u/Pretend_Door8037

[Post was written with AI assistance]

⏪⏪ The Early History of Qur’an-Centric and Qur’an-Only Thought ⏩⏩

The Kharijite movement

The earliest movement that can plausibly be connected to a strong Qur’an-centered or Qur’an-only tendency was the Kharijite movement, which emerged during the first Muslim civil war. In 657 CE, during the Battle of Ṣiffīn between the forces of Caliph ʿAli ibn Abi Talib and Muʿawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, an arbitration was agreed upon after pressure from elements within ʿAli’s army. A group of ʿAli’s supporters rejected the arbitration and separated from him, maintaining that “judgment belongs to God alone” (lā ḥukma illā li-llāh). They regarded arbitration between human beings as an unacceptable replacement for divine judgment and eventually established themselves as a distinct movement. Their first major confrontation with ʿAli came at Nahrawan in 658 CE, where his forces defeated them. The movement nevertheless survived and developed into a number of factions that continued to revolt against both the Umayyads and, later, the Abbasids. Early Kharijite history is therefore inseparable from the political struggles of the first Islamic century.

The Kharijites were not a single homogeneous sect, and it is therefore dangerous to describe every Kharijite as “Qur’an-only.” Their central concern was initially political and theological rather than a systematic theory of scripture and hadith. Nevertheless, some Kharijite branches are reported to have adopted an exceptionally restrictive approach to religious authority. The Kharijites as the first Qur’an-only movement in a particular sense is a useful description for this strand of early thought, especially because later theological sources attribute to certain Kharijite factions the view that religious knowledge could be obtained from the Qur’an alone and that transmitted reports should not be accepted as an independent source of doctrine or law. The Azariqa and Bazighiyya are particularly associated in later reports with this position. According to material preserved from the early Muʿtazilite theologian Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr and later recorded by Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhi, these groups held that knowledge of religion was obtained from the Qur’an alone and rejected reports and consensus. Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhi likewise described some Kharijites as rejecting transmitted tradition altogether and insisting on what was literally contained in the Book.

Yet the historical development of Kharijism was dominated by its political struggles rather than by a sustained program of Qur’anic interpretation. After Nahrawan, surviving Kharijite groups dispersed and began developing very different doctrines. Some became extremely militant, most famously the Azariqa, founded by Nafiʿ ibn al-Azraq. The Azariqa established themselves in southern Iran and Iraq and launched repeated revolts against Umayyad authority. Their doctrine became increasingly uncompromising: they regarded Muslims who disagreed with them as unbelievers or apostates, developed severe rules concerning those who remained outside their movement, and regarded rebellion against unjust rulers as a religious duty. Their military campaigns continued through the second half of the seventh century until Umayyad forces gradually destroyed their political power. The history of the Azariqa therefore demonstrates the fragility of the early Qur’an-centered tendency: whatever their scriptural orientation, they developed into a revolutionary sect whose survival depended upon military organization and territorial control rather than upon a stable scholarly institution. The Azariqa were eventually crushed, and their particular interpretation disappeared as an organized political movement.

One of the most striking examples of this scripturalist tendency is found in reports concerning the Bidʿiyya, a subgroup that some heresiographical sources connect with the Azāriqa. Their importance for the history of Qur’an-centric thought lies not simply in rejecting particular hadith, but in reportedly allowing the Qur’an to determine religious practice even when this meant departing from practices that had become widely established among Muslims. The surviving accounts associate them with a rejection of the conventional requirement of five daily prayers. They are described as rejecting the Sunnah’s five daily prayers, while other reports suggest a doctrine of two obligatory prayers, one in the morning and another in the evening. The evidence is not sufficiently clear to reconstruct their exact ritual practice with certainty, but the underlying principle is significant: the number of obligatory prayers was being judged according to what could be established from the Qur’an rather than simply accepted on the basis of established communal practice.

The same scripturalist tendency appears even more clearly in their position on rajm, the stoning of married adulterers. The Qur’an explicitly prescribes flogging for zina in Qur’an 24:2, whereas the classical Sunni ruling of stoning depends upon Prophetic reports and the doctrine that the Prophet’s Sunnah could establish or specify law beyond the explicit wording of the Qur’an. The Azāriqa are repeatedly reported to have rejected rajm precisely because they did not accept that additional ruling. Their position therefore followed a distinctly Qur’an-centered legal principle: where a punishment was not explicitly established by the Qur’an, it could not simply be imposed because it was attributed to the Prophet through later transmitted reports. Academic studies of the classical evidence identify the Azāriqa as a major Kharijite exception to the juristic position on rajm and associate their position with Qur’an 24:2.

