme assumed by ACDA was unrealistic, and the results should be considered a high estimate. Nevertheless, Soviet fatalities are lower than the United States for both in-place and evacuated population postures. The lower Soviet fatalities are again primarily due to major differences in the yields of the weapons detonating in each country, and to the greater proportion of Soviet population that lives in rural areas.

As to the cause of fatalities (blast, thermal radiation, and direct nuclear radiation versus fallout radiation), DCPA data suggests that, in large attacks, that is, attacks that include economic or economic and population targets, fatalities are primarily due to prompt effects as opposed to fallout. Prompt effects account for at least 80 percent of the fatalities for all population postures when economic targets or population are included in the attack

. ACDA notes a similar result in its study for attacks that include counterforce and other military targets. The reason for this is that in attacks on targets near urban areas, that is, attacks involving economic targets or population, those protected enough to survive the blast effects also have enough protection to survive the fallout. Conversely, those who do not have enough protection against fallout in urban areas near targets will not have enough protection against prompt effects and will already be dead before fallout has an effect. Estimates of Soviet injuries were generally not included in the analyses. However, one study suggested that injuries might be roughly equal to fatalities under certain attack and exposure assumptions"

Pages 105-6 of the PDF: The Effects of Nuclear War

NT's usually say they have the right to reject you, and if malignant they try to demand you prove yourself to them what happens if you say "No", and don't interact with them. Some complain about NT rejection but they might have done us a great favor by granting us the right to reject. With billions of people in the world, you should connect with those you connect with.

Most importantly some NT are outright enemies. They also deem you a threat, and will try to hurt you. You will be both infantile and evil to them, do not interact with them. This is only if said NT consider you an enemy.

Example: If your both evil and infantile at the same time, they fear autistic shooters, support the Judge Rotenberg Center, are weirded out and scared of you, then they are real threats to you.

​

What if Poland sensing German intentions and fearing a two front war with the Soviets, not believing the French were reliable, responded to Munich or Anschluss by mobilizing and invading Berlin, and East Prussia?

How far would the Polish army get?

What impact would it have on ww2?

What would the Soviets do?

Poland attenpts to claim it is a drill to keep the German off guard.

What if Poland sensing German intentions and fearing a two front war with the Soviets, not believing the French were reliable, responded to Munich or Anschluss by mobilizing and invading Berlin, and East Prussia?

How far would the Polish army get?

What impact would it have on ww2?

What would the Soviets do?

Poland attenpts to claim it is a drill to keep the German off guard.

There are 700,000 of us with diverse skills. Probably a couple hundred or thousand with military experience. A few of us have financial resources to buy guns, toyatas and drones. Can we form a PMC and do it? Would we be able to hire blackwater and some bored ex Syrian rebels?

Can we crowdsource an improvised warship made from a freighter and some fishing boats?

What would we do after we win? How much power does Cody have? Figurehead or supreme leader?

Who gets the oil wealth? Are we targeting the oil companies or marching to Baghdad to topple the Government like Wagner did or both? Do we arrive from Syria with all the weapons lying around or Kuwait so we can march along the main roadways? Would we stick to Iraq or go for Kuwait instead before marching to Baghdad?

Does Z Com produce any weapons or does it only use pre outbreak weaponry and tweak them for killing zombies?

What are your headcanons?

There is a common headcanon that the Covey by virtue of singing, "freedom loving", even traveling were viewed as inherent rebels even without affiliation in the Organized Rebellion.

If this is true, then why would the capitol allow them to exist? If the Capitol allowed them to exist but as a hated persecuted minority then how would that work in a totalitarian regime of the pre dark days capitol? Why weren't they forcibly assimilated before the war? If they were how did they survive as a culture throughout the difficult centuries of Capitol domination?

If the covey could escape outside Panem why didn't they do it during the dark days or why did they do it?

CASE 4: A LARGE SOVIET ATTACK ON U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC TARGETS

This case discusses a massive attack that one normally associates with all-out nuclear war. The attack uses thousands of warheads to attack urban-industrial targets, strategic targets, and other military targets. The number of deaths and the damage and destruction inflicted on the U.S. society and economy by the sheer magnitude of such an attack would place in question whether the United States would ever recover its position as an organized, industrial, and powerful country.

