u/bourbonwarrior

https://investornews.com/critical-minerals-rare-earths/technology-metals-report-10-04-2026-a-summit-without-a-rare-earth-deal-leaves-the-west-buying-its-way-to-supply/

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When Xi Jinping left Washington on September 25th after a three-day state visit, the most telling sentence in the White House’s account of his talks with President Donald Trump was also its vaguest. The fact sheet said only that the two countries “continue to work on U.S. concerns regarding supply chain shortages related to rare earths and other critical minerals,” with the goal of returning shipments to “appropriate levels.”

The summit did produce concrete outcomes elsewhere: consensus on more favorable tariff treatment for US$30 billion of “non-sensitive” goods in each direction, a Chinese commitment to import at least 10 million metric tons of American coal in both 2027 and 2028, and the formal launch of bilateral boards on trade and investment. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on September 24th that the trade truce struck last year would now run to January 10th, 2027, rather than expiring on November 10th. China’s Commerce Ministry, for its part, emphasized that more than 90% of the products in the new tariff package would move to most-favored-nation rates. On critical minerals, Beijing gave up nothing, and the two weeks that followed were defined by Western governments and companies trying to build, buy or finance their way around that fact.

The data explain the urgency. Chinese customs figures released just before the summit showed August exports of rare earths magnets to the United States falling to 512 metric tons, down 21% from July and 13% from a year earlier, while total magnet exports slipped 18% year on year. Prices tell a more nuanced story. The Critical Minerals Platform, CMI’s pricing partner, assessed terbium oxide (99.9%) at US$799.97 per kilogram FOB Asia Pacific on September 29th, up 1.3% from a month earlier but 19.5% lower than a year ago and well below its 52-week high of US$996.01. Yttrium oxide (99%) has moved the other way over the year: at US$17.31 per kilogram on the same basis, it was 1.5% lower on the month but 49.1% higher than a year earlier, having peaked at US$19.02 in January.

The contrast suggests that for Western buyers the binding constraint is less the Asian benchmark price than access to licensed material. Shortages are most acute among the heavy rare earths covered by China’s April 2025 licensing regime, which the truce never suspended. Reuters reported that American and Japanese officials met on September 10th to discuss yttrium, used in thermal barrier coatings on jet engine turbine blades, after Chinese customs data recorded zero US-bound yttrium shipments in January, May and June. Even the tariff package left the subject untouched: the agreed lists cover 77 categories of American imports from China and 1,619 categories of Chinese imports from the United States, with rare earths, as the South China Morning Post put it, left off the record.

Washington appears to be looking for leverage of its own. On October 1st, Reuters reported, citing unnamed sources, that the Commerce Department has slowed export licenses for aircraft parts bound for China, including shipments to the state-owned planemaker Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC), and is considering new rules covering landing gear and other parts as well as licensing requirements for aviation hydraulic fluid. The administration has not confirmed the policy, and the Chinese embassy has previously accused the United States of abusing export controls. If the reporting is accurate, it suggests the truce extension has become a negotiating window rather than a settlement, with aerospace inputs now set against Chinese mineral exports.

The more durable response is industrial, and tungsten, one of the CMI’s five priority categories, offered the clearest illustration. The Elmet Group Co. (Nasdaq: ELMT), which disclosed a US$450 million Department of War investment commitment in redeemable preferred equity on September 14th, agreed on September 23rd and completed on October 1st the purchase of a 4.99% stake in Masan High-Tech Materials Corporation (UPCoM: MSR), owner of Vietnam’s Nui Phao mine, one of the largest tungsten producers outside China. The 55.14 million shares cost VND 3.24 trillion, about US$124.8 million.

Elmet gains a board seat, and long-term agreements for mined tungsten and for conversion services at Masan’s Vietnamese refinery take effect on closing, linking Vietnamese mining and refining to American manufacturing demand. A day earlier, its subsidiary Elmet Technologies won a roughly US$36 million Defense Logistics Agency contract for molybdenum and tungsten alloys. In South Korea, Almonty Industries Inc. (Nasdaq: ALM) reported that its Sangdong processing plant received final operational certification on September 21st and produced its first tungsten on September 23rd, the first output at the site since 1993; on September 29th the company announced the start of Phase II development. Sangdong’s operating start is a material milestone for non-Chinese supply, although its contribution will depend on how quickly it ramps toward design capacity.

The defense calendar adds its own pressure. Under a Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement rule finalized in 2024, from January 1st, 2027, samarium-cobalt and neodymium-iron-boron magnets, tantalum, and tungsten metal powder and heavy alloys delivered under covered defense contracts may not be mined, refined, separated, melted or produced in China, Russia, Iran or North Korea; until then, the restriction reaches only melting and production. Exceptions remain for certain commercial items, electronic devices and US-recycled magnet feed. The rule governs defense procurement rather than commercial imports, but its arrival nine days before the truce deadline means contractual eligibility, not diplomatic goodwill, will determine where defense suppliers can source.