Their scripturalism extended into other areas of law and ritual as well. Classical heresiographical reports attribute to the Azāriqa and their associated subgroups several positions that departed from emerging Sunni law when that law depended upon hadith, communal consensus, or inherited practice rather than an explicit Qur’anic basis. Their treatment of ritual prayer, the punishment of adultery, and other legal questions consequently became part of the wider controversy over whether the Qur’an was sufficient as the ultimate source of religious legislation. This makes the Bidʿiyya and related Azāriqa material particularly important in the history of Qur’an-centric thought: centuries before the modern Ahl al-Qur’an movements, there were already Muslim groups whose scripturalist reasoning could lead them to reject established religious practices when those practices could not, in their view, be demonstrated directly from the Qur’an.

(At the same time, the evidence requires caution. The Bidʿiyya are poorly documented independently, and their precise relationship with the Azāriqa is uncertain. Much of the information about them survives through medieval heresiographical works written after the events and often by opponents of the movements being described. The methodological problems involved in reconstructing early sectarian doctrines from this material are therefore substantial. The two-prayer position should consequently be presented as a reported doctrine attributed to a Kharijite subgroup, rather than as an indisputably established practice of all Kharijites or even all Azāriqa. What can be said with greater confidence is that early Kharijite circles included strongly scripturalist tendencies, and that some reports describe them rejecting established practices—including five daily prayers and rajm—when they believed those practices lacked a sufficient Qur’anic foundation.)

Other Kharijite branches followed different paths. The Najdat, another major Kharijite faction, became powerful in Arabia and eastern regions during the Second Fitna, but internal disagreements over leadership, sin, and the status of Muslims outside the movement eventually fractured them. The Sufriyya also survived for longer periods in North Africa and elsewhere, while the Ibadi branch developed into the one major Kharijite-derived tradition to survive continuously into the present. The Ibadis, however, should not be treated as a surviving Qur’an-only movement. Their tradition developed its own hadith corpus, legal scholarship, theological literature, and concept of Sunnah. What survived from early Kharijism was therefore not an intact Qur’an-only school but one branch of a much broader early sectarian tradition. The Kharijite movement as a political force fragmented because its factions disagreed over theology, leadership, the status of sinners, relations with other Muslims, and the legitimacy of rebellion.

The historical significance of these early Kharijite tendencies lies in the fact that they demonstrate that a strong appeal to the Qur’an as the decisive religious authority was present very early in Islamic history. At the same time, their story also demonstrates why it is misleading to construct a simple uninterrupted genealogy between them and modern Qur’anism. Their historical circumstances were completely different. They were products of the first civil wars, the struggle over political legitimacy, and disputes about the caliphate. Their Qur’an-centered tendencies existed within a much wider revolutionary ideology. There was no modern conception of “Qur’anism” as a transnational religious reform movement, no developed theory of hadith criticism comparable to that of later centuries, and no organized project for reconstructing Islamic law exclusively from the Qur’an.

Rationalists, The Ḍirāriyya & The Muʿtazilite movement

The second important stage came during the late seventh and eighth centuries, when Muslim scholars and theologians increasingly debated the evidentiary status of transmitted reports. This was not yet one unified “anti-hadith movement.” Rather, there were a number of people who questioned whether reports attributed to the Prophet could independently establish religious doctrine or law. The diversity of these positions is especially visible in the intellectual environment of Basra, Kufa, Baghdad, and other major centers of learning, where theologians, jurists, traditionists, and rationalist thinkers were developing different methods of determining religious truth.

Among the most important figures in this broader intellectual environment was Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr, a theologian active in the late eighth and early ninth centuries. He became associated with the theological group later known as the Ḍirāriyya and was involved in disputes concerning theology, religious authority, and transmitted reports. His surviving work, Kitāb al-Taḥrīsh, is particularly significant because it preserves material concerning competing sectarian arguments and reports that different groups used in theological disputes. Its treatment of contradictory hadith became relevant to later discussions of how reports should be evaluated. Recent research on Ḍirār emphasizes that his surviving work contains material concerning apparently conflicting hadith and that he was critical of the ways hadith were employed polemically.