OTA favored examining purely retaliatory strikes for both sides, but all of the available executive branch studies involved Soviet preemption and U.S. retaliation. However, the differences between a Soviet first strike and a retaliation do not appear to be appreciably large in terms of damage to the civilian structure. Like the United States, the Soviets have a secure second-strike force in their SLBMs and are assumed to target them generally against the softer urban-industrial targets. Moreover, a U.S. first strike would be unlikely to destroy the bulk of Soviet ICBMs before they could be launched in retaliation.

The effects of a large Soviet attack against the United States would be devastating. The most immediate effects would be the loss of millions of human lives, accompanied by similar incomprehensible levels of injuries, and the physical destruction of a high percentage of U.S. economic and industrial capacity. The full range of effects resulting from several thousand warheads — most having yields of a megaton or greater— impacting on or near U.S. cities can only be discussed in terms of uncertainty and speculation. The executive branch studies that addressed this level of attack report a wide range of fatality levels reflecting various assumptions about the size of the attack, the protective posture of the population, and the proportion of air bursts to ground burst weapons.

The DOD 1977 study estimated that 155 million to 165 million Americans would be killed by this attack if no civil defense measures were taken and all weapons were ground burst. DCPA looked at a similar attack in 1978 where only half the weapons were ground burst; it reduced the fatality estimate to 122 million. ACDA's analysis of a similar case estimated that 105 million to 131 million would die.

If people made use of existing shelters near their homes, the 155 million to 165 million fatality estimate would be reduced to 110 million to 145 million, and the 122 million fatalities to 100 million. The comparable ACDA fatality estimate drops to 76 million to 85 million. Again ACDA gets a lower figure through assuming air bursts for about 60 percent of the incoming weapons. Finally, if urban populations were evacuated from risk areas, the estimated prompt fatality levels would be substantially reduced. The DOD study showed fatalities of 40 million to 55 million, with DCPA showing a very large drop to 20 million from the 100 million level. The primary reason for the 2-to-1 differential is the degree of protection from fallout assumed for the evacuated population.

In summary, U.S. fatality estimates range from a high of 155 million to 165 million to a low of 20 million to 55 million. Fatalities of this magnitude beg the question of injuries to the survivors. None of the analyses attempted to estimate injuries with the same precision used in estimated fatalities. However, DCPA did provide injury estimates ranging from 33 million to 12 million, depending on circumstances. An additional point worth noting is that all of the fatality figures just discussed are for the first 30 days following the attack; they do not account for subsequent deaths among the injured or from economic disruption and deprivation.

The First Few Hours

The devastation caused by a single 1-Mt weapon over Detroit (chapter II), and of two similar weapons denoted near Philadelphia, have been described. In this attack the same destruction would take place in 30 or so other major cities (with populations of a million or greater). Many cities with smaller populations would also be destroyed. The effects on U.S. society would be catastrophic.

The majority of urban deaths will be blast induced, e.g., victims of collapsing buildings, flying debris, being blown into objects, etc. Except for administering to the injured, the next most pressing thing (probably ahead of handling the dead) for most survivors would be to get reliable information about what has occurred, what is taking place, and what is expected. Experience has shown that in a disaster situation, timely and relevant information is critical to avoiding panic, helpful in organizing and directing productive recovery efforts, and therapeutic to the overall psychological and physical well being of those involved. Presumably, the civil preparedness functions would be operating well enough to meet some of this need.

Rescuing and treating the injured will have to be done against near insurmountable odds. Fire and rescue vehicles and equipment not destroyed will find it impossible to move about in any direction. Fires will be raging, water mains will be flooding, powerlines will be down, bridges will be gone, freeway overpasses will be collapsed, and debris will be everywhere. People will be buried under heavy debris and structures, and without proper equipment capable of lifting such loads, the injured cannot be reached and will not survive. The fortunate ones that rescuers can reach will then be faced with the unavailability of treatment facilities. Hospitals and clinics in downtown areas would likely have been destroyed along with most of their stocks of medical supplies. Doctors, nurses, and technicians needed to man makeshift treatment centers are likely to have been among the casualties. The entire area of holocaust will be further numbed by either the real or imagined danger of fallout. People will not know whether they should try to evacuate their damaged city, or attempt to seek shelter from fallout in local areas and hope there will be no new attacks. No doubt some of both would be done.

if this situation were an isolated incident or even part of a small number of destroyed cities in an otherwise healthy United States, outside help would certainly be available. But if 250 U.S. cities are struck and damaged to similar levels, then one must ask, "Who is able to help?" Smaller towns are limited in the amount of assistance they can provide their metropolitan neighbors.