Finance moved alongside production. Glencore plc (LSE: GLEN; JSE: GLN) said on September 23rd that it will be a founding partner of VaultCo, the public-private US strategic minerals reserve, backed by US$500 million in financing from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, with Glencore sourcing and delivering material into the stockpile. The release named no specific metals and did not describe the financing as disbursed. The same week, a document seen by Reuters showed Washington planning up to US$7 billion in EXIM loans over two years for Argentine lithium, copper and energy projects, structured to finance purchases of American equipment.

It is lending capacity across several sectors, neither a disbursement nor a commitment devoted solely to mining. Argentina’s own incentives are doing similar work: Eramet S.A. (Euronext Paris: ERA) said on October 1st that it plans to apply under the RIGI incentive regime for a first expansion of its Centenario-Ratones lithium operation, adding 11,000 metric tons a year of lithium carbonate equivalent to existing nameplate capacity of 24,000 tons at an estimated cost of about US$350 million, with a final investment decision possible by the end of 2027. Nigeria and the United States signed a non-binding framework on September 24th covering geological data and exploration, processing, infrastructure and technical capacity, while United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres announced a mechanism to help Guinea, Indonesia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe capture more value from their mineral wealth. These are, for now, statements of intent and lending capacity rather than mines or refineries, and the distinction matters for anyone measuring progress.

Processing, the narrowest link in most of these chains, also advanced. On September 21st, Korea Zinc Company, Ltd. (KRX: 010130) received a federal finding of no significant impact for its planned US$7.4 billion smelter in Clarksville, Tennessee, which is intended to produce a slate of critical minerals that has been reported to include gallium, germanium and antimony. Commercial production is not expected until about 2030. The gap that project aims to close remains wide: Asia Times reported that gallium traded at roughly US$2,100 per kilogram in Western warehouses in August, against about US$247 inside China.

Chinese customs data reported on September 21st show how abruptly licensed flows can shift: gallium exports fell to 350 kilograms in August from 7,200 kilograms in July, with all of August’s shipments going to South Korea, while germanium exports reached 2,769 kilograms, the highest monthly total of the year. Such swings in earlier trade data do not signal a new policy, but they show how availability can vary sharply by material and destination under licensing. Meanwhile, the US Geological Survey released version 3.0 of its national critical mineral deposits database on September 29th, identifying 1,271 deposits across 41 states and Puerto Rico, of which 412 have documented resources but no production history. The figure is a reminder of how much of the domestic pipeline remains geological potential rather than permitted capacity. Beijing is pursuing the same logic at home: on September 23rd, Deputy Minister of Natural Resources Zhou Xing announced a national “mineral exploration offensive” aimed at finding large, high-grade deposits of oil, iron, copper, aluminum and rare earths.

The period’s largest rare earths transaction came from Australia. On October 1st, Lynas Rare Earths Limited (ASX: LYC; OTCQX: LYSDY, LYSCF) signed a binding scheme implementation deed to acquire Meteoric Resources Limited (ASX: MEI; OTCQB: METOF), developer of the Caldeira ionic clay project in Minas Gerais, Brazil. Meteoric shareholders would receive 0.0207 new Lynas shares for each share held, valuing the target at A$968 million on a fully diluted basis using Lynas’s 60-day volume-weighted average price, a 68.4% premium to Meteoric’s last close. The Meteoric board unanimously recommends the scheme, subject to an independent expert’s opinion and the absence of a superior proposal; shareholder and court approvals and Brazilian change-of-control clearance are still required, with a vote expected in January and implementation in March 2027. Caldeira hosts a resource of 802,000 metric tons of neodymium-praseodymium oxide and 41,000 metric tons of dysprosium-terbium oxide, and Meteoric’s July 31st definitive feasibility study targets average annual production of about 3,862 metric tons of NdPr and 127 metric tons of DyTb, at capital costs of more than US$500 million. Lynas cites potential integration with its Kuantan plant in Malaysia and plans to study additional downstream processing in Brazil, though neither yet amounts to separation capacity. Its strategic logic lies in those heavy rare earths, precisely the elements Beijing still licenses tightly, although the project remains a development asset rather than a source of supply.

Ownership is becoming as contested as geology. Reuters reported on September 18th that China Rare Earth Group was in talks to take control of Shenghe Resources Holding Co., Ltd. (SSE: 600392), which holds a minority stake of about 3% in MP Materials Corp. (NYSE: MP); Shenghe has denied any plan to transfer control. Valuations have also proved volatile: the Australian Financial Review estimated that Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd’s holdings in MP Materials and Lynas had lost about A$680 million in market value over 12 months, a paper decline rather than a recorded impairment, and one whose methodology Hancock disputes.