The Muʿtazilite movement also emerged during this period, although calling the Muʿtazilites Qur’an-only would be inaccurate. Their importance to the history of Qur’an-centered thought comes from the fact that they developed a highly rationalist method for evaluating religious claims. They insisted that reason could establish certain truths about God and morality and that revelation should not be interpreted in ways that produced contradictions with sound rational principles. Their approach affected their treatment of hadith. Rather than automatically accepting a report because it was transmitted, Muʿtazilite thinkers scrutinized its content and evidentiary status. Some required very strong transmission before granting a report certainty in matters of theology. The famous Muʿtazilite thinker Ibrahim al-Naẓẓām, active in the Abbasid period, went considerably further in his criticism of particular hadith traditions, especially reports attributed to Abu Hurayra. Later accounts describe him as arguing that even multiple transmission could not automatically guarantee the reliability of reports when the underlying transmission remained vulnerable to human error and distortion.

Al-Naẓẓām's position is historically important because it illustrates a different route toward Qur’an-centered religious thought. He did not simply say, “Ignore the Qur’an and hadith everything else”; rather, he placed rational certainty above the mere existence of a transmitted report. A report could not establish theological truth simply because a chain of transmission existed. The substance of the report, its consistency, and its epistemological status mattered. This approach became part of the wider rationalist challenge to the growing authority of traditionist scholarship. However, the Muʿtazilite movement itself never became a Qur’an-only movement. It possessed its own theological literature, engaged extensively with inherited Islamic traditions, and accepted forms of prophetic authority. Its significance lies in its contribution to the intellectual tools through which later Muslims could question the authority of individual hadith or insist that revelation and reason could not be subordinated to uncritical transmission.

Al-Shafiʿi, The rise of Traditionalists and Ahl al-Hadith

The growing debate eventually reached one of its clearest surviving expressions in the work of Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafiʿi (d. 820). Al-Shafiʿi wrote at a time when competing theories of law were struggling to establish which sources could legitimately produce religious rulings. In his Jimaʿ al-ʿIlm, he presented debates with opponents whom he considered to be rejecting the authority of hadith. Crucially, he divided them into two broad categories: those who rejected hadith altogether and those who rejected particular categories of reports. The work therefore provides direct evidence that, by the beginning of the ninth century, there were Muslims who openly disputed the independent authority of hadith.

The people whom al-Shafiʿi debated are difficult to reconstruct because he generally did not identify them by name or clearly attach them to organized schools. This is one of the major limitations of the evidence. It would therefore be wrong to turn these unnamed opponents into a single, organized “Qur’anist sect.” They may have represented several different intellectual positions. Some appear to have rejected hadith altogether, whereas others accepted some categories of reports while rejecting others. The debates nevertheless reveal that the question of whether hadith constituted binding religious evidence was alive and controversial precisely when the foundations of classical Islamic jurisprudence were being formulated. A study devoted specifically to Jimaʿ al-ʿIlm identifies it as among the earliest surviving evidence for individuals or groups questioning or repudiating the authority of hadith.

Al-Shafiʿi's response was decisive for the subsequent history of Islamic law. He developed an argument for the binding authority of the Prophet's Sunnah and treated authentic prophetic reports as a textual basis for law. In his legal theory, the Qur’an and Sunnah were intimately connected rather than competing authorities. His project did not mean that every later Sunni principle was simply invented by him, but his writings became enormously influential in giving systematic legal expression to the authority of prophetic tradition. Modern scholarship has therefore treated al-Shafiʿi as a crucial figure in the transformation of the debate over Sunnah and hadith into a formal theory of law.

This was the point at which the intellectual balance began moving decisively away from the early groups that questioned transmitted authority. The Ahl al-Hadith, or traditionalist current, increasingly presented the preservation and transmission of prophetic reports as a central religious task. Hadith scholars built increasingly sophisticated methods for evaluating transmitters and chains of transmission, while jurists incorporated accepted reports into legal reasoning. The result was not an immediate disappearance of disagreement, but the gradual creation of an intellectual world in which hadith and Sunnah had an increasingly secure place within Islamic scholarship. The Qur’an remained the supreme revelation, but the Prophet's Sunnah increasingly came to be understood as a necessary authoritative explanation and practical embodiment of the Qur’an.