It is doubtful that there would be a strong urge to buck the tide of evacuation in order to reach a place where most of the natives are trying to leave. Additionally, the smaller cities and towns would have their own preparedness problems of coping with the anticipated arrival of fallout plus the influx of refugees.

In light of these and other considerations, it appears that in an attack of this magnitude, there is likely not to be substantial outside assistance for the targeted areas until prospective helpers are convinced of two things: the attack is over, and fallout intensity has reached safe levels. Neither of these conditions is likely to be met in the first few hours.

The First Few Days

Survivors will continue to be faced with the decision whether to evacuate or seek shelter in place during this interval. The competence and credibility of authority will be under continuous question. Will survivors be told the facts, or what is best for them to know, and who decides? Deaths will have climbed due to untreated injuries, sickness, shock, and poor judgement. Many people will decide to attempt evacuation simply to escape the reality of the environment. For those staying, it likely means the beginning of an extended period of shelter survival. Ideally, shelters must protect from radiation while meeting the minimums of comfort, subsistence, and personal hygiene. Convincing people to remain in shelters until radiation levels are safely low will be difficult, but probably no more so than convincing them that it is safe to leave on the basis of a radiation-rate meter reading. There will be unanswerable questions on long-term effects. Sheltering the survivors in the populous Boston to Norfolk corridor will present un- precedented problems. Almost one-fifth of the U.S. population lives in this small, 150- by 550- mile [250 by 900 km] area. Aside from the threat of destruction from direct attack, these populations are in the path of fallout from at- tacks on missile silos and many industrial targets in the Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Duluth triangle. Depending on the winds at altitude, the fallout from the Midwest will begin arriving 12 to 30 hours after the attack.

At the time when fallout radiation first becomes intense, only a fraction of the surviving urban population will be in adequate fallout shelters. Those that are sheltered will face a variety of problems: making do with existing stocks of food, water, and other necessities or else minimizing exposure while leaving the shelter for supplies; dealing with problems of sanitation, which will not only create health hazards but also exacerbate the social tensions of crowds of frightened people in a small space; dealing with additional people wanting to enter the shelter, who would not only want to share scarce supplies but might bring contamination in with them; dealing with disease, which would be exacerbated not only by the effects of radiation but by psychosomatic factors; and finally judging when it is safe to venture out. Boredom will gradually replace panic, but will be no easier to cope with. Those with inadequate shelters or no shelters at all will die in large numbers, either from lethal doses of radiation or from the combination of other hazards with weakness induced by radiation sickness.

The conditions cited above are generally more applicable to urbanites who are trying to survive. The problems of rural survivors are somewhat different, some being simpler- others more complex. With warning, people living in rural areas could readily fabricate adequate fallout shelters. However, it might be more difficult for a rural shelteree to have current and accurate information regarding fallout intensity and location. The farm family is likely not to have suffered the traumatic exposure to death and destruction and consequently is probably better prepared psychologically to spend the required time in a shelter. (Possible consequences to livestock and crops are addressed later in this section.)

Outdoor activity in or near major cities that were struck would likely be limited to emergency crews attempting to control fires or continuing to rescue the injured. Crews would wear protective clothing, but it would be necessary to severely limit the total work hours of any one crew member, so as not to risk dangerous accumulations of radiation. Areas not threatened by fallout could begin more deliberate fire control and rescue operations.

Whether a national facility would survive to identify weapons impact points and predict fallout patterns is doubtful.

The extent of death and destruction to the Nation would still be unknown. For the most part, the agencies responsible for assembling such information would not be functioning. This task would have to wait until the numbing effect of the attack had worn off, and the Government could once again begin to function, however precariously.

The Shelter Period (Up to a Month)

As noted earlier, after the initial shock period, including locating and getting settled in shelters, the problem of sheltering large masses of people will be compounded as the shelter time extends. Survival will remain the key concern. People will experience or witness radiation death and sickness for the first time.

Many previously untreated injuries will require medical attention, if permanent damage or death to the individual is to be avoided. Stockpiles of medical, food, and water supplies are sure to become items of utmost concern.