Copper, another priority category, showed that Beijing’s leverage extends beyond the minerals it controls at the mine. On October 2nd, Reuters reported that China’s State Administration for Market Regulation, the last authority yet to clear the US$54 billion combination of Anglo American plc (LSE: AAL; JSE: AGL) and Teck Resources Limited (TSX: TECK.A, TECK.B; NYSE: TECK), wants commitments to supply steady volumes of copper concentrate to Chinese smelters, including material sold through traders. Anglo American said it was working constructively with the regulator; Teck declined to comment. The request, if confirmed, would turn merger review into a tool of feedstock security at a moment when Chinese smelters face a severe shortage of concentrate.

That shortage is being worsened by events at the mine gate. At Escondida in Chile, the world’s largest copper mine, operated by BHP Group Limited (ASX: BHP; NYSE: BHP), operations were halted after a worker was killed in the last week of September, and the restart was gradual. Supervisors subsequently voted overwhelmingly to reject BHP’s contract offer and authorize a strike, which must first pass through government-mediated talks. Freeport-McMoRan Inc. (NYSE: FCX) reported on October 2nd that third-quarter copper production was about 830 million pounds and that Grasberg’s mill throughput averaged roughly 67% of pre-incident rates, with full capacity targeted for the end of 2027. In Panama, a ministerial commission recommended on September 30th that the government open formal negotiations with First Quantum Minerals Ltd. (TSX: FM) over the idled Cobre Panamá mine, conditioned on, among other things, termination of pending international arbitrations; the company said it would engage in good faith, but no decision has been made. Three-month copper on the London Metal Exchange stood at US$14,262.50 per metric ton on October 2nd, according to Reuters, below the record of US$14,875 set on September 10th. In Argentina, Glencore’s roughly US$4 billion MARA copper project won approval under the country’s large-investment incentive regime on October 2nd, an incentive approval rather than a final investment decision.

Uranium, the fifth priority category, drew support from demand-side policy. On September 30th, Cameco Corporation (TSX: CCO; NYSE: CCJ), which owns 49% of Westinghouse Electric Company, acknowledged a US-South Korea framework contemplating up to US$120 billion in Korean investment and as many as six Westinghouse AP1000 reactors and two Korean APR1400 units. The terms are explicitly non-binding and subject to definitive agreements, siting, financing and regulatory approvals. Enrichment remains the tighter constraint. Deputy Energy Secretary James Danly said in mid-September that Washington wants capacity built faster, with waivers for Russian enriched uranium imports due to end in 2028. On September 29th, privately held General Matter submitted a Nuclear Regulatory Commission license application for an enrichment plant at Paducah, Kentucky, targeting full operations by the end of 2030 and a separate amendment for high-assay low-enriched uranium in 2027. Cameco’s month-end average of industry indicators put the long-term uranium price at US$96.50 per pound of U3O8 on September 30th, with spot at US$89.63, according to its published price data. On the supply side, Uranium Energy Corp. (NYSE American: UEC) reported with its fiscal 2026 results on September 29th that four additional header houses at its Christensen Ranch in-situ recovery operation in Wyoming received final regulatory approval on September 28th, with production expected within weeks. Its planned refining and conversion subsidiary, United States Uranium Refining & Conversion Corp., remains in pre-licensing work with no site selected, a reminder that more mined uranium does not by itself supply conversion or enrichment capacity.

Battery materials told a story of Chinese policy moving faster than Chinese prices. In late September, seven agencies including the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology made public a 2026–2030 plan for the battery industry that targets initial large-scale use of all-solid-state batteries by 2030 and calls for faster development of domestic lithium and cobalt resources. Headlines this week about China ending an 11-year tax break on lithium-ion batteries describe a measure issued in July that took effect on September 1st: a 2% consumption tax, rising to 4% in September 2027, on lithium-ion, nickel-metal hydride and vanadium redox flow batteries, with sodium-ion and solid-state cells exempt through 2028. The South China Morning Post reported that automakers and cell makers are now disputing who absorbs it, while Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (SZSE: 300750; HKEX: 3750) has reportedly said its orders fluctuated after the tax took effect. Lithium carbonate futures in Guangzhou fell by roughly a quarter during September, closing at 118,800 yuan per metric ton on September 29th, according to Shanghai Metals Market, before Chinese markets closed for the National Day holiday. Western alternatives face their own capital test. Reuters reported on September 30th that Vianode AS, the privately held synthetic graphite producer with an anode offtake agreement with General Motors, is working with JPMorgan to explore a partnership or sale to help finance its planned plant in St. Thomas, Ontario, where production is envisaged for 2029; it already operates a smaller facility in Norway. Strategic relevance, in other words, has not removed the need for capital. In Bolivia, Bloomberg reported that nearly 500,000 cooperative miners, responsible for roughly half of the country’s mineral extraction, remain the main political constraint on President Rodrigo Paz’s effort to open a sector spanning tin, silver, zinc, lithium and antimony to private investment; the reforms remain intentions rather than completed liberalization.