The early hadith-critical and Qur’an-centered tendencies therefore did not disappear because their questions were necessarily solved to everyone's satisfaction. They disappeared as organized alternative movements because the intellectual institutions of Islamic civilization increasingly favored traditions that integrated the Qur’an with the Prophetic Sunnah and established mechanisms for determining which reports were acceptable. Traditionalist scholarship gained authority through teaching networks, juristic institutions, hadith collections, and the formation of legal schools. At the same time, the early radical movements themselves were vulnerable to internal fragmentation. The Kharijites divided into competing factions; the Muʿtazilites remained a rationalist theological school rather than becoming Qur’an-only; and the identifiable opponents of al-Shafiʿi did not leave behind a continuous organized community that preserved their position.

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⏪⏪ 9th-17th century: Domination by the Traditionalists ⏩⏩

From the ninth through seventeenth centuries, therefore, there is no comparable continuous Qur’an-only movement that can be followed from generation to generation. This was overwhelmingly the period in which classical Islamic scholarship consolidated itself. Sunni Islam developed around the major legal schools, hadith scholarship, Qur’anic exegesis, theology, and other disciplines, while Shi‘i traditions developed their own systems of transmitted authority and jurisprudence. There continued to be disagreements over the authenticity, interpretation, and legal significance of hadith, and rationalist scholars continued to criticize certain traditions, but those disagreements generally occurred inside larger Islamic intellectual traditions rather than through a sustained movement insisting that the Qur’an alone was sufficient as the sole source of religious authority. The earlier Qur’an-centered tendencies had either disappeared, been absorbed into broader theological traditions, or survived in substantially transformed forms.

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Sources:

1. Hüseyin Hansu — “Debates on the Authority of Hadith in Early Islamic Intellectual History: Identifying al-Shafi‘i’s Opponents in Jimaʿ al-ʿIlm” https://avesis.istanbul.edu.tr/yayin/84c32c65-c334-4c7e-9a30-85267d7cd5b4/debates-on-the-authority-of-hadith-in-early-islamic-intellectual-history-identifying-al-shafiis-opponents-in-jima-al-ilm

2. Abdul Karim Ali — “Anti-Hadith: Rujukan Kepada Kitab Jima' al-'Ilm” — Jurnal Usuluddin, University of Malaya https://mojc.um.edu.my/index.php/JUD/article/view/3761

3. Hannah-Lena Hagemann — The Kharijites in Early Islamic Historical Tradition: Heroes and Villains https://academic.oup.com/edinburgh-scholarship-online/book/42718

4. Clifford Edmund Bosworth — “Kharijites in Persia,” Encyclopaedia Iranica https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/kharijites-in-persia/

5. Abdulhameed Majeed Ismael Al Sheesh — “Dirar ibn Amr’s Understanding of Hadith in His Kitab al-Tahrish” https://doaj.org/article/f79800f274a04829aefee5aaa0e93c9e

6. Abdulhamid Al-Sheesh & Abdelsalam A. M. Abu Samha — “Dirar ibn Amr between the People of Hadith and Ahl al-Kalam” (2025) https://qspace.qu.edu.qa/handle/10576/63234

7. Adam Gaiser — “The Kharijites and Contemporary Scholarship,” Oxford Bibliographies in Islamic Studies https://academic.oup.com/reference/62361/reference-article-abstract/554573165

8. Keith Lewinstein, “The Azāriqa in Islamic Heresiography” — Cambridge Core www.cambridge.org/core/journals/bulletin-of-the-school-of-oriental-and-african-studies/article/abs/azariqa-in-islamic-heresiography1/67410490930463A35628DA90F5D5E723

9. Keith Lewinstein, “The Azāriqa in Islamic Heresiography” — DOI doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X00014774

10. Keith Lewinstein, “The Azāriqa in Islamic Heresiography” — JSTOR www.jstor.org/stable/619134

11. Al-Shāfiʿī’s Contribution to Ḥadīth — PDF core.ac.uk/download/429732896.pdf

12. Journal of Islamic Law and Culture — Article discussing rajm and the Azāriqa www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1528817X.2012.733132

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Update:

Part 2:

• https://www.reddit.com/r/Quraniyoon/comments/1vqk71q/history_of_the_quran_only_movement_part_2_from/

This meme was made in response to this argument of Yasir Qadhi which he said in front of camera:

• https://www.reddit.com/r/progressive_islam/comments/1jo156o/to_the_sunni_shia_mutazilie_other_sect_followers/

• More recent thread that got me to make this meme: https://www.reddit.com/r/MuslimAcademics/comments/1voltqi/why_did_every_early_scholar_understood_the/

Full lecture: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GBcdKwin0qE (he starts talking about the consensus at 51:11 minutes)

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Notice that in this meme I wrote that “when speaking in front of camera” because Yasir Qadhi did try to address this issue off camera. I've written about it in this comment.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was not a Quranist himself, and I don't think there's any reason to pretend that he was. But whether he intended it or not, the transformation he carried out in Turkey created an environment in which Quranist thought could eventually emerge and develop.