Whether some people can safely venture outside the shelter for short periods to forage for uncontaminated supplies will depend on fallout intensity, and the availability of reliable means of measuring it. This period will continue to be marked by more inactivity than activity. Many areas will have been freed from the fallout threat either by rain, shifting winds, or distance from the detonations. But economic activity will not resume immediately. Workers will remain concerned about their immediate families and may not want to risk leaving them. Information and instruction may not be forthcoming. and if it is, it may be confusing and misleading, and of little use. Uncertainty and frustration will plague the survivors, and even the most minor tasks will require efforts far out of proportion to their difficulty. Many will interpret this as symptomatic of radiation effects and become further confused and depressed. The overall psychological effects will likely worsen until they become a major national concern, perhaps on the same level with other incapacitating injuries. Deaths occurring within the first 30 days of an attack are categorized as prompt fatalities. This duration is a computation standard more than it is related to specific death-producing effects, and is the basis for most fatality estimates. However, deaths from burns, injuries, and radiation sickness can be expected to continue far beyond this particular interval.

The Recuperation Period

Whether economic recovery would take place, and if so what form it would take, would depend both on the physical survival of enough people and resources to sustain recovery, and on the question of whether these survivors could adequately organize themselves. Physical survival of some people is quite probable, and even a population of a few million can sustain a reasonably modern economy under favorable circumstances, The survivors would not be a cross-section of prewar America, since people who had lived in rural areas would be more likely to survive than the inhabitants of cities and suburbs. The surviving population would lack some key industrial and technical skills; on the other hand, rural people and those urban people who would survive are generally hardier than the American average.

While the absolute level of surviving stocks of materials and products would seem low by prewar standards, there would be a much smaller population to use these stocks. Apart from medicines (which tend to have a short shelf life, and which are manufactured exclusively in urban areas), there would probably not be any essential commodity of which supplies were desperately short at first. A lack of medicines would accentuate the smallness and hardiness of the surviving population. Restoring production would be a much more difficult task than finding interim stockpiles. Production in the United States is extremely complex, involving many intermediate stages.

https://preview.redd.it/nyywmlijqx3h1.png?width=607&format=png&auto=webp&s=ded3bb29b3b38fa5419850cdda677f5a665b98fe

New patterns of production, which did not rely on facilities that have been destroyed, would have to be established. It cannot be said whether the productive facilities that physically survived (undamaged or repairable with available supplies and skills) would be adequate to sustain recovery. It seems probable that there would be enough equipment and that scavenging among the ruins could provide adequate "raw materials" where natural resources were no longer accessible with surviving technology. The most serious problems would be organizational. Industrial society depends on the division of labor, and the division of labor depends on certain governmental functions.

Physical security comes first-a person is reluctant to leave home to go to work without some assurance that the home will not be looted. While some degree of law and order could probably be maintained in localities where a fairly dense population survived, the remaining highways might become quite unsafe, which would reduce trade over substantial distances. The second requirement is some form of payment for work. Barter is notoriously inefficient. Payment by fiat (for example, those who work get Government ration cards) is inefficient as well and requires a Government stronger than a postwar United States would be likely to inherit. A strong Government might grow up, but most surviving citizens would be reluctant to support a dictatorship by whatever name. The best solution is a viable monetary system, but it would not, be easy to establish. Regions or localities might develop their own monies, with "foreign" trade among regions.

The surviving resources might not be used very efficiently. Ideally one would want to conduct a national survey of surviving assets, but the surviving Government would probably not be capable of doing so, especially since people would fear that to acknowledge a surviving stock was to invite its confiscation. To make use of surviving factories, workers would have to live nearby, and they might be unwilling to do so in the absence of minimally adequate housing for their families. Ownership of some assets would be hopelessly confused, which would diminish the incentives for investment or even temporary repairs

. There is a possibility that the country might break up into several regional entities. If these came into conflict with each other there would be further waste and destruction.

effect, the country would enter a race, with economic viability as the prize. The country would try to restore production to the point where consumption of stocks and the wearing out of surviving goods and tools was matched by new production. If this was achieved before stocks ran out, then viability would be attained. Otherwise, consumption would necessarily sink to the level of new production and in so doing would probably depress production further, creating a downward spiral. At some point this spiral would stop, but by the time it did so the United States might have returned to the economic equivalent of the Middle Ages.