Trade defense in the bulk materials continued to tighten. The Commerce Department issued a temporary rule on September 24th capping polysilicon, wafer, cell and module imports by newly registered importers ahead of Section 232 measures that take effect December 4th. The European Union’s “melt and pour” origin requirement for steel imports took effect on October 1st. In Canada, Ottawa threatened legal action against Cleveland-Cliffs Inc. (NYSE: CLF) over its plan to idle finishing lines at Stelco’s Hamilton Works, invoking undertakings given when the acquisition was approved under the Investment Canada Act. Steel, newly added to the CMI Watchlist alongside indium, also saw Brussels act on a specialized grade: the European Commission’s provisional safeguard on grain-oriented electrical steel, adopted September 18th, applies from September 25th through February 26th, 2027, combining country-specific tariff-rate quotas with price thresholds and extending to the laminations and cores used in power transformers. Protecting that capacity supports European steelmakers, but it also raises a question for utilities and transformer makers expanding the grid.

Taken together, the period’s developments describe a sector in which the central bargaining question remains unresolved, and the Western response is broad but still largely prospective. Most of what was announced, from reserve financing and Argentine credit lines to the Korean nuclear framework and Caldeira, is lending capacity, conditional agreements or development projects rather than new supply, while Sangdong’s start shows how long the path from strategy to concentrate can be. China, for its part, is drawing on a widening set of levers, from export licensing to merger review, to protect access to the materials its industries need. The milestones that merit attention are already scheduled: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Shenzhen in November, the Section 232 polysilicon measures on December 4th, the defense sourcing restrictions on January 1st, the truce’s January 10th expiry, Meteoric’s scheme vote in January, and a decision by China’s market regulator on Anglo American and Teck before the companies’ March 2027 target. Each will show whether the West is building supply or simply paying for the promise of it.

October 4th

America Break China’s Grip on Rare Earths?

China spent decades building a dominant position across rare-earth mining, processing and magnet manufacturing, leaving the US dependent on a foreign supply chain for materials essential to everything from vehicles and wind turbines to electronics and defense systems.

MP Materials is now trying to rebuild that chain domestically, moving from its Mountain Pass mine in California into refining.

But catching up will take more than finding minerals: the US still faces higher costs, limited processing capacity, opaque pricing and a Chinese lead that industry experts say took roughly 25 years to build.

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https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2026-10-04/can-america-break-china-s-grip-on-rare-earths-video?srnd=all

ALOY-SRC solves the bottleneck

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Canada’s defence sector is entering a period of significant change. Increased investment and a renewed focus on domestic industrial capacity are creating opportunities across defence, aerospace, space and advanced manufacturing. At the same time, Canada is looking to deepen industrial relationships with trusted international partners.

The federal government’s Defence Industrial Strategy reflects this shift. Its Build–Partner–Buy framework prioritizes building domestically in areas of Canadian strength and sovereign importance, partnering with allies where collaboration makes sense and buying from abroad where necessary.

What will it take to translate those ambitions into actual industrial capacity?

That question was at the centre of Sovereign Skies: Building the New Canada–Italy Industrial Alliance in Defence, Space and Advanced Manufacturing, the Canada–Italy Aerospace Conference held in Montréal on September 22. Across two panels bringing together leaders from industry, finance and law, a consistent theme emerged: capturing the opportunity will require long-term investment, stronger supply chains, strategic partnerships and early preparation.

Building Where Canada Can Lead – and Partnering Where It Cannot

Strengthening Canadian defence capabilities does not mean attempting to build everything domestically.

Instead, Canada will need to identify where it can develop or maintain best-in-class capabilities, where additional domestic capacity is necessary to create resilience and redundancy, and where international partnerships offer a more effective path.

The conference provided several examples of longstanding relationships between Canadian and Italian businesses involving pilot training, aircraft manufacturing, space systems and radar technologies. These illustrated how relationships initially built around a particular capability or program can evolve over time and extend into other markets and opportunities.

For businesses, the discussion highlighted the value of looking beyond partnerships built around an individual opportunity. Companies can work together across programs and markets, creating longer-term industrial value.

Making Defence Investment More Strategic

The same longer-term thinking applies to industrial investment. Traditional approaches under the Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB) Policy have not always produced the durable capabilities Canada needs. A more strategic approach would see investment associated with major procurements support capabilities and supply-chain relationships that can endure beyond a particular transaction.

Larger companies also have a role to play in developing the broader industrial base. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may have valuable technologies and capabilities, but entering defence and aerospace supply chains can require significant investment and expertise. As such, collaboration among government, major industry participants and SMEs will be important to identifying capabilities worth developing and helping smaller businesses integrate into domestic and international supply chains.