When Atatürk established the Republic, he radically dismantled the old religious institutions. The caliphate was abolished in 1924, the madrasas and religious courts were closed, and the traditional religious establishment lost much of its institutional authority. At the same time, the new Republic placed religious affairs under the state through the Diyanet and pushed Turkey toward a modern, secular educational system.

But one of the most interesting parts of this transformation was the emphasis on making the Qur'an accessible to Turkish people in their own language. In the 1920s, the Republic commissioned a Turkish Qur'an translation and tafsir, and Turkish translations of the Qur'an became increasingly available. This was significant because it made it much easier for ordinary Turkish Muslims to engage directly with the Qur'an rather than relying exclusively on traditional Arabic-language scholarship and inherited religious institutions.

Atatürk obviously did not do this with the intention of creating Quranism. In fact, the official Qur'an commentary commissioned by the Republic was written by Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, a traditional Sunni scholar. But the long-term consequence was that Turkey developed a population that was increasingly educated, literate and capable of engaging with the Qur'an directly in Turkish, while the traditional religious establishment no longer possessed the same authority it had under the Ottoman system. And several decades later, something very interesting happened.

In the 1970s, Hüseyin Atay emerged as one of the earliest major Turkish thinkers to argue for a much more Qur'an-centered understanding of Islam. He questioned the authority traditionally given to hadith, later scholarship and inherited jurisprudence, arguing for the centrality of the Qur'an and reason. He also produced his own Turkish Qur'an translation.

Then came Yaşar Nuri Öztürk, who was a student of Atay and helped take these ideas to a mass audience. His books and television appearances made Qur'an-centered reformism enormously popular in Turkey. He challenged many traditional interpretations and repeatedly emphasized returning to the Qur'an itself.

And eventually you get Edip Yüksel, who went further toward an explicitly Quran-only position. After encountering Rashad Khalifa's ideas in the 1980s, Yüksel rejected the authority of hadith altogether and became one of the most prominent advocates of the Qur'an Alone position.

Atatürk was not a Quranist. Atatürk wanted to secularize and modernize Turkey, but the intellectual space created by his revolution eventually gave birth to the the Quran-only movement that exists in Turkey today.

He has very unorthodox takes on a lot of subjects (like covering the hair isn't mandatory for women, there's no coming of Imam Mahdi & no second coming of Isa/Jesus AS, there's no death penalty for apostasy, no stoning for adultery, women can lead men in prayer and so on) and because of that he faces heavy criticism from the mainstream traditionalist ulama. What do you think of his views?

Translation of the vocal narration:

Muslim sister, a young Muslim woman testifies, saying that she was offered, along with other young Muslim women, the opportunity to sign a resolution declaring it permissible for Muslim women in Bosnia and Herzegovina to remove the zar. And that the zar has nothing to do with Islam.

She says, “At the mere thought of signing it, the blood in my veins froze. Where would I, she says, sign it? And thereby betray Allah, the Almighty, and betray the religion of Islam?”

But today, we are quite often being told that the zar was imported, that it came from the Arabs in the last few years, and that someone imposed it upon our beautiful tradition, a tradition that supposedly had no memory of the zar and feredža.

Well then, what were our grandmothers? From which Arab country did they bring, or import, this custom of the zar and feredža? And they were not ashamed of it at the time. And rightly so, a grandmother can say that when communism came, and it became forbidden for a Muslim woman to cover her face when she went outside her home, they remained in their homes until their appointed time came.

She could rightfully come on the Day of Judgment and be asked, “So why did you squander that trust?” “I did not want to leave my home, so that I would not bring shame upon my family, nor my honor, nor my Islamic identity.”

And yet today those same granddaughters and great-granddaughters go out as they do, and follow the fashions of the West, which truly does not wish us well.

We must be capable of finding ways to preserve our tradition.