The effect of an all-out attack would be equally devastating to the U.S. social structure. Heavy fatalities in the major urban areas would deprive the country of a high percentage of its top business executives, Government officials, medical educators, and performers. There is no measure for estimating the impact of such lasting losses on our society. In addition to the irreplaceable loss of genius and talents, the destruction of their associated institutions is still another compounding of effects that is overlooked by some recovery estimates. Who could calculate how long to get over the loss of Wall Street, an MIT, a Mayo Clinic, and the Smithsonian?

The American way of life is characterized by material possessions, with private ownership of items representing substantial long-term investments (such as homes, businesses, and automobiles) being the rule rather than exception. Widespread loss of individual assets such as these could have a strong, lasting effect on our social structure. Similarly, the question of whether individual right to ownership of surviving assets would remain unchanged in a postattack environment would arise. For example, the Government might find it necessary to force persons having homes to house families who had lost their homes

The family group would be particularly hard hit by the effects of general nuclear war. Deaths, severe injuries, forced separation, and loss of contact could place inordinate strains on the family structure.

Finally, major changes should be anticipated in the societal structure, as survivors attempt to adapt to a severe and desponding environment never before experienced. The loss of a hundred million people, mostly in the larger cities, could raise a question on the advisability of rebuilding the cities. (Why reconstruct obvious targets for a nuclear Armageddon of the future?) The surviving population could seek to alter the social and geopolitical structure of the rebuilding nation in hopes of minimizing the effects of any future conflicts.

How well the U.S. political structure might recover from a large-scale nuclear attack depends on a number of uncertainties. First, with warning, national level officials are presumed to evacuate to outlying shelter areas; State and local authorities will take similar precautions, but probably with less success, especially at the lower levels. The confidence and credibility of the system will come under severe strains as relief and recovery programs are implemented.

Changes in an already weakened structure are sure to result as many normal practices and routines are set aside to facilitate recovery. Survivors may demand more immediate expressions of their likes, dislikes, and needs. Widespread dissatisfaction could result in a weakening of the Federal process, leading to a new emphasis on local government. An alternative possibility is martial law, which might be controlled in theory but decentralized in practice. All of this assumes that there would be no significant ecological damage, a possibility discussed in chapter V. Chapter V also discusses long-term health hazards.

The Effects of Nuclear War pdf pages 99-105

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The epilogue was written by Plutarch and described the work of district 13 in the second rebellion on eve of the battle of the Capitol. This would be After Haymitch gives an account of the destruction of the 3QQ arena.

What would need to change in the book itself? Imo many of the books flaws would be more explainable.

Effie would've been presented in a more negative light, though.

I think a in universe Panem propoganda book would utilize more photos to reach district workers less interested in reading.

Uses

Shading

Light to dark contrast

Having ocean dark so as to make the land lighter for contrast

What are your thoughts on the cartographic applications of Charcoal?

Palpatine's response?

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In your headcanon what would happen?

Revenge of the Sith novel*

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Ways to take Midi-chlorian-from what I've seen midis die when the host dies-would a parasite/symbiont of a force user gain force power? Could the midis of a newly deceased Jedi or blood/body waste soon after separation from life be taken-put in a jar then gathered-be used to generate unlimited power? or breeding midis in a lab and utilizing industrial agricultural breeding for Midi-chlorian to create more midichloreans and then power. The force has a will of its own though-how to ensure the force obeys, is the question. If it is using Midis then can any force entities stop the acheivement of power?(different then any force hyperdrives, with domesticated midis the force will be domesticated itself. What is the force without Midichloreans?

This is after Anakin pledges himself to Sidious Palpatine says this will give him strength in the dark side to save Padme. Palpatine also gives Anakin the painful surgery himself, using ancient sith knives, and chainsaws. This is as he says he will save Padme, and Palps does this instead of saying that together they will find out the secrets.

Would this unironically increase Anakin's powers in the dark side? (Anakin has both limbs their just burned)-Darth Plagueis brought Palps to a ice cold planet, and Vader cut an Inquisitors arms off. Palps suit put him in pain to increase his power.

The pressure wave and thermal injuries would have major effects, there just isn't enough nukes to use it as a zombie killing bomb.

Fallout might kill some microbes in the zombie. Would nuclear weapons be effective against a large zombie horde?

Function: Show the disorder that "make the games necessary"

What type of crimes would people in districts commit?

If done in the 70s-theft particularly of food, breaking all sorts of small capitolite rules

if done in the 20s-30s- Rebels would try to escape the district and hunt down "traitors" under the guise of crime.