The Opportunity Extends Beyond Traditional Defence Companies

The potential supplier base is also broader than companies already operating principally in defence. Businesses with dual-use and defence-adjacent capabilities can play a key role – they may already possess technologies, manufacturing capabilities or expertise relevant to defence applications without yet participating meaningfully in the sector. Bringing more of those companies into defence supply chains could help increase Canadian capacity. But making that transition is not as simple as identifying a potential customer.

As Franziska Ruf explained, defence can appear daunting to new entrants precisely because it is highly regulated. Businesses may encounter requirements involving certifications, government procurement, security, personnel, residency, imports and exports, among others. The more useful starting point is therefore not to treat the regulatory environment as a single obstacle, but to determine what actually applies to the particular business and opportunity. Where does the company sit in the supply chain? What requirements apply to that role? What needs to be in place before it can bid, partner or transact?

Breaking the process down in that way can make the path into the sector considerably more manageable.

Start Preparing Before the Opportunity Arrives

For SMEs in particular, entering the defence sector can be a multi-year undertaking. Certifications and security processes take time. Relationships within the supply chain need to be established. Companies may also need to develop new capabilities before they are positioned to pursue particular opportunities.

Financing adds another challenge. Companies can face a mismatch between the investment required to prepare and scale and the timing and predictability of revenue from defence work. Traditional lenders generally look for reliable cash flows, while businesses may need to invest well before a contract produces them. That makes financing strategy part of market-entry strategy.

Companies should begin considering how future growth will be financed before a contract arrives. Public funding and government-supported financing can play a role, but Canada’s defence ambitions cannot be financed by public capital alone. Private investment will be necessary as the industrial base grows.

Partnerships, Investments and M&A Offer Different Paths into the Sector

There is also no single route into Canada’s defence ecosystem. Businesses may pursue opportunities through partnerships, joint ventures, investments or acquisitions. The appropriate route will depend on the company’s capabilities, objectives and place within the supply chain. Those choices also bring different legal considerations.

Companies need to understand early how competition and foreign investment rules may affect their strategy, particularly given that defence is a sector where national security considerations under foreign investment rules can arise.

Security requirements can also have practical consequences for transactions. Franziska pointed to due diligence involving classified information as one example: parties cannot necessarily conduct a conventional diligence process if those reviewing information do not have the required clearances. Depending on the circumstances, appropriately cleared personnel or structures such as clean teams may be necessary.

The broader lesson is straightforward: in defence, legal and regulatory considerations can influence not only whether a transaction or opportunity proceeds, but how it needs to be structured and executed.

Conclusion

Perhaps the most consistent message across the conference was the need to turn policy announcements and investment commitments into action. For government, the importance of clear priorities, strategic investment and speed in translating policy into programs, contracts and industrial activity cannot be overstated.

For industry, the challenge is different. Companies cannot necessarily wait for a procurement opportunity to appear before deciding whether they are ready to participate. Understanding their position in the supply chain, identifying applicable regulatory and certification requirements, building relationships, considering financing and evaluating potential partnerships all take time.

The opportunity created by Canada’s defence build-out may be substantial. But for businesses hoping to participate in it, one of the most important steps may also be the simplest: start preparing now.

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https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/canada-s-defence-build-out-from-9646394/

https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/commodities/articles/tungsten-concentrate-prices-roughly-tripled-125600913.html

Price is the clearer signal. Tungsten concentrate, basis 50 to 70% WO3, was assessed by Fastmarkets at $750 to $850 per metric tonne unit at the start of 2026 and has held between $2,500 and $2,800 per unit since May 29, according to a September 16 commentary distributed on PR Newswire. That is roughly a tripling in five months.

Supply policy explains much of it. In December 2025, China said only 15 firms would be authorized to export tungsten in 2026 and 2027, formalized through its dual-use items catalogue. In the United States, the Bureau of Industry and Security published a temporary final rule on August 6, 2026 implementing a Directive Allocation Order that requires U.S. sellers of tungsten waste and scrap to allocate 100% of monthly sales to domestic buyers, effective August 27, 2026 through August 27, 2027, following a Presidential Determination on July 30, 2026, as summarized in an August 21 PR Newswire commentary.

Procurement rules add a hard date. Through the end of 2026, the restriction under DFARS 252.225-7052 on tungsten sourced from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea turns on where the material was melted or produced. From January 1, 2027, the clause widens to the mine or ore stage and names recycled and scrap material explicitly, so material that has passed through a recycling stream no longer resets its country of origin, per the same September 16 commentary.

Canada has moved on the capital side. Budget 2025 added tungsten to the eligible minerals list under the Critical Mineral Exploration Tax Credit, and Bill C-15 received Royal Assent on March 26, 2026, providing a 30% credit on flow-through agreements entered after November 4, 2025 and on or before March 31, 2027. Policy, price and procurement deadlines are now pulling exploration money toward historic ground in North America. That is the backdrop for this week's developments.