>Note on terminology: The labels "Revisionist" and "Pluralist / Radical Revisionist" are used in a descriptive and academic sense, referring to approaches that revisit, reinterpret, and expand traditional understandings of Islamic texts and jurisprudence. These terms are not intended as negative labels or to imply that these perspectives are less authentic or less Islamic; they simply describe different interpretive approaches.

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Extremely Traditional/Conservative

Death penalty for apostasy: yes

Stoning for adultery: yes

Instrumental music: haram

Drawing living animals/humans and creating statues: haram (all forms of casual drawing prohibited, including stylized cartoons, silhouettes, stick figures, and incomplete figures with omitted facial features or body parts) | permitted only in cases of unavoidable necessity

Gender segregation: heavily required

Hijab: mandatory

LGBTQ:

• Homosexual feelings: not sinful (but to be resisted)

• Act of homosexuality (i.e. same-sex sexual relationships): haram

• Punishment of homosexuality: death

• Gender identities: rejected

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Very conservative

Death penalty for apostasy: yes

Stoning for adultery: yes

Instrumental music: haram

Drawing living animals/humans and creating statues: haram (unless there is a genuine necessity or educational need) | Casual drawing prohibited; even stylized or incomplete figures, such as cartoons with omitted facial features or missing body parts, are avoided

Gender segregation: required

Hijab: mandatory

LGBTQ:

• Homosexual feelings: not sinful (but to be resisted)

• Act of homosexuality (i.e. same-sex sexual relationships): haram

• Punishment of homosexuality: death penalty, or taʿzīr

• Gender identities: rejected

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Conservative

Death penalty for apostasy: yes

Stoning for adultery: yes

Instrumental music: haram (according to some only duff or drum allowed in casual nasheeds or songs, but other instruments are prohibited)

Drawing living animals/humans and creating statues: haram | However, casual drawing is permitted if rendered incomplete, e.g. omitting facial features, replacing eyes with Arabic letters, or drawing a head without a neck/body, as in the FreeQuranEducation YouTube channel animation style

Gender segregation: preferred

Hijab: mandatory

LGBTQ:

• Homosexual feelings: not sinful

• Act of homosexuality (i.e. same-sex sexual relationships): haram

• Punishment of homosexuality: taʿzīr or death penalty

• Gender identities: rejected

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Moderate traditional

Death penalty for apostasy: no

Stoning for adultery: no

Instrumental music: halal

Drawing living animals/humans and creating statues: halal

Gender segregation: not necessary

Hijab: mandatory

LGBTQ:

• Homosexual feelings: not sinful

• Act of homosexuality (i.e. same-sex sexual relationships): haram

• Punishment of homosexuality: none

• Gender identities: transgender may be accepted under conditions; other gender identities are rejected

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Contextualist

Death penalty for apostasy: no

Stoning for adultery: no

Instrumental music: halal

Drawing living animals/humans and creating statues: halal

Gender segregation: not necessary

Hijab: not mandatory

LGBTQ:

• Homosexual feelings: not sinful

• Act of homosexuality (i.e. same-sex sexual relationships): haram

• Punishment of homosexuality: none

• Gender identities: transgender could be accepted under conditions; other gender identities generally rejected

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Revisionist

Death penalty for apostasy: no

Stoning for adultery: no

Instrumental music: halal

Drawing living animals/humans and creating statues: halal

Gender segregation: not necessary

Hijab: not mandatory

LGBTQ:

There are two possibilities. It's either,

1️⃣

• Homosexual feelings: accepted

• Act of homosexuality (i.e. same-sex sexual relationships): accepted

• Punishment of homosexuality: none

• ⛔ Gender identities: only transgender accepted, other gender identities generally rejected ⛔

Or,

2️⃣

• Homosexual feelings: accepted

• ⛔ Act of homosexuality (i.e. same-sex sexual relationships): not accepted ⛔

• Punishment of homosexuality: none

• Gender identities: all accepted (transgender, non binary, gender fluid, agender, bigender, trigender, pangender, xenogender etc)

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Pluralist/Radical revisionist

Death penalty for apostasy: no

Stoning for adultery: no

Instrumental music: halal

Drawing living animals/humans and creating statues: halal

Gender segregation: not necessary

Hijab: not mandatory

LGBTQ:

• Homosexual feelings: accepted

• Act of homosexuality (i.e. same-sex sexual relationships): accepted

• Punishment of homosexuality: none

• Gender identities: all accepted (transgender, non binary, gender fluid, agender, bigender, trigender, pangender, xenogender etc)

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