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Almonty Industries Inc. (NASDAQ: ALM)

Almonty operates the Sangdong mine in South Korea, which moved into processing operations during 2026, and holds assets across Europe and the United States, including the Gentung project in Beaverhead County, Montana. On September 21, the Company reported final certification clearing its Sangdong processing plant and crushing facilities to begin commercial operations, covering Phase I.

On September 14, Almonty announced a binding joint venture with the Government of Rwanda under which Rwanda receives a 25% stake in Almonty Rwanda in exchange for the Shyorongi tungsten exploration concession and a mineral processing licence. In July, the Company expanded its Sangdong offtake agreement with Global Tungsten & Powders, extending the term from 15 to 21 years and increasing contracted volume by 40% to 4.41 million MTU. Its board has also approved a buyback of up to 14.4 million shares, for up to $300 million over 36 months, starting August 24. Almonty's shares have moved sharply in both directions in recent weeks, and its filings on SEC EDGAR describe the financing, operating and commissioning risks.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent issued an official statement because this benchmark is the missing legal and financial gear needed for U.S. industrial policy:

Banks will not underwrite multi-hundred-million-dollar loans without a recognized reference price. Bessent called this transparent pricing "essential to attracting the private capital needed to build secure, resilient supply chains."

The U.S. is negotiating the Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals (ATCM) with the G7, the European Union, Japan, and Mexico.

The goal is to enforce a border-adjusted price floor. If foreign subsidized metal tries to enter below the S&P cost benchmark, tariffs or equalization fees kick in automatically to protect Western producers.

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The Pentagon and National Defense Stockpile managers now have an official benchmark to structure multi-year contracts without paying inflated spot prices or getting undercut by state-backed dumping.

Benefits the sector overall, but ALM, ALOY, MP, UUUU, USCM, USAR and others directly.

Don't get shaken out.

GL

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Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury welcomed S&P Global’s introduction of new reference prices for critical minerals, calling the development an important advancement in promoting greater transparency to enable market-based price discovery across global critical minerals markets.

The new benchmarks cover Gallium, Germanium, Tungsten, Antimony, and Neodymium and Praseodymium, providing enhanced pricing visibility and market intelligence that will support more informed investment and sourcing decisions.

Transparent, credible reference prices are essential to well-functioning markets. By improving price visibility, these reference prices can help strengthen investor confidence, encourage long-term private-sector investment, and support the development of critical mineral supply chains while countering the effects of non-market policies and practices.

“Transparent, market-based pricing is essential to attracting the private capital needed to build secure, resilient, and diversified critical mineral supply chains,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “As the United States works with trusted partners to strengthen critical mineral markets, reliable reference prices will support the Trump Administration's efforts to address market distortions and advance our long-term economic and national security.”

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The Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals seeks to establish phased-in, mineral-specific price floors adjusted at the border while advancing common standards among like-minded trading partners. Negotiations build on discussions held earlier this year among G7 Finance and Trade Ministers, as well as action plans developed with Japan, Mexico, and the European Union.

The proposed framework for the Agreement reflects feedback received through nearly 2,500 public comments submitted in response to the Federal Register Notice issued on February 26, 2026. Treasury looks forward to continued engagement with international partners to promote transparent, competitive, and resilient critical minerals markets.

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https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0600

https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/commodity/metals

Benchmark Mineral Intelligence released its Q3 rare earths review today, revealing an accelerating divergence between Western and Chinese domestic pricing:

• Dysprosium Oxide (Dy): CIF Europe surged 56% to average $3,500/kg.
• Terbium Oxide (Tb): CIF Europe gained 23% to reach $6,745/kg.

Western magnet makers and defense primes are paying steep premiums on large-volume transactions to secure non-Chinese HREEs ahead of statutory 2027 defense procurement bans, even while domestic Chinese prices softened over the same quarter.

Bodes well for ALOY-SRC - Yttrium is a natural byproduct of their Dy and Tb separation and metallization processes.

Good infographics in the article

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Light and heavy rare earth prices diverged sharply for much of Q3 2026. The BMI Praseodymium-Neodymium Oxide (PrNd) DDP China price eased by just 1% over the period, while the BMI PrNd CIF North America and Europe prices fell more sharply, slipping below the $110/kg floor built into MP Materials and Lynas Rare Earths' agreements with the US Department of Defense. In contrast, ex-China dysprosium, terbium and yttrium prices surged, with BMI Dysprosium Oxide CIF Europe increasing 150% by quarter-end.

The defining theme of Q3 was the extreme widening of the China–ex-China bifurcation within heavy rare earths, a dynamic Benchmark's forecasting team expects to persist, noting that the ex-China DyTb premium is still the economic signal required to bring new heavy rare earth capacity online.

“There is mounting evidence that ex-China heavy rare earth supply chains remain acutely under-supplied relative to demand, a dynamic reflected in pricing across the quarter,” said George Ingall, a senior rare earth price analyst at Benchmark. “Chinese export restrictions continued to constrain availability, with buyers paying significant premiums to secure larger volumes of dysprosium and terbium. Light rare earths beyond China remained oversupplied, though this dynamic is stabilising.”

How wide did heavy rare earth price bifurcation get in Q3?

CIF Europe dysprosium oxide prices are now around 16.3 times DDP China price levels, up from 6.8 times at the end of Q2. This is even starker for yttrium oxide, for which the CIF North America price sits at roughly 196 times the equivalent DDP China price.

Over the course of July, dysprosium oxide CIF Europe prices climbed more than 16% as ex-China buyers scrambled for scarce material, while the Chinese domestic assessment moved only fractionally. Terbium oxide in China rose nearly 6% on tight availability, while yttrium markets were comparatively subdued in both regions.

In August, ex-China heavy rare earths rose, with dysprosium oxide CIF Europe surging more than 32%, terbium oxide CIF Europe by 10%, and yttrium oxide CIF North America nearly 18%. Scarcity continued to underpin heavy rare earth pricing.

A US presidential determination moved to treat recoverable rare earths and end-of-life magnets as strategic defence resources, a step that could improve future domestic access to secondary dysprosium and terbium feedstock. Chinese domestic heavy rare earth pricing was comparatively muted in August, with dysprosium and terbium easing slightly.

By September, dysprosium oxide CIF Europe gained 56% to reach an average of $3,500/kg and terbium oxide rose 23% to $6,745/kg, driven by premiums on larger-volume transactions, while Chinese domestic dysprosium and terbium prices continued to retreat from their mid-Q3 highs. Yttrium oxide held steady in both China and North America, with ongoing US production limiting further upward momentum.

What happened to PrNd oxide prices in Q3?

In July, PrNd CIF Europe/North America pricing held flat, while prices in China ticked modestly higher before renewed weakness took hold. Then, in August, ex-China PrNd oxide prices fell over 13%, with the decline accelerating late in the month as ex-China producers, wary of the reputational sensitivity of selling into China, redirected volume toward an increasingly oversupplied ex-China market. This led to a 7.3% drop between 6–20 August alone. Chinese domestic PrNd, now commanding a premium, fell a more moderate 5% over the same month.

PrNd prices stabilised in China by September, with the oxide assessment edging up 1% to an average of RMB729,500/t (USD$108,696), while ex-China prices rose 12% to $106,500/t on a CIF basis.

What could impact rare earths prices in Q4?

An update is due from China’s government on rare earth export restrictions when the current controls expire in November.

“Buyers speaking to Benchmark have already indicated they have had little luck exporting ytterbium and erbium from China in recent months, even though these minerals are not currently under export controls,” Ingall said. “In North America and Europe, meanwhile, demo- and pilot-scale procurement from aspiring magnet makers is likely to drive up heavy rare earth oxide prices.”

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https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/ex-china-heavy-rare-earths-continue-to-surge-q3-2026-rare-earths-price-review?utm_source=gemini

Bodes well, imo

Atholville EU GMP governmental approval coming

ALJ report & recommended decision due soon too

GL Longs

China’s restrictions on exports of crucial rare-earth metals and rare-earth magnets remain one of the most difficult unresolved issues as President Trump and Xi Jinping prepare to meet this week.

For months, manufacturers in the United States, Europe, Japan and India have complained about difficulties in obtaining enough rare-earth metals from China, which dominates global production. The materials are essential for making products ranging from cars and wind turbines to semiconductors, computer displays and military equipment.

China imposed export controls in April 2025 on seven kinds of rare earths and magnets made from them. It later announced a broader set of restrictions, now scheduled to take effect Nov. 10. And in a political dispute, China has slashed shipments of rare earths and magnets to Japan, disrupting supply chains that also serve American manufacturers.

All three issues — the existing controls, the Nov. 10 restrictions and the curbs on Japan — are expected to loom over the meeting between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi, China’s top leader. There is little indication so far of how they might be resolved.

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Rare earths have become a critical trade issue between the two countries since Beijing introduced export licensing rules two days after Mr. Trump imposed steep tariffs in April 2025 on China and dozens of other countries. China’s rare-earth shipments slowed to a trickle, and some manufacturers from elsewhere had to cut output of their products.

The experience last year demonstrated the leverage China derives from its near monopoly on the production of the important materials.

The White House says China has not fully followed through on previous discussions about issuing more export licenses. Deliveries have “not been up to par of what we would expect, and that, I’m sure, will be a topic of discussion,” a senior U.S. official said at a briefing on Friday.

American and European business groups say shipments are frequently delayed or incomplete or never arrive. China’s Ministry of Commerce scrutinizes every export application.

Rare-earth refineries in Baotou in northern China.Credit...The New York Times

“While most of our members report getting the majority of the rare-earth supplies they need, the restrictions around the sector have given many doubts about relying on China as a dependable long-term supply chain partner,” said Michael Hart, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in China.

Guo Jiakun, a spokesman for China’s foreign ministry, said on Monday that Beijing remained committed to maintaining stable and secure supply chains for critical minerals.

The restrictions set to begin on Nov. 10 present another challenge. Current and former American officials said the United States and China had discussed postponing the rules but had been unable to agree on how long such an extension should last. They spoke on the condition of anonymity because of diplomatic sensitivities.

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The United States has proposed a delay of six months to a year as part of a broader freeze on American tariffs and other trade actions, the officials said.

Such a deal would push renewed trade tensions beyond the U.S. midterm elections while leaving the Trump administration time to press Beijing before the 2028 presidential campaign over its trade surplus, import restrictions and industrial subsidies.

But Beijing has its own political calendar. The Communist Party is expected to hold its once-every-five-years national congress next autumn, when it chooses the country’s top leadership. China typically seeks to minimize disputes ahead of the gathering, meaning a six-month or one-year deal could expire at an awkward time.

China has instead sought a halt to further American tariffs and other trade actions for the remainder of Mr. Trump’s presidency, current and former American officials said. Chinese officials have declined to confirm that position and claim that the export controls are intended to prevent rare earths from being used in military equipment.

Mr. Guo declined on Monday to discuss a possible extension of the Nov. 10 rules.

Those rules would impose controls on five additional rare-earth elements, including erbium, which is vital for fiber-optic communications in artificial intelligence data centers and transoceanic cables. Even before the rules take effect, China appears to be restricting or delaying erbium exports, industry experts said.

A display of magnetic materials at the National Museum. Credit...Maxim Shemetov/Reuters

“You’ve had bottlenecks building up at several Chinese ports,” said Ellie Saklatvala, metals director at Argus Media, a commodities pricing firm in London.

The most difficult dispute may be China’s sharp reduction in shipments of rare-earth magnets to Japan and its near suspension of some particularly important rare earths, including dysprosium, which is widely used in magnets for cars and in the most advanced chips.

China began imposing the restrictions in December after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan said her country could help defend Taiwan if China invaded. Taiwan is an island democracy that Beijing considers part of its territory.

China has generally handled the sales of rare earths with each country separately, and it is unclear whether Mr. Xi will discuss the restrictions on Japan with Mr. Trump. Asked Monday about shipments to Japan, Mr. Guo, the Chinese government spokesman, said China prohibited exports of dual-use items intended for Japan’s military, as well as other items that could strengthen its military.

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China’s dominance of the industry gives it considerable leverage. Its refineries produce about 90 percent of the world’s supply of four rare-earth elements widely used in oil refining, glass polishing and low-end magnets: lanthanum, cerium, neodymium and praseodymium. Beijing has not restricted their export.

It also produces nearly all of the global supply of a dozen other rare-earth elements needed for a range of products, from semiconductors and lasers to wind turbines and robots. The export of seven of those have required special licenses since April 2025, and the Nov. 10 rules call for export licensing on the other five.

Beijing says its rare-earth controls are meant to prevent weapons proliferation, rather than to exert economic pressure. But military uses account for only a small share of global rare-earth consumption.

The Department of Defense estimated in 2024 that American military demand accounted for only 0.1 percent of global rare-earth demand. But that figure is skewed lower because it includes enormous volumes of common rare earths used in civilian applications like oil refining and glass polishing.

Even when the comparison is limited to the scarcer rare earths most important to weapon production, industry estimates put military uses at roughly 2 to 5 percent of overall demand.

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https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/business/china-rare-earth-summit.html?unlocked_article_code=1.DFE.eBLO.yFbsnlgm9ZbD&smid=url-share

CRML is up 36% on "Permanent US Security Deal for Greenland"

https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/crml-glnd-grml-surge-overnight-015054024.html

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May 21, 2026

ALOY Signs Definitive Long-Term Rare Earth Offtake Agreement with Critical Metals Corp. for 15% of Tanbreez Phase 1 Production

Definitive agreement secures U.S.-aligned heavy rare earth supply from one of the largest known HREE deposits globally; advances ALOY mine-to-magnet strategy for U.S. defense and critical industrial markets.

The contract grants ALOY critical priority rights over shipments carrying elevated concentrations of the high-demand heavy rare earth elements dysprosium and terbium, alongside a Right of First Refusal over additional output.

Commercial pricing relies on a market-referenced, element-by-element formula indexed to international rare earth oxide benchmarks, incorporating floor-price protection on specified payable elements.

Deliveries will clear out of Tanbreez's year-round deepwater fjord port under standard commercial FOB terms, with execution subject to concentrate passing ALOY qualification protocols and a five-year long-stop delivery termination window.

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https://finance.yahoo.com/sectors/energy/articles/crml-executes-15-binding-definitive-114000090